Final Report

Review of the United Nations Strategic Framework 2017 – 2022

March 8, 2022

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List of Abbreviations

CSO	Civil Society Organizations
DSWG	Data and Statistics Working Group
DG	Donor Group
ERP	Emergency Response Plan
GWG	Gender Working Group
GoL	Government of Lebanon
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HDPN	Humanitarian–Development–Peace Nexus
HRWG	Human Rights Working Group
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organizations
LCRP	Lebanon Crisis Response Plan
LEA	Lebanon Emergency Appeal
LHDF	Lebanon Humanitarian & Development NGOs Forum
LHIF	Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum
MTR	Mid-term Review
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OMT	Operations Management Team
PMT	Program Management Team
PPSG	Political/peace and security/governance
RCO	Resident Coordinator's Office
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNSCOL	United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNSDCF	United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
UNSF	United Nations Stategic Framework
VNR	Voluntary National Review
WB	World Bank
WoLA	Whole of Lebanon approach

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Review Scope

As elaborated on the purpose of the review, the **scope** of the Final Review covered the internal and external barriers, enablers, modality of working and processes within the United Nations country team (UNCT), as well as the potential influence of the other collaboration mechanisms on the UNSF. It attempted to unpack all of those factors that influence and affect the transitioning into the new UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF), by addressing the question of what needs to change to ensure the new Framework works best to achieve its stated priorities.

Critically, the review did not address the new UNSDCF components and programmatic areas of focus. It focused on the current United Nations Strategic Framework (UNSF) programmatic areas to unpack the **relevance and coherence** dimension (by design and during implementation) to (a) study the synergies between the UNSF structure and others; (b) unpack the complementarity with the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) and how the dual system functioned; (c) examine the linkages with the 2030 Agenda, the peace priorities and LCRP (while capitalizing on the midterm review or MTR findings) and the Lebanon Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework (3RF) and Emergency Response Plan (ERP) to explore the humanitarian–development–peace nexus (HDPN); and (d) study how **effective** the cross-cutting issues are integrated. To that end, the review took stock of the achievements across those areas based on the reported outcomes of the UNSF Joint Workplan. In addition to the desk review, it ran an extensive consultation to unpack this aspect.

The review explored and assessed the enabling factors and bottlenecks identified in the strategy and MTR, namely: (a) UN-Intra Coordination mechanisms, (b) the operations/Service Management, (c) the communication mechanisms and (d) the financing schemes. This is critical for the assessment of the **relevance and efficiency** of the coordination.

The review further assessed the external enablers categorized at two levels: (a) international and (b) national levels. At the international level, the review primarily

looked at the partnerships established to gear the UNSF, the Coordination mechanisms and platforms with those partners and the resources and fundings schemes that fed into the strategic framework. At the national level, the review explored the Coordination mechanisms with the state and non-state actors. Typically, this covers the capacity of the Government of Lebanon (GoL) and that of the non-state actors (civil society, among others), the GoL plans and priorities, the financing schemes available, among others.

1.2 Review Objectives

The overall **purpose** of the UNSF Final Review was:

- To support greater learning about what works, what does not and why in the context of the UNSF. The Final Review will provide important information for strengthening programming and results at the country level, specifically informing the planning and decision-making for the next UNSDCF and for improving United Nations coordination at the country level.

The objectives of the Final Review were:

- to assess the contribution and engagement made by the UNCT in the framework of the UNSF in implementing the **"Whole of Lebanon approach"** as a HDPN to national results through evidence-based decision making (accountability).
- to identify the factors that have affected the UNCT's contribution, answering the question of why the performance is as it is and explaining the enabling factors and bottlenecks, including based on the recommendations of the MTR (learning).
- To identify the extent to which the UNCT has effectively integrated cross-cutting issues, including data, LGBTIQ+, human rights and gender equality, throughout its implementation of the UNSF.
- to provide actionable recommendations for improving the UNCT's contribution, especially for incorporation into the new UNSDCF. These recommendations should be logically linked to the conclusions and draw upon lessons learned identified through the Final Review.

Given the scope and the strategic nature of the UNSF, the review was designed and undertaken at the strategic level, and hence it did not delve much on the extent to which the UNSF outcomes and outputs were achieved.

1.3 Review Methodology

This Review included a meta-analysis of the relevant reviews, data collected, and documentation to date in accordance with the scope. Findings from the documents were mapped against the review questions and thematically coded. Evidence was corroborated across documents and cross-validated with stakeholder consultations. Where there was limited availability of documented data to help answer the review questions, questions were developed to gather primary data from Key Informant Interviews (KII) and validated across stakeholder groups. Data was synthesized and triangulated to answer the review questions.

1.31 Data Collection, Methods and Sources

The data collection comprised a blended meta-analysis approach relying on both a desk review and a consultation process.

1.32 Meta-assessment and analysis

The following documents were systematically reviewed and categorized thematically, analysed and synthesized to help answer the review questions. Documents were mapped against the evaluation questions and thematically coded. Evidence was corroborated across documents and cross-validated with each other.

1.33 Consultations

The consultation was run with key UNSF stakeholders within the UN system, the Government of Lebanon and other national stakeholders (NGOs and private sector), as well as with partners, the donor community and international NGOs working in Lebanon through online platforms (Microsoft Teams, Skype, emails). Preliminary findings and insights from the document review were validated through the stakeholder interviews. Where there were gaps in the data, questions were developed to collect primary data from the stakeholder groups. Semi-guided interview questionnaires were developed for the different stakeholder groups on the basis of the key review questions, judgement criteria and related indicators.

The Canadian Leaders in International Consulting Inc (CLIC) team held 24 consultations, in addition to the ongoing consultations with the RCO team.

1.4 Limitations

- Timeframe allocated for the review over a period of 3 months coinciding with the year-end holidays, did not match with the level of efforts needed for similar scope.
- In addition to the timeframe, the restriction on travel and mobility imposed by the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic has limited any sort of face-to-face engagement. All consultations with the stakeholders took place online. Longer interactions with stakeholders and on-site observations were limitations of the review.
- Information was sometimes hard to reach due to the lack of consistent data collection, monitoring, reporting and tools to track progress of the UNSF from conceptualization through to implementation.
- Inability to access the former RC, whose mandate was conceiving and implementing the UNSF until he left in 2020, staff turnover over the years, coupled with lack of documentation to cover the period of the previous RC mandate, left some background information limitations.
- Excluding the other inter-agency framework from the review limited the Review Team from exploring the areas of convergence and divergence and the implications on the UNSF from both the programme and inter-agency coordination fronts.
- As a consequence, the Review Team (RT) had to balance between the breadth over depth of the scope. Expectations for those who seek deep dive explorations in certain aspects might not be met.
- Despite a series of follow up, the RCO succeeded in convening only one consultation meeting to which more than 20 government officials were invited to provide input. While this reflects the weak ownership from the side of the government, it also provided limited insights.
- It was not possible to meet all stakeholders on the stakeholder map as individuals were unavailable due to a variety of reasons (i.e., holidays, health, schedules, etc.).

2.0 Country Context and Key Challenges

The refrain that "Lebanon before October 2019 is not the Lebanon of 2022" is a common understanding across the country. A number of factors in Lebanon's turbulent history have influenced and compounded on one another leading to the current economic and political crisis. Since gaining its independence in 1943, Lebanon has faced numerous civil conflicts, including a 15-year civil war, the presence of Syrian troops and occupation by Israeli forces as well as numerous acts of violence and wars. More recently, the assassination of the former Prime Minister in 2005 catalyzed the breakdown and ushered in a period of constant conflicts and challenges that Lebanon currently finds itself in. Clearly, regional events did not help in fostering stability: the pressure of the Syria crisis, the ongoing wars in the region, the regional economic crisis, and the results of the Arab Spring have all been contributing factors.

The war with Israel in 2006 led to massive destruction of key infrastructure and major population displacement, impacting the country for several years. As a result, the Security Council expanded the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon' (UNIFIL), adopting UNSCR 1701. In 2007, protests by political parties paralyzed the country and led to the suspension of Parliament. In 2008, the country came close to a civil war. In 2011, Prime Minister Saad Hariri's Government was toppled due to its support to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon investigating his father's death. In the same year, the Syrian war begins flooding Lebanon with refugees, and in 2012, Hezbollah entered the war in Syria. From 2012 to 2015, extremist suicide bombing campaigns caused major disruptions, death and destruction. In 2017, PM Hariri is forced to resign while in Saudi Arabia.

In 2019, the Government of Lebanon announced its inability to service its debt; Lebanon's public debt reached USD $91 billion, one of the highest public debts in the world as it constitutes over 170% of GDP.[1] Lebanon had found itself in this situation due to a number of internal mismanagements, including chronic overspending and borrowing, as well as external factors. More so, foreign currency shortages had far-reaching consequences. Lebanese banks announced that they were unable to pay back

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[1] IMF Communications Department, "Lebanon IMF Executive Board Concludes 2019 Article IV Consultation" (October 17, 2019) Press Release No. 19/378.

the deposits, triggering far and wide consequences to individual depositors, severely restricting the private sector's access to cash. The LCRP Situational Analysis describes it as a "Humanitarian Crisis within an Economic Crisis." The economic crisis exacerbated the poverty rate in Lebanon which increased to approximately 55% of the population below the poverty line, according to UNESCWA.

In 2020, Prime Minister Diab was appointed to replace Hariri after his failure to reach consensus on his agenda to appoint independent ministers, and COVID-19 became a global pandemic multiplying the burdens already felt in Lebanon. The first COVID-19 case was recorded in Lebanon in February, leaving the Ministry of Public Health with very limited options, with resources in short supply. COVID-19 hit hard at the same time as the country was experiencing shortages in regular medical and pharmaceutical supplies. Reports of hoarding, hedging, and black-market sales of subsidized medications were rampant in local media. COVID-19 contributed to an already contracting economy. In 2020, the tourism sector in Lebanon suffered tremendously and in 2021, according to the WB, it was the only sector in Lebanon that regained some of its health.

On August 4, 2020, the massive explosion in Beirut was felt across the country. The death toll was over 200 and over 6,500 people were injured. Over 300,000 people were immediately affected as they lost their homes. The location of the blast in the Port of Beirut and within the tourist sector of Beirut contributed to the economic downturn. The massive support of the donor community, the UN agencies as well as the local and international organizations was swift. A recent study estimates that the damage may have exceeded USD $4.6 billion[2]. The same study indicates that the overall impact on the social, urban, historical and economic life of Lebanon as a whole is yet to be understood. Thousands of jobs were also lost as many businesses were unable to recover.

The UN estimates that the private sector, in particular the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), employ 50% of the work force in Lebanon, which includes Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian refugees. The economic crisis, COVID-19, and the port explosion resulted in massive layoffs and many companies were unable to recover. Demand for their services was down. Many were unable to finance their companies as banks closed down their

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[2] Nassar K.C. & Nastacă C.C. Theoretical and Empirical Researchers in Urban Management; THE BEIRUT PORT EXPLOSION: SOCIAL, URBAN AND ECONOMIC IMPACT, Volume 16 Issue 3, August 2021

accounts and were unwilling to lend. There are some positive signs emerging recently, in particular, the growth of the informal sector which has provided new job opportunities to both host community members and refugees. More so, as restrictions linked to COVID-19 prevention are gradually lifted, the economy seems to be responding positively as per capita monthly income for all households had notably increased in 2021 compared to previous years[3]. However, at this early stage though their impact is yet to be measured. As a result of the lower purchasing power of the average Lebanese, some local companies are creating local alternatives using local products and production. There are also nascent companies attempting to fill the market demand for high-quality products.

An escalation of existing tensions along the Blue Line between Israel and Lebanon and a deteriorating domestic security situation, risk to offset any efforts to initiate a reform process. In this context, the emerging financial crisis and political instability in Lebanon since 2019 have put considerable strain on the security agencies, most notably LAF and ISF to maintain critical operational capabilities, as the sole legitimate security providers in Lebanon, including the South, where any void can be filled by non-state actors. LAF and ISF have emergency needs that need to be addressed, but long-term LAF and ISF capacity-building remains important to avoid a security void in the future.

Political Paralysis and Policy Vacuum

In a recent study addressing the factors contributing to Lebanon's political, economic, and social challenges, the World Bank Lebanon Economic Monitor highlighted the following factors "(i) (pre crisis) economic fundamentals; (ii) global conditions; and (iii) political/institutional environment"[4]. The WB, the IMF and others have stated that Lebanon's crisis is self-made, laying much of the blame on the political elites.

In order to address the systematic nature of many of Lebanon's economic woes, UN agencies, the international community and the NGO sector are hard pressed to work with the Government of Lebanon within a united strategic framework. A reluctance to do so comes from, as mentioned above, the governments prior failures to address these issues and a perception of the political elite as incapable and/or unwilling. More so, an

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[3]UNHCR, "VASyR 2021: Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon" (https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/vasyr-2021-vulnerability-assessment-syrian-refugees-lebanon-0)
[4] Lebanon's Crisis: Great Denial in the Deliberate Depression (worldbank.org)

overall framework engaging the government, linked to policy reform and sustainable change with improved government services is difficult to achieve. This is not a new challenge; the international community has been trying for almost two decades to assist the successive governments in Lebanon to deal with their reconstruction and reform challenges, budgetary and economic improvement and support the sustainable development of the country. Here is a list of some of these interventions:

| Intervention	Implementation Date	Achievement
Paris I	23 February 2001	500 million euros were raised in international aid.
Paris II	23 November 2002	4.2 billion Euros were raised (3.1 financial aid and 1.3 billion for projects).
Stockholm Conference	31 August 2006	was reconvened for the reconstruction of Lebanon after the war with Israel, close to 1.2 billion for reconstruction and rehabilitation.
Towards Paris III	25 January 2007	In preparation of the Paris III, it examined the need to: a) strengthen the state institution to exercise its sovereignty over the whole of Lebanon; b) assess Lebanon's sectoral, economic, and social needs) the macroeconomic and financial, focusing on debt management and support for the reform programme.
Paris III	January 2007	For its ambitious programme of development, which included major economic reform to stimulate growth, lower unemployment, reduce poverty and increase Lebanon's role in the WTO, among other commitments.[5]

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[5] The "Paris III Conference" and the reform agenda | Social Watch

Rome II Ministerial Conference	March 15, 2018	Under the auspices of the International Support Group for Lebanon, the chairmanship of the United Nations and the Government of Italy, "participants appreciated the need to accelerate and expand their assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces" as the only legitimate armed forces and security institution of Lebanon.
Conférence économique pour le développement par les réformes et avec les entreprises (CEDRE)	April 6, 2018	An international conference in support of Lebanon development and reforms, was hosted by France in Paris. The international community pledged USD11 billion towards the development of Lebanon's infrastructure and governance.

In 2018, the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies published an analysis titled Learning from Paris III. It examined State Reform in Lebanon and was published in preparation for the CEDRE. It provided the international community a road map for the type of reform that is possible given the significant political paralysis in the country: "For CEDRE, the international community's approach to designing the reform program must reflect the low capacity of the Lebanese state to enact reforms by focusing on enhancing administrative capacity in public service delivery in order to increase the likelihood of success". The study identified two important conclusions for real reform in the country: 1) High expectations of policy transformation requiring parliamentary approvals are almost impossible to achieve given the current political structure; and 2) Reform should be focused on the public sector and institutions of government that have constitutional basis to reform by decrees and/or resolutions invested in the ministry/department[6].

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[6] LCPS Policy Brief November 2018 "CEDRE Reform Program: Learning from Paris III Sami Atallah, Mounir Mahmalat, and Sami Zoughaib 2018 (lcps-lebanon.org)

The ongoing situation Lebanon finds itself in is best summarized by the World Bank in its 2022 report *Lebanon's Crisis: Great Denial in the Deliberate Depression*: "Lebanon's *deliberate depression* is orchestrated by the country's elite that has long captured the state and lived off its economic rents. This capture persists despite the severity of the crisis… it has come to threaten the country's long-term stability and social peace."[7] As the international community attempts to support the people of Lebanon in what is a very complex context, and according to the same report "*one of the top ten, possibly top three most severe economic collapses worldwide since the 1850s*", there are difficult challenges facing the recovery and rebuilding of the country.

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[7] Lebanon's Crisis: Great Denial in the Deliberate Depression (worldbank.org)

3.0 Main Findings

Since 2017, the UN has been guided by a UN Strategic Framework (2017-2022) to guide its priorities in the country. The study presents some key recommendations to reflect on based on its experience with the UN Strategic Framework as the UN plans to develop a new framework for its engagement in Lebanon.

The findings address the questions on the relevance, efficiency, and results of the UNSF as stipulated in the Terms of Reference of this Review.

1. Has the "Whole of Lebanon Approach" as a HDPN increased collaboration and met the pressing priorities of the country? And if not, why not?
2. What are the changes observed at national level, including changes in relevant statistical indicators and UNSF outcomes, and what is the UN's plausible contribution to these changes?
3. Have the synergies between UNCT agencies helped to achieve broader-based results and greater value for money than would have been the case, had the work been done individually?
4. To what extent has the UNCT effectively integrated cross-cutting issues?
5. Has the UNCT made the appropriate changes following the MTR of the UNSF? And if not, why not?

3.1 The Whole of Lebanon Approach

In the face of the multi-dimensional challenges that Lebanon was facing at the time of the UNSF 2017-2020 inception, a "Whole of Lebanon Approach" was conceptualized and adopted, which consists of a common vision for the UN response in Lebanon to ensure the unity of purpose and the integration of UN strategies and interventions in advancing Lebanon's peace, stability and development. The approach also aimed to support Lebanon and its people on the path to longer-term sustainable development in accordance with the vision, principles and goals of the 2030 Agenda.

The Whole of Lebanon Approach is an overarching, integrated approach with the intention to support 'a secure, stable and prosperous Lebanon, exercising full sovereignty while respecting, protecting and ensuring the rights of all'[8]. It calls for bringing together the expertise, capacities, and resources of the UN to deliver as one, which was to be in line with what later, in 2018, was articulated under the United Nations Development System Reform[9] agenda.

Adopting this approach through an elaborate multi-stakeholder consultation process[10], received strong support from the Government of Lebanon, as well as the international community working in the country, which saw in the approach an opportunity to address the impacts of the protracted conflicts and the Syria crisis.

During its inception, the UNSF was designed with the mind-set that it is a much-needed space for bringing together the UN system in Lebanon to discuss strategic priorities and common understanding of the political and development challenges facing the UN in delivering its mandate in Lebanon. The declared overarching goal was articulated in the UNSF document to address three interconnected and "core" priorities, which, at the time, constituted fundamental prerequisites for long-term stability and prosperity, and which provided the overall strategic framework for assistance. The UNSF was later revised in early 2021 to reflect the changing context to focus on four "core" priorities.

The review referred to the UNSF results matrix, the annual reports and their annexes, the results of the MTR, and the consultations with the stakeholders to:

- Examine the extent to which the UNSF was able to galvanize support around progress towards the SDGs and achieving the core priorities outcomes; and

- Assess key factors that hindered achieving the UNSF anticipated results, namely: (a) internal structural issues, (b) multiple coordination frameworks, (c) the premise of delivering as one, (d) partnerships, and (e) visibility and communication.

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[8] United Nations Strategic Framework for Lebanon 2017-2020 document. Page 3. https://lebanon.un.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/UNStrategicFrameworkLebanon2017-2020-021856.pdf
[9] https://d.docs.live.net/e2d312a63819b56c/Documents/WOLA%202.docx#_ftn1
[10] Annex 1: Summary of UNSF Consultation Process of the UNSF document. Page 56.

3.11 UNSF contribution to results

3.111 UNSF and the SDGs

Typically, a UN strategic framework is structured around a national development plan and roadmap. In the case of Lebanon, however, the effect of the absence of those two fundamental national documents affected SDG planning at the national, regional, and local levels.

During the UNCT retreat in October 2017 rolling out SDGs was set as a priority by the Lebanese government with an immediate objective to prepare for Lebanon's first Voluntary National Review (VNR) as part of delivering on Agenda 2030. It was also recommended that the UN engage with the Prime Minister's Office to share a proposal for SDG roll-out in Lebanon, including through the establishment of technical working groups (SDG Task Force, which was later dissolved). Many challenges have affected the roll-out of SDGs, exacerbated pre-crisis bottlenecks, and have hence compromised efforts towards strengthening national development. They are namely: deficiencies in data; weak institutional capacities; limited financing for SDGs (high debt level, high deficits, possible donor fatigue); insufficient cooperation and coordination among all stakeholders; including strong engagement from a fragmented civil society in Lebanon. These challenges were all present before the pandemic, the blast, or the stern economic crisis.

In 2018, the GoL presented its VNR with direct support from the UN to report on the status of the SDGs in the country and to prepare for an SDGs vision and a mid-term action plan. A national SDGs roadmap is yet to be published[11]; however, the individual plans of line ministries and municipalities do in fact reflect the contribution of sectoral programmes and projects to the progress towards the SDGs[12]. Nonetheless, the Review noted that:

- The siloed bilateral engagement with line ministries, while accounting for the relevant SDGs, undermined the holistic universal integration of the principles

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[11] With WHO support, a consultative process for developing the SDG 3+ GAP was completed, and the seven Accelerators were included in the national Road map developed for the SDG3+, focusing on its main determinants.
[12] In October 2021, WHO initiated the development of the National Health sector Strategy in line with SDG 2030, and expected to be finalised by June 2022

embedded in the 2030 Agenda, and the VNR national dialogue on SDGs did not translate into further development policy elaboration.

- The efforts to shift the focus toward any form of a "localized" approach to the SDGs, in line with the evolving discourse globally and in the region, were limited. There is no serious consideration so far to translate the results of the national SDGs consultations into tangible and active engagement in localization of SDGs.

- The donor community's appetite to engage in an SDG-driven policy discussion and financing mechanisms was weak, despite the global efforts on financing the 2030 Agenda implementation in countries with limited resources. This lack of appetite was the result of a government lacking leadership, competing pressing priorities related to the refugee crises among other contextual elements.

Overall, and up until 2019, the time of publishing the MTR, the SDGs process has not yet been internalized within the UNSF pillar groups. The MTR brought attention to the importance of ensuring inclusive, system-wide and integrated support to the national SDG process to avoid its fragmentation, to which no progress was made due to the absence of a national development plan and an SDG roadmap. From a UNSF implementation perspective, the UNSF annual report continuously aligned reported activities under each of the core priorities with respective SDGs; however, reporting on national progress towards the SDGs and 2030 Agenda featured lower on the list of priorities due to the aforementioned reasons.

The emphasis on SDGs' integration was later articulated in the text of the 3RF (though not a development document per se). Within the UNCT, there is currently a clear shift in the language towards 'going back to delivering' and 'reconnecting to' the 2030 Agenda. Still, there is no specific mention of the SDGs or Agenda 2030 in the reports of January, April, or October 2021 UNCT retreats, which reflects the heavy focus on recovering from the impacts of the consecutive crises as a first step towards development.

3.112 Delivering on Core Priorities: Changes Observed at the National Level

The Review explored all the UNSF available documentation and noted a new outcome was conceived and developed in 2021, but with neither financial nor programmatic data to include in this Review. Therefore, the analysis will focus on the three original Core

Pillar groups (Peace & Security, Governance and Political Stability and Socioeconomic Development)[13] instead of the currently endorsed four pillars, namely Political, Peace, Security and Governance (PPSG), Environment, Social and Economic.

The Review was not able to delineate the UNSF contribution to changes at the outcome levels over the last couple of years. Such limitation is attributed to the absence of the Joint Work Plans for the years 2020 and 2021, the financial resources made available to deliver the intended outcomes (as illustrated in Table 1), the UN annual report and its Annex (UNSF progress against results) as well as the limited reported data through the UNSF M&E system.

To that end, the Review acknowledges the findings of the MTR for the period covering 2017 through 2019 and makes clear reference to the UN Annual reports to reflect the key achievements and contributions to the UNSF priorities and pillars, while it does not provide an exhaustive account of each result. It utilizes a quick budget analysis[14] to further triangulate the findings.

Budgets are in Million USD	Pillar 1 (Peace & Security)	Pillar 2 Governance & Political Stability)	Pillar 3 (Socio-economic Development)	Totals
Indicative resources estimated upon inception required to reach the priorities	76.3	142.37	3,213.37	3,432.03
Ratio of Total estimated budget	2.2%	4.14%	93.6%	

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[13] It is worth noting that the Peace and Security Pillar is led by UNSCOL and UNDP), the Governance and political stability is led by UNDP and OHCHR, and the Socio-economic development pillar is led by UNICEF and WFP

[14] It is worth noting that the budget review was not a requirement by the Review. The Review Team used it to highlight the imbalance in focus by design and implementation across the three pillars, and to counter the prevailing argument that the focus has shifted during implementation.

Funds received in 2018-2020[15]	30.94	73.72	3,169.02	3,273.68
Ratio of Total received budget	0.95%	2.25%	96.8%	
Ratio (received/ estimated)	41%	52%	99%	

*Table 1: Distribution of estimated and disbursed budget over three pillars (2018-2020).
Ddd Source: UNSF Annual Report*

Examining the UNSF delivery on the core priorities as reflected in the three core pillars reveals that a lot of efforts were geared toward achieving the results associated with the provision of the socio-economic needs of and services to the increasingly vulnerable and less towards longer-term policy, governance, and development priorities, as will be elaborated later. It further unveils a systemic imbalance in focus stemming from the design through the implementation across the three pillars, tilted hugely toward the socio-economic development pillar. A closer look at the figures shows that nearly 6.4% of the total estimated required budget upon inception was dedicated to Pillars 1 and 2; while the disbursed accounts for less than 3.3% of the total received for the three pillars over the three years. Such a designed approach clearly counters any prevailing argument suggesting that the UNSF focus has shifted over the years to address eminent socio-economic issues. A more detailed breakdown of the budget per year is provided in Table (2).

[15] Those figures were drawn from the Annual reports and cover only the 3 years. The data for 2017 budget was not disaggregated.

Budget (USD)/ years	Pillar 1 (Peace & Security)		Pillar 2 Governance & Political Stability)		Pillar 3 (Socioeconomic Development)		Totals (USD)
Year	Funds Received	% of total received	Funds Received	% of total received	Funds Received	% of total received	Total
2017	Not Broken Down by Pillar						
2018	9,250,340	1.0%	30,120,284	3.1%	921,863,348	95.9%	961,235,991
2019	6,300,000	0.6%	14,400,000	1.4%	1,020,000,000	98.0%	1,040,702,020
2020	15,384,951	1.2%	29,199,434	2.3%	1,227,159,126	96.5%	1,271,745,532
Total	30,935,291	0.9%	73,719,718	2.3%	3,169,022,474	96.8%	3,273,683,543

Table 2: Distribution of disbursed funds over the three pillars (2018-2020). Source: UNSF Document and Annual Reports.

When examining the **Core Priority 1 (*All people in Lebanon have peace and security)*****,** the Review could not confirm the UN's collective achievements at the national level (outcomes 1 and 2)[16] due to lack of reporting on the respective measures (2 out of 6 indicators of Outcome 1.2, and their breakdowns, have not been reported consistently throughout the years), as well as limited financial resources disbursed to deliver on this Core Priority (less than 1% of the total budget received/ disbursed on the three Pillars. In fact, the UNSF budget analysis clearly shows that only 41% (30.94 million USD) of the estimated required resources (76.29 million USD)[17] to deliver the three outcomes under Pillar (1) were disbursed and translated into action.

More specifically, the review could not establish, based on the reported data, the extent to which (a) the territorial integrity and security were strengthened (Outcome 1.1), and (b) the Lebanese authorities were better equipped to maintain internal security and law and order (Outcome 1.2)[18]. The reported measures show an increased tends in reporting on the municipality efforts to maintain security and reduce tensions (outcome indicators 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.3.1 and 1.3.2), but none of the indicators accounts for and clearly reflect the internal security and border integrity aspects. This is mostly due to

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[16] As for Outcome 1.3 there has been a consistent reporting against its indicators, which is not the case for outcomes 1.1 and 1.2

[17] Estimated in the UNSF Document (Section 8 of the UNSF 2017-2020)

[18] Inconsistent reporting (with gaps) against the respective indicators over the years.

how the outcomes were scoped and the way their indicators were crafted with less focus on the outcomes per se and more on the outputs.

The Review noted that most of the UN support to the Government of Lebanon translated into support to developing the legal and regulatory frameworks on internal security and municipal policing in line with Lebanon's international human rights obligations, reinforcing and building capacity to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and local authorities to enforce the law, improving the detention facilities and associated capacity, clearing Lebanon of mines and unexploded weapons, promoting local peacebuilding initiatives, managing social tensions and security incidents, among others. A detailed account of the deliverables and achievements of the UN efforts is available in the respective Annual UN Reports for the years 2017 through 2020. Besides, the evidence strongly suggests that the efforts at the sub-regional (municipal levels) have improved. In fact, an ascending trend (between 2017 and 2020) in how municipalities have institutionalized mechanisms to promote peace and prevent, mitigate and manage conflict within their communities has been reported in the UNSF Results Matrix and further elaborated in the UN Annual reports.

Nevertheless, these efforts should be further reinforced, and better measures should be used to reflect the prevailing security situation at the outcome level. In fact, they are contested when factoring in the consistent increase in the number of security violations within the communities associated with theft, homicide, and violence cases (including household and Gender-based), as reported by the Ministry of Interior (National Security Forces) and the national media outlets over the last four years. Similarly, it has highlighted over the last three years unprecedented cases of smuggling and violations across the borders despite the surveillance efforts by the Lebanese Security Forces and Army supported by the international community. Such prevailing conditions clearly signal that (a) the outcomes measures adopted at the UNSF strategic level lose in relevance when faced with reality, and (b) the Lebanese Security Forces and Army are in need of more in-kind resources, as well as stronger political empowerment by the government, to ensure the territorial integrity is reinforced and national security is maintained.

Internally within the UN, the consultations' findings show that one of the main successes of the UNSF concerning Core Priority 1 is the participation of peacekeeping in the UNCT collaborative work. Previously, UNIFIL was under a Peace and Development Agenda,

which served as a common platform for cooperation between UN actors in Lebanon[19]. The consultations prove that by including peace and security, the UNSF reflected a good platform to improve internal coherence and a unified front of the UN system. Despite not having a programme implementation arm, or being directly involved in the other pillars, UN Peacekeeping   supported the UNSF by providing the language for the document, through its interaction with the Lebanese Armed Forces, the authorities, and the civil society, and by coordinating with members of the International Support Group for Lebanon and the permanent members of the Security Council.

As far as the **Core Priority 2 (***Lebanon enjoys domestic stability and practices effective governance***)**, the Review findings could not establish the extent to which the UN efforts under the UNSF have contributed to improving the policy discourse and governance structures in Lebanon. Three main reasons are:

(a) inconsistent reporting on most of the respective indicators. In fact, 17 out of the 24 indicators identified to measure the progress/ achievement on outcomes 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 were inconsistently reported over the years[20] and;

(b) the scope of the interventions (focused more on policy reform, advocacy and dialogue), was not timely, given the deteriorating policy, governance, and political structure, associated with the political deadlock and policy paralysis. In such a context, any attempt to support institutional, policy, and reform issues, influencing national decision-making processes, shaping the administration of justice or the oversight capacity was perceived by those consulted as being out of context and ill-timed. The Review asserts that the complex context, the political stagnation (with two caretaker governments on board for more than 18 months in three years), and hence the lack of donors' readiness and priorities, have contributed to a 50% in the investment in Pillar (2) for the year of 2019 in comparison to 2018. In fact, the budget analysis (Table 2) also reveals that only

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[19] Since 2008 UNIFIL as an observer has participated in the UNCT work. In 2009 under Peace and Development Agenda an integrated approach was agreed, aimed at consolidating peace and development in Lebanon and four thematic Integrated Working Groups were established: Governance, Palestinian Issues, Human Rights and Regional Disparities and Borders. (ref. ISF for Lebanon 2011).

[20] 8 out of 11 indicators for Outcome (2.1), 7 out of 7 indicators for Outcome (2.2) and 2 out of 6 indicators for Outcome (2.3) were not reported consistently.

52% (73.72 million USD) of the estimated required resources (142.57 million USD)[21] to deliver the three outcomes under Pillar (2) was funded.

Due to the inconsistency and gaps in reporting, the Review could not establish the extent to which the UN collective and bilateral efforts under the UNSF were able to meet the targets set under Core Pillar (2). Nevertheless, the available evidence confirms that UN efforts to push forward the accountability and inclusion agenda have culminated into some key achievements, such as:

- The endorsement of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (based on the national efforts to endorse the Access to Information legislation) by the government in May 2020;

- The protection of human rights and access to justice, through expanding the provision of legal aid and counseling, detention centres, among others, that reached tens of thousands of people, including Syrian refugees, domestic workers, and prisoners;

- Support the execution of the Labour Force and Household Living Conditions Survey (LFHLCS) to generate quality data at a district (*caza*) level;

- Strengthen the capacities of partners (CSOs, NGOs, line ministries[22], among others) to promote gender equality;

- Critically, the evidence strongly suggests that the UN efforts to promote gender equality and eliminate gender-based violence have been gaining momentum through key achievements, namely: endorsing the national legislation on sexual harassment in the workplace (December 2020), and law 204/2020 (which amended law 293 on domestic violence), maintaining the Gender Focal Points within the government institutions at the same level and scale (achieving 54 FP out of the target 65), along with surging efforts to influence the gender-related policies (reporting 9 consultations targeting the parliamentary committees by the women machinery).

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[21] Estimated in the UNSF Document (Section 8 of the UNSF 2017-2020)

[22] Up until 2019. Since the end of 2019, there has been little opportunity to build the capacity of the ministries due to the prevailing political paralysis.

Data inconsistency, the multiple sources, and the limited disaggregation of the available data affected the utilization of the reporting against the UNSF **Core Priority 3 (***Lebanon reduces poverty and promotes sustainable development while addressing immediate needs in a human rights/gender sensitive manner***)**. The Review confirms that the Core Priority (3) covered the different sectoral needs and priorities as reflected in:

a) the breadth and depth of the interventions that extend to the diverse social needs and services, focusing on the vulnerable and those in need, including the refugees and the host communities, in addition to the environmental services including waste management and energy efficiency initiatives.

b) A scrutinized examination of the budget allocation and disbursement. In fact, the budget analysis clearly shows that more than 96.8% of the total UNSF budget (namely USD 3,273,683,543) was dedicated to delivering the three outcomes under Pillar (3).

Nevertheless, the Review could not establish the extent to which the UNSF contributed to reducing poverty at a time when the World Bank and ESCWA reported doubling poverty rates[23]. In fact, none of the core pillars indicators measures poverty, and the bulk of the indicators related to access are crude measures (count of people) with no clear denominators[24] reflecting systemic flaws in the UNSF result framework and its associated M&E system.

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[23] Further confirmed through the surveys of UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF that show an increase in vulnerability, food insecurity, etc...

[24] While acknowledging the lack of a census and sensitivity of the issue of population data in view of the mosaic of the societies and the political tensions, many of the indicators refer to some targeted communities (geographically and regionally bound). In these cases, it is advisable to use denominators extracted from the sets of records and surveys done in those areas (reference here is the databases of the Ministry of interior, and CAS) or rely on the most reliable estimates available. This is critical to put things in perspectives. In case this is not doable for the Lebanese communities given the sensitivities, there is no reason why it can't be done for the Syrian communities - since most of the indicators are broken down by nationality. Critically, supporting the local authority to sort out the "denominator" at the national (and sub-national) level should be a focus of the UN Development frameworks.

Under the productive sectors, inclusive growth, and local development (outcome 3.1), the Review noted that the interventions were focusing on the vulnerable refugees and host communities support in livelihood and employment, and less on additional institutional support as originally envisaged[25]. A similar emphasis was given to strengthening environmental governance (outcome 3.3) on areas related to municipal solid waste and developing institutional capacities to implement environmental agreements related to climate change. Besides, the UN efforts to improve equitable access and delivery to social services, social protection, and basic assistance (outcome 3.2) consumed the bulk of the budget allocated for Pillar (3), with the main focus on supporting the Lebanese public health, education, and water service capacities for improved access to health care, education opportunities and social services (including protection and gender equity) for vulnerable people with a focus on youth and women.

> " We do not have data for instance on the performance of the industrial sector, so it is difficult to really measure the progress. The same for the agricultural sector [...] The Central Administration of Statistics exists but is not sufficiently empowered. It does not have the needed personnel or resources."—An informant

With all these efforts in place, the impressive budget, and the reported achievements, the UNSF couldn't capture neither the sectoral outcomes nor the contribution toward the SDGs, despite the attempts to match the priorities with the SDGs. Evidently, the reasons behind such deficiency are related to:

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[25] Supporting the line ministries of Social Affairs, CAS and industry, as alluded to in the UN Annual report 2018, and ministry of Agriculture (UN Annual report 2020)

a. Weak monitoring, tracking and evaluation mechanisms, associated with fragmented implementation and diversification of the sources of input/data, and;

b. Absence of a national SDGs agenda and priorities, associated with limited and dwindling capacity within the government institutions to set and gear the sector efforts toward clear SDGs-oriented outcomes and targets.

" **Since there was no solid UNSF M&E framework, we [UN agencies] tended to focus on the agency's work and contribution to the SDGs."—An informant**

In addition to the core pillars, the UN has been responsive to the COVID-19 pandemic by launching the COVID-19 Lebanon Emergency Appeal (LEA), along with humanitarian partners in 2020. The Review could not establish direct linkages between the LEA and the UNSF and whether it was addressed as an inter-agency strategy/plan. Nevertheless, it confirmed that the LEA identified areas of humanitarian interventions that were led by WHO[26], and partially integrated in LCRP and the 3RF and the ERP, developed in late 2021) with the aim to protect the lives of those at risk due to the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly given the worsening socio-economic conditions they are experiencing. Under the WHO-led Country Preparedness and Response Plan, the UN supported the preparedness and response capacity of the Lebanese health system to cope with the COVID-19 emergency needs including reinforcing surveillance and expanding public hospitals capacity to provide COVID-19 patient care, raising public awareness, and promoting good hygiene practices while engaging national and local stakeholders. A detailed account of the LEA can be found in the 2020 Annual UN Report.

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[26] Country Preparedness Response Plan (CPRP) for Lebanon (Priorities 1 and 2), the 2020 LCRP (Priority 3)

3.12 Key factors that hindered achieving the UNSF anticipated results

3.121 UNSF's Integral Structural Issues

According to an OECD report[27], the Whole of 'Government' Approach was previously tested in Afghanistan, South Sudan, and Syria, and faced several challenges at the implementation level, including, but not limited to, effectively aligning divergent institutional interests, competing priorities, conflicts over funding and resources, and different approaches in working with local institutions and government actors.

Similarly, in the case of Lebanon, while the approach brought innovative thinking into the process of scaling-up the UN response in the country, it was faced with challenges at the design and implementation levels, hindering its premise to allow the UN to "Deliver as One" and to meet the pressing priorities of the country. Measured against the spirit and the commitments declared in the UNSF, the later guidelines of the UNDS reform, and the vision of the Whole of Lebanon Approach, the UNSF review and feedback from stakeholders' consultations revealed important insights that call for attention in future decision-making.

A Shifting country context and changes in internal UN guidance

The socio-economic and political challenges surrounding the UNSF existed before its initiation. A malfunctioning social contract, political tensions, economic bottlenecks, lagging social protection and services, coupled with an unprecedented Syria crisis, set the scene for the UN strategy in Lebanon and dictated the priorities at the time.

Soon after the launch of the framework, however, the political situation escalated leading to civil demonstrations and further deterioration of the socio-economic situation threatening the social stability in the country. The COVID-19 pandemic hit right after, followed by the Beirut Port explosion, and the total breakdown of the financial and banking systems. As a result of these events, the focus of the international community in Lebanon shifted towards supporting the new emerging response frameworks (e.g. the flash appeal, 3RF, ERP, etc.) therefore altering the direction of the UN effort away

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[27]Responding to Refugee Crises in Developing Countries, OECD (2017). https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/responding-to-refugee-crises-in-developing

from UNSF development priorities to respond and adapt to the catastrophic situation that resulted.

Against this backdrop, the government has constantly been the absent partner throughout the implementation of the UNSF. The government signing off on the UNSF was perceived by UN actors in decision-making roles, as an act of formality with no meaningful sense of ownership. The role of the GoL in gearing/steering the process has not been assumed due to these challenges, but also, due to UNSF's coordination structure that does not have a steering committee that includes a government seat, as will be brought up later in this Review. The findings confirm, however, that while the central government did not engage, line ministries and regional authorities were engaged on a bilateral agency-ministry basis, but often inconsistently. This siloed bilateral approach, although reflecting commitment at the technical level, lacked the political support needed to shield the UNSF from fragmentation.

Internally, and as early as October 2017, profound shifts under the UN system reform[28] agenda were announced, affecting expectations on how the UN delivers and functions. A new reinvigorated role was assigned to RCs around the world, followed by introducing the HDP nexus holistic approach.

Due to the emerging, and often competing, priorities and areas of focus, and as a result of these recurrent shocks, shifts and changes, both internally and externally, the UN effort in Lebanon fell short of answering the requirements of the Whole of Lebanon Approach in integrating response strategies and the UNSF's ambition to 'Deliver as One'.

The contextual changes, coupled with an unyielding structure, rendered the UNSF "irrelevant" and "unresponsive," as dubbed by many of its stakeholders during consultations, stressing the importance of a new country framework that is pertinent to the agreed-upon need to link back with the development priorities, while at the same time responding to the present-day urgent needs.

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[28] More on UNDS Reform is available on: https://reform.un.org/content/development-reform

The Humanitarian, Development and Peace continuum within the UNSF

The strategy of engagement for each of the three core priority areas of the UNSF articulates the expected strategic outcomes over the five years of UNSF implementation. The focus on both peace and stability, and development is properly aligned with the outcomes stipulated in the LCRP. Under its results matrix and in its joint work plans, the UNSF creates the HDP linkages, shows interconnectivity, and reflects the continuum by mapping out activities and indicators included in both the UNSF and the LCRP.

As such, the UNSF had well-designed outcomes that reflect the spirit of the HDP nexus when referring to the LCRP until 2019 and then the ERP, 3RF and LCRP following 2021, even before the term HDP was streamlined within the UN literature and became the embodiment of this overarching comprehensive approach to reduce humanitarian needs, risks and vulnerabilities of the people of Lebanon by working towards 'collective outcomes' and address HDP priority areas. The strategic outcomes properly articulate the humanitarian–development–peace continuum, which trickles down to the level of the outputs, activities and indicators.

That being said, the UNSF, sound as it may be from a design perspective, endured multifaceted challenges during its implementation, including:

- **Formalization of the HDP nexus and the need for a CCA:** in 2020, operationalizing the HDP nexus was formalized, as part and parcel of the support to achieving Agenda 2030 in countries affected by a crisis, a disaster or a conflict. The Cooperation Framework for Implementation companion piece stresses the need for a Common Country Analysis (CCA) in such a context in order to provide a comprehensive and integrated analysis of the situation, and address the root causes of crises, current and emerging risks, and vulnerabilities at all levels. Until the time of carrying this review, Lebanon did not have an updated CCA which accurately describes the current situation. The absence of an updated CCA makes it challenging for the UN team in Lebanon to operationalize the HDP nexus, although in spirit, the UNSF does reflect the HDP continuum as seen above. To note that for the UN at the country level, the most significant framework for advancing the UN Agenda 2030 is the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF). Lebanon will design a new UNSDCF in 2022, aiming for its implementation by 2023. Ahead of this process, a UN CCA will be undertaken in Q4 of 2021 and Q1 of 2022, covering all pillars

of UN concern in the country and is expected to be updated at least annually. Evidence of following up on the HDP nexus operationalization tools was lacking, whether through desk review or stakeholder consultations. There is more room as well for improved messaging and communication on the HDP concept, its link to the CCA, joint programming, and funding and financing. The Review showed that there is a lack of common understanding of what the HDP nexus is, what it means to actors' day-to-day work, and that actors are not familiar with how it could successfully operate.

- **Balancing the humanitarian-development-peace continuum under the UNSF and the LCRP:** the UNSF reaffirmed the humanitarian principles as stipulated under the LCRP in relation to the impact of the Syria crisis on Lebanon and the needs of the Syrian refugees, as well as those of the host communities. It declared that "the UNSF and UN support for the LCRP […] is outlined in the UNSF. The LCRP and UNSF are thus fully aligned and complementary"[29]. LCRP outputs are listed mostly under the third outcome of the UNSF, and in reality, balancing results between the three outcomes faced major challenges in terms of double reporting to both the UNSF and the LCRP, joint work, coordination, and acquiring funding as seen above.

Annual reporting on UNSF achievements was done jointly and combined results from both the UNSF and LCRP in line with the aforementioned UNSF results matrix; however, the consultations with stakeholders reflected the kind of difficulties faced while trying to work jointly to cover both the humanitarian and the longer-term development aspects of a programme. It was expressed that "initially there was confusion and resistance towards combining both lenses, since each articulates its goals differently, uses different timeframes and tools, and focuses on different parts of the response process. But eventually, an agreement was reached to work with the same tools and activities but remain clear on what is humanitarian and what is development"[30].

Due to the ever-growing humanitarian needs and the constant attention of the international community to support them, activities included under the LCRP

[29] UNSF Document. Page 10.
[30] Key Informant Interviews

received the lion's share of funding, the uninterrupted, yet understandable, attention of the UN agencies working predominantly on implementing the activities of the LCRP under the third output of the UNSF.

As noted by the examination of UNSF outcomes' delivery, including outputs implemented under the LCRP, and as stated by many actors during the KIIs, UNSF's identity and visibility remained limited. UN agencies continued to focus more on the humanitarian/recovery component of the HDP nexus and focused less on the long-term development priorities.

● **Lack of financing modalities**: Financing instruments are key to the successful implementation and operationalization of UNSF strategic outcomes. The review shows that the UNSF had no dedicated financial instrument or a "collective budget" to support its implementation.

Lebanon Development Aid Tracker, which is the tool that provides the government with real-time information by the UN and donor partners on aid flows coming into Lebanon, gives quarterly updates on reported available funds and known future/expected commitments to Lebanon. The Tracker includes multiple corporations' frameworks (LCRP and GCFF before 2019, then LCRP, COVID-19 appeal, 3RF, and ERF as of 2020) but does not include the UNSF as a framework targeted with funding.

There is a clear stress by stakeholders on the need for a more targeted funding and financing of programmes and projects, as well as joint programmes, which could contribute to further support to the UNSF agenda; otherwise, the UNSF will have no power or "clout" to deliver its results. In answering what drives the collaboration among the UN agencies, there was a consensus among key informants that resources are usually the main driver, while the UNDS Reform guidelines and the 'interest' of the individual agencies are reinforcing factors. Equally, there is a need to understand how the dedicated RCO budget is supporting the joined-up efforts to deliver as one.

3.122 The effects of the multiple co-existing coordination frameworks

As seen, the implementation of the UNSF was already meeting multiple challenges, including the heavier weight of the LCRP versus the other components of the UNSF, the

Covid-19 Strategic response plan in 2020 amidst a severe financial crisis, the 3RF in 2020 as a response to the Beirut explosion, followed by Lebanon's ERP in 2021. Thus, over the period of 2017–2021, all UN agencies in Lebanon, to varying extents, had to deliver under those frameworks in parallel, in one way or another.

While every framework serves a different purpose and responds to different needs, a quick comparison between the set priorities identified by the UNCT for 2021 and those listed under the other frameworks reveals an overlap in activities, despite the varying scopes. This overlap, and sometimes duplication, made it hard for UN actors to keep up and use resources efficiently, let alone deliver as one.


Figure 1: Mapping the different concurrent interagency coordination frameworks over scope and time

> **In contexts where the humanitarian community have a multi-year humanitarian plan (usually covering a two-to-four-year period), it is even more critical for partners, in particular those working across the HDP equation, to engage with humanitarian actors to identify the areas where development action can be critical to reduce acute and chronic vulnerabilities and needs, address the root causes and support strengthening public service provision through national or local structures. (HDP Cooperation Framework Companion Piece- May 2020)**

3.123 The premise of 'Delivering as One'

The introduction of the new UNDS Reform guidelines for the UN to 'Deliver as One' required a defined collective UN identity and a substantial cultural shift in the way the UN agencies function and deliver. A history of territorial and competing mandates, coupled with limited resources, and an extremely challenging country context, hindered the transformation required to achieve the 'New Way of Working' to 'Deliver as One'. The call for a joined-up approach was a recognition that mandates are different; however, this diversity should not be a barrier to integration and coordination, to 'Leave No One Behind' and address all vulnerabilities regardless of the targeted population.

UNDS Reform guidelines defined in 2018 a new and reinvigorated role for the RC and gave it convening capacities within the UN that require strong leadership to galvanize support around Agenda 2030, deliver a collective response and support the host country in meeting national priorities and needs, accelerating progress towards the SDGs.

The Review found that, measured against success criteria defined in those guidelines, and with all limitations and challenges considered, these requirements were not fully met during the course of the UNSF life. The UNSF could have benefited from enhanced leadership to identify opportunities for partnerships and access to new sources of financing in support of the development agenda. The UNSF did not result in a clear-cut identifiable progress on the development agenda, or enhanced ownership by the Government of Lebanon, or managed to show the discipline needed to act and support the country as one.

> **In double- and triple-hatted contexts, the RC/HC coordinates the work of the UNCT/HCT, ensuring close collaboration across humanitarian, development and, where relevant, peace action to deliver results (MAF, 3.1 Leadership of UN development activities, p 11).**

The consultations also showed that in reality, not all UN actors shared a common understanding or interest in the "New Way of Work" and the importance of operationalizing the HDP nexus, which led to weakening the UNSF and negatively affecting the UNCT accountability to the RC to deliver as one.

More recently, during the April 2021 retreat, the UNCT reiterated the importance of working jointly based on the newly defined priorities and coordination structures and to further the implementation of the HDP nexus. As a result of the retreat, a number of opportunities for potential joint programmes were identified to scale up UN support in the strategic priority areas, specifically environmental governance and support to Lebanon's business environment. The UNCT made sure that almost all priority areas are being addressed jointly, whether through already existing joint programmes or other forms of formal or ad-hoc collaboration. A list of nine suggested joint programmes was agreed upon, identifying which UN agencies would be involved. An elaborate Joint Programme document template was developed by the RCO to operationalize the implementation of the proposed joint programmes. The Review, however, could not assess the effectiveness and efficiency of these programmes since they have only recently been launched (2021).

3.124 Partnerships

Partnership with the donor community

The Review found high commitment on the side of donors to support the work of the UN in Lebanon. It is noted that the focus of the donors could be steered by how the UN defines and communicates priorities.

As far as donors were concerned, there was little to no reference to the UNSF as the overarching UN framework in the country and a lot of initiatives are taking place outside the framework; however, these initiatives may very well be in line with the objectives of the UNSF. Examples of these initiatives are the sectoral briefs, the work done by the Cash Taskforce in March 2021 on the Risk and Mitigation Measures Analysis of Dollarization of Humanitarian Cash Assistance, the issuance of key messages for the Lebanon Development forum, Reviewing the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Lebanon Recovery Fund, and the alignment of advocacy messages around engagement of the international community with the GoL regarding the commitments made at the CEDRE conference.

It was stated during donors' consultations that the discussions around the UNSF were minimal in the funding appeals, especially in the more recent years. More specifically, in order for the donor community to help support development through the UNSF, it is important to improve the UN's advocacy and communication on its strategic direction with the donors.

It is evident for donors, especially after the Beirut explosion, that there is a welcomed willingness on the side of the UN to improve engagement in response. The concern of the donor community now is less in the visibility of the UNSF, and more in the need for strengthened leadership from the UN side to present a unified front on key priorities and update their framework (when warranted) to match new realities. Despite acknowledgement from donors who are familiar with the UNSF that the core priorities are all still relevant, the longer-term development aspects are much harder to achieve under the current circumstances.

Multiple donors expressed that the main framework that they are engaged in and supporting is the LCRP. There is no evident awareness of how the two frameworks are interconnected or how their expected outcomes are aligned. More specifically, since the inclusion of the support and recovery of host communities' elements into the LCRP, the common understanding became that the LCRP is doing a lot more than being solely humanitarian.

On joint programming, the Review found that donors are keen on harmonizing programming; however, there is hesitation on the part of some donors to fully support joint programming especially among UN agencies that do not have similar mandates. That being said, coordination and common modalities of implementation are areas that donors could get behind.

There has been a common consensus among the donor community on the following:

- Leadership on the UN side to bring the reform agenda forward, specifically through common analysis and the use of a well-defined vulnerability approach to aid.
- Address internal conflicts and clarify how the UN (RC/H) collaborate on decision-making to increase efficiency and improve joint programming.
- Resolve the multitude of frameworks, which is endangering aid to Lebanon and risking accountability, by focusing on the principles of aid effectiveness in fragile states and putting accountability structures in place.
- For the new framework, there is a need to build on existing successes and expertise of each UN agency and partner to move forward.

Partnership with the INGOs and CSOs community

The Non-Governmental Organizations' community in Lebanon were consulted on the UNSF design and were dynamically engaged in implementing UN activities through bilateral cooperation with the individual UN agencies at both the national and regional levels, and actively participated in the working groups under the LCRP. While most NGOs are involved in the humanitarian response, some organizations work across the development sectors but noted there is no comprehensive understanding on how the UNSF and HDP Nexus is being implemented in Lebanon.

What applies to the donor community vis-à-vis the visibility of the UNSF applies as well to the INGOs and CSOs community. The overall perception is that the UNSF is a clear and well-articulated document, however, it has no clear implementation arm, and became rather 'irrelevant' considering the shifting national context and competition with multiple other frameworks that exist in parallel which are more actively funded and operated.

The findings show that the response under LCRP has 10 thematic sectors, each one has a WG, LHIF has 62 international NGOs, and the national forum LHDF, has about 75. There is a large number of NGOs working together at both the national and regional levels and all participate in working groups by project. LHIF and LHDF each have 3 seats on the HCT, with meetings taking place bi-weekly. This mechanism represents how the connection between INGOs and the HCT functions at the working level. This contribution, however, is not being portrayed or emphasized as being part of or linked to the UNSF, through collaboration at the UNCT level. The focus is more on identifying needs, responses by the NGOs, and securing funding.

As of 2020, the 3RF was perceived as a game changer having INGOs and CSOs rotating their role in the observer seat and the consultative group steering committee, participating in setting priorities, and channeling concerns. This, however, adds yet another layer of coordination, which is creating confusion, especially because many actors participate in different working groups within different frameworks but under the same themes (health, education, protection, etc.).

The representatives of the NGO community expressed the need for better coordination mechanisms to avoid working in silos, especially after 2021 when more Lebanese fell into poverty and the number of vulnerable people in the country reached unparalleled rates. It is imperative to push for harmonization of response, simplification of processes,

consolidation of results, and sharing the responsibility of co-leading the working groups without duplication. There is also a need to move away from the language of targeting specific population groups or nationalities or geography as assistance cannot be tailored to one specific group. Rather it needs to be re-focused to target the most in need or the most vulnerable of the population, regardless of who they are in line with the principle of "Leaving No One Behind".

The review found as well that there was no inclusion of the private sector in the UNSF before the inception of the 3RF upon the Beirut Port Blast. The consultations noted that this inclusion in the discussions and the implementation of the 3RF was highly welcomed by the private sector but was perceived to be rather slow with nothing yet materialized or translated into actionable programmes.

3.125 UNSF visibility and communication

The Review established that the consensus on the lack of UNSF visibility was a common thread across consultations with all actors and stakeholders. This lack of UNSF ability to attract attention and to establish itself as the overarching all-encompassing document on the UN response in Lebanon, affected the depth and quality of engagement with partners, as well as implementation, financing, and reporting.

The lack of visibility was the result of both structural and coordination limitations, in addition to the aforementioned competition among mandates and across frameworks, coupled with a constantly shifting crisis context. With staff turnover over the years, both within the UN and among the network of partners, the knowledge of the UNSF gradually dwindled, signaling weak institutionalization of the framework and its tools. Recent generations of actors in Lebanon, in the government, the donor community, or civil society, either know of the UNSF but are not familiar with it, or had not heard of it at all. A communication strategy with an integrated communication plan and a communication campaign was developed for the years 2017-2021 by the UN Communication Group with the purpose of advocating for Agenda 2030 and the SDGs. In 2018, the integration campaign was launched using 219 activation elements in 2019, 100 in 2020, and over 95 activation elements in 2021 including social media, use of influencers, TV spots, radio spots, infomercials, PR stunts, celebrities' endorsements, and direct beneficiary engagement. Every year, the campaign focuses on agreed-upon priority goals of the 17 SDGs.

This communication campaign, however, does not single out the UNSF as a framework. The Review found that the focus was on promoting SDGs in general and the joint work of the UN under specific priorities. It also found that there is a need for more strategic discussion and messaging on setting priorities for the communication campaign. Consultations showed that there is a need to be more active and less reactive in promoting outcomes. In addition, there is also a need to address the absence of a systematic Monitoring and Evaluation framework, which led to selecting results on an ad-hoc, first come first serve basis instead of strategizing communication messages. It was highlighted that the urgent, pressing, and 'breaking news' nature of humanitarian work, made it easier for it to get promoted. Advocacy for the development work done jointly needs dedicated resources since the long-term results are less immediate, less tangible, and require more focused efforts.

3.2 Management and Coordination

The UNSF coordination structure has evolved over the years from a two layered to a three-layered structure, with the introduction of the Advisory Group in late 2019 and the endorsement of the Programme Management Team (PMT), replacing the Advisory Group, in January 2021.

The structure, as it stands, is comparable to any UN Development framework structure, such as those in a neighboring country (Jordan for instance)[31]. In both cases, the UNCT

Figure 2: UNSF Three Tier Structure

[31] Jordan is selected for comparability purposes given the similarity on many fronts, namely the eminent pressure set by the protracted Syrian crisis and the pressing socio-economic situation.

is supported by an Operations Management Team (OMT), a Communication Group (UNCG)[32] and a Programme Management Team (PMT) (called Programme Coordination Team – PCT in Jordan). However, the Lebanon version lacks a central foundation in the structure, namely the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) in which the government authorities are represented to provide high-level oversight and support to ensure government ownership and buy-in.

The inter-Agency collaboration is examined at the three identified layers of the UNSF structure. Clearly, instating the **PMT** resonated well to ensure efficient channeling from the bottom up and

Pillars are expected to do both planning and coordination and joint assessments and have an extensive list of tasks, including [UNSF 154]:

Develop Joint Work Plans for each pillar (the main instruments for operationalizing the UNSF)

Translate UNSF outcomes into concrete, measurable and time-bound outputs

Create links to monitoring and evaluating the UNSF

Undertake joint analysis of the policy environment, key development issues and emerging trends

Contribute to the development of common UNCT advocacy and joint messaging, and inform policy dialogue with government counterparts

Ensure information sharing between agencies

effective top-down technical support and oversight. **The PMT function**, mostly assumed by the Advisory group, absorbed some of the burden from the pillars and streamlined the UNSF programmatic discussions by channeling the work of the pillars and thematic groups to the UNCT for endorsement and action, all the while ensuring strategic advice, technical support and quality assurance. This has been acknowledged by the majority of the consulted informants as a critical step in the right direction[33]. Nevertheless, many informants stressed the possibility to do better across the board.

The Review acknowledges that the **pillar and thematic working groups** are set up to advance joint planning, provide analysis, coordinate work around the delivery and reporting against the UNSF outcomes. Delivering the WGs function was however challenged by (a) limited documentation on the process, (b) inconsistent progress on the WGs workplans and (c) lack of reporting—hence weak evidence. Similarly, there is

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[32] Discussed under the visibility section
[33] A management response to action one of the MTR recommendations. The Review acknowledged that the UNCT has formalized and institutionalized the PMT function in the structure, rather than instituting the Advisory Group on an adhoc basis.

not enough evidence to show and assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the Pillars in fulfilling their functions, as stipulated in the TOR. The fact that there has been no joint programming, except toward the end of the UNSF cycle, is critical evidence that there is plenty of room to improve and reflect the spirit of collective planning, analysis, messaging, advocacy, and execution of joint programmes (Box 1).

Overall, the Review confirms that the structure has been challenged by some inherent institutional issues that ultimately led to inefficient and hampered functionality, as expressed by many of the consulted informants. The evidence concurs that, in addition to weak government ownership and buy-in, the UNSF structure is primarily challenged by:

(i) The potential of overlap and duplication with other frameworks as seen above, and the confusion among the different UN agencies and their partners around the different coordination channels.

(ii) Lack of an integrated funding scheme that can provide the impetus for joint programming and fuel the coordination at all levels of the UNSF structure.

(iii) Inter-Agency competition over mandate and resources translated into inefficiency, as seen, despite potential opportunities for adding value, and the UNDS Reform guidance and directives to increase collaboration.

(iv) Limited dedicated capacity to ensure the structure is fully geared to deliver, while proportionately sharing the workload with the PMT and the pillar groups.

While the fist two challenges were covered earlier in the report, the Review acknowledges the goodwill of the different agencies to collaborate, but highlights key aspects related to Inter-Agency competition over mandate (including accountability and capacity) and resources. In fact, the Review depicts that the individual UN agency is subject to fulfill its accountability along two axes: a vertical one toward its respective Headquarters (and ultimately their donors) and a horizontal one vis-a-vis the Resident Coordinator (RC), while both account for and urge it to remain responsive and accountable to the respective counterpart authority within the government. Balancing these two axes of accountability often leads to imbalances in favor of the vertical one illustrated in delivering the country programmes. Hence, all available resources (financial and human capital) are usually geared to fulfill the country's programme priorities, leaving little capacity for coordination and joint programming, unless the latter brings additional resources.

> UNCT members have two interrelated sets of accountabilities: firstly, to their respective entities on individual mandates; and, secondly, to their respective RC for their contribution to agreed results as defined in the UN Cooperation Framework and other inter-agency development agreements. (MAF, page 8)

With regard to the dedicated capacity to deliver the UNSF results, the Review noted the informants' concerns over their increasing responsibility and workload to carry forward the efforts of their respective agencies' contributions under the different frameworks. Some of the UN and non-UN WG members expressed a sense of frustration (sitting on WGs can be a full-time job in and of itself – as expressed by a WG member), while others commented that their coordination efforts and engagement in such an inter-agency cooperation framework are often unfairly accounted for in their performance appraisals.

> UNCT members' job profiles and terms of reference at all levels - include responsibility for active engagement in UNCT processes and related Cooperation Framework implementation groups and joint programming efforts including joint evaluations and delivery on their respective areas of the UN Cooperation Framework and the 2030 Agenda. (MAF, 3.2 Strategic Planning and Programming, p 13)

> UNCT members and RC ensure staff leading on these initiatives have at least one performance management target associated with their work in support of the engagement and implementation of the Business Operations, Strategy, Common Back Office and Common Premises. (MAF, 3.4 Common Services, p 18)

The Operation Management Team (OMT) is another cornerstone (operational backbone) in the UNSF structure that is mandated to ensure efficient, coherent, and harmonized operation practices across the UN and hence reflect proper implementation of the framework of cooperation. The Review confirmed that the OMT, through the relevant working groups, has coordinated the development of a joint business continuity plan to make sure all agencies' field operations are not disrupted by the emerging contextual challenges. The OMT has delivered on key 2020 priorities, as elaborated by the respective informants, among them are: a central database for long-term agreements (LTAs); a joint document library for the OMT; a joint Human resource (recruitment and onboarding) process; Terms of Reference for harmonized customs clearance and overland transportation services; expanded staff welfare services; a joint Business Continuity Plan (BCP) and return to office strategy as a response to restrictions

imposed by the COVID 19 pandemic; common premises shared among agencies in Beirut, Zahle (Beqaa), and Qobayat, and Tripoli (North and Akkar); and a carpooling initiative. Cumulatively, these joint operations have saved more than 5 million USD (Annual report 2020 and explained by OMT Chair). These successes are perceived by engaged agencies as opportunities to learn, build upon and explore other opportunities to align and minimize costs.

The review informants highlighted that the collaboration is often driven by UN reform, and less by resource mobilization. Relatively resourceful UN agencies do not benefit much from the joint projects. Smaller agencies (less resourceful) often free-ride and tend to piggyback on the structure.

Besides, the review noted both the OMT and the UNCT were slow in reacting to the unexpected implications of the COVID-19 pandemic and have not built pre-emptive and proactive measures to address the looming dire socio-economic circumstances as they unfolded. Some of those engaged in the operations believe the Business Continuity plan did not translate rapidly into action. For many, neither the UNCT mindset nor the UNSF structure and modus operandi were geared toward the emerging crisis since the 2019 uprising.

Among the challenges identified to have affected the collaboration at the operational level are:

- Weak alignment on terminology among different UN agencies. Different logistical terms mean different things to different agencies.
- Different work modalities (such as procurement rules and procedures, selection criteria, different levels of bureaucracy leading to different efficiencies or speed of work),
- Heavy negotiation process to get things done due to resource availability. A funding structure should be swift and efficient and avoid the complex and heavy administrative, negotiation and decision-making processes.

3.3 Cross-Cutting Themes

Cross-cutting themes' Working Groups were created and served as a useful space for coordination and strategic discussion and action on selected issues. They also engaged with national non-governmental partners, gaining buy-in across agencies, and serving

as venues for coordinating and integrating key cross-cutting issues across the core pillars of the UNSF and individual UN agencies' programmes, and they serve as an excellent platform to reflect commonality among the UN agencies.

Significant effort and work have been embraced by cross-cutting themes working groups (WGs), namely Data and Statistics, Gender, and Human Rights. In some cases, they were able to identify opportunities for joint action (though this is usually not operational action). Also, the possibility that the same people sit on the same working group across the different frameworks reinforced the chances for integration of the cross-cutting issues across frameworks (even if the WG focus was different according to the framework).

The role of the Working Group expanded and evolved with the changing context and reforms. And while awaiting the new coordination structure for Lebanon, some of the working groups went ahead and created their own coordination structure. The working groups, in some cases, spanned across the Nexus, where all HDP components were touched on in a meeting. They did bring focus to the pillars, in varying degrees. Though this is also reflecting that the same people often sat on a WG and one of the pillars. Both UN and non-UN WG members expressed their concern that participating on WGs can be a full-time job in and of itself. Engagement in such an inter-agency cooperation framework should be reflected in the performance appraisal system.

For instance, the efforts and results of the work of the "Gender Equality" and "Data and Statistics" groups were highly recognized both at the level of programme integration, reporting and supporting the government counterparts. The former is illustrated in dedicating outcome 2.3 to *improve the legal status of women and girls, gender-based violence and gender equality*, and the related initiatives to raise awareness and build capacity on gender-based violence.

The Gender Thematic Group's efforts were praised, by non-UN informants, for (a) ensuring gender equality is mainstreamed through all the UNSF programmes and documents, (b) mapping out the UNCT's gender equality and women's empowerment (GEWE) programmes and projects (2019) and (c) supporting the women machinery and the National Commission of Lebanese Women (NCLW) on many programmatic and advocacy fronts. Notably, the campaigns on IWD and Days of Activism against GBV were identified as key contributions of the group. The Review could not establish whether the GWG had developed the planned "Lebanon Gender Profile", that was envisioned to feed into the common country analysis (CCA). Having noted this, it should be stressed that the UNSF should increase the UN contribution to further promote the use of gender

equality markers beyond the 13 UN agencies (identified in the mapping report)[34], and to mobilize additional resources to promote gender equality (increase the financial contributions to GEWE projects beyond the US $30 million in 2019).

The Data & Statistics working group (DSWG) was highlighted in the consultations as another example of effective collaboration. Typically, reference is made to supporting the Central Administration of Statistics' (CAS) and building the "Lebanon Assessment, Survey, and Evaluation Registry" (LASER). In supporting CAS, two initiatives were highlighted in the UNSF: (a) developing and deploying the Labour Force and Household Living Conditions Survey (LFHLCS) in order to generate quality and timely data at a district (caza) level, and (b) assessing and building CAS capacity. The latter was concluded in 2019 and entrusted to UNDP and UNFPA to follow-up on recommendations of the CAS Capacity Assessment Report and to prepare for the UN capacity development implementation plan. The Review could not, however, establish progress on the subject. Besides, the Review confirms that the LASER, as a registry of assessments, research and evaluations reports, executed nationally within and outside the UN realm, is up to date (with more than 675 entries) and accessible online. It reflects a joint inter-agency initiative benefiting both the UNSF and LCRP frameworks. Its utilization among the UN agencies and other partners has not been confirmed.

The DSWG also plays an active role in monitoring the UNSF matrix and is accommodating the existing set of measures despite the deficiencies identified earlier. It reviewed the 2018 and 2019 JWPs and is contributing to the preparation for the new UNSDCF and the CCA including a Lebanon crisis impact framework which serves as a dashboard.

Similarly, the Human Rights Working Group (HRWG) has been active in coordinating the UN efforts to integrate Human Rights in programming, communication and monitoring it across the UNSF outcomes. Toward that end, the HRWG has contributed its "Universal Periodic Review" of the impact of the evolving socio-economic situation on human rights in Lebanon, to report back to the UNCT on the situation, build awareness and advocate for mainstreaming HR into the interventions led by the UN agencies.

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[34] 50% implementation across the UN agencies and programmes, with no clarity on the scores and the efforts to increase the use of the markers across the board.

However, the thematic working groups by definition are not the locus for operational action, and their limited scope mirrored the general weaknesses reported throughout the UNSF Review. While the various Working Groups (WGs) have contributed to mainstreaming gender equality and human rights and strengthening the evidence-base within the UN agencies and across the UNSF pillars, the Review could not establish the extent to which and how those efforts have translated into mainstreaming the cross-cutting themes across the pillars. In addition to coordination challenges mentioned above, shortcomings included multiplication of frameworks, which diluted the focus and the purpose of the WGs, over-burden of time and effort spent on convening and following up on the WGs' progress, and the limitation of what a WG can realistically achieve. Also, the Review found that a sizable part of the work under the three themes was done either bilaterally with the different UN agencies or by the leading/co-leading organization directly with the UNCT without going back to the working group.

The Review noted the dismantling of the "evaluation" group and integrating it within the DSWG. Evidently, and given the huge gap and inconsistencies identified in reporting against the UNSF indicators, the Review challenges the decision and considers a stand-alone Monitoring & Evaluation Working Group as fundamental to complement the mandate of the DSWG with planning, designing, and implementing (a) a cooperation results framework (including coordinating the reporting against it), (b) joint programmes evaluations among UN agencies – a practice believed to be as a key UNSF function, and (c) lessons-learned distilled from the evaluations of agencies specific programmes.

3.4 Reporting & Monitoring

The Final Review confirms the MTR findings related to the systemic deficiencies, inconsistencies and reporting timeliness of the results framework adopted to monitor and report against the UNSF outcomes. The available evidence, as illustrated throughout the report, asserts that the UNSF M&E framework has not been conducive to report on the outputs and outcomes. These deficiencies affect the utility and reliability of the reported data over time. They relate to:

a) The absence of a clear Theory of Change that guides the results framework, identifies contributions, sets accountabilities, and supports resource mobilisation. This relates to the approach used in putting together the UNSF as a compilation of UN agencies programmes, making it difficult to identify UN

agencies contribution to the common outcomes, and to identify the assumptions underneath the aspired changes at the outcomes and beyond;

b) The formulation of outcome indicators, many of which reflect deliverable outputs not anticipated outcome changes or progress on achieving results. Many of those outcome indicators are framed as "Number of", not "level of" or "extent of" for instance;

c) Inconsistency in reporting the indicators. The Review confirms that almost half of the indicators were not reported in 2020 (53% of the indicators were reported, 31 out of 58 indicators, excluding the disaggregated ones);

d) The inconsistency in the ability to disaggregate the reported figures by age or gender, nationality, and district;

e) The limited use of rates and ratios (due to the absence of the denominators for the majority of the indicators);

f) Difficulty in aggregating data from multiple sources (multiple methodologies for data collections);

g) No direct linkages to the SDGs, for the reasons addressed earlier.

Many of those deficiencies were highlighted in the external Midterm review conducted in 2019, but limited efforts have been made to rectify them.

The Review noted a sense of frustration raised by many informants for having duplicate discussions and reporting held under the two frameworks (LCRP task Forces and the UNSF pillars and thematic groups). This frustration is partly understood when it comes to those shady areas of the Nexus, illustrated under the UNSF Core Pillar 3 which has many of the humanitarian interventions (and indicators)[35] within the different sectors (social, economic, education, etc...).

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[35] There are indicators under Core Pillar 1 and 2 (such as indicator 1.2.3 and 1.3.2, as well as 2.1.4) that reflect the integration between the humanitarian and development realms.

4.0 Status of the MTR Recommendations

The Final Review noted a relatively low sense of urgency to address the structural challenges facing the UNSF after two years of implementation, and before the dramatic changes that Lebanon has undergone since the end of 2019. Contrary to the conclusion by the MTR, should "major facelifts"[36] take place immediately after the MTR, some of those internal structural challenges would have been addressed.

Close examination of the 31 recommendations set forward by the MTR reveal that (a) three of them were not accepted by the UNCT; (b) three required more clarification from the consultants, with no indication that this clarification was provided, (c) three of them were accepted, but UNCT made a decision not to follow through with the recommendation, and (d) the remaining recommendations were mostly deferred to the new cycle of the Cooperation Framework (UNSDF). The Review re-examined the MTR recommendations and provided a quick update on their status toward the end of 2021, as elaborated in the Table below.

The Review confirmed that the MTR did not have internal buy-in, as perceived during the consultations with the different stakeholders. When asked about the MTR and recommendations, "not practical" or "do not recall" were common answers that emerged. However, the Review stresses that some of those recommendations are still valid and should be acted upon when embarking into the new UNSDCF and as the CCA and implementation of UN reforms unfold.

There are some recommendations that were accepted, but then the actions adopted directly opposed the recommendation, with no clear rationale from the UNCT. These actions are identified below:

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[36] The MTR concluded the report by emphasizing that "The UNSF should not go through major facelifts during the remaining period, given the ongoing SDG planning process. Instead, the mid-term review team suggests the following overall adjustments for the remaining period of the UNSF".

a. the abandoning of the evaluation sub-group with no clear rationale; minimizing the capacity to design and coordinate joint evaluations (Rec 4 and 9);

b. instituting the PMT despite the clear recommendation not to do so despite its acceptance at the time of the MTR (Rec 7). The PMT was considered more inclusive hence adopted by the UNCT.

While acknowledging the absence of a national development strategy and the dire political decay that has rendered any policy discourse on the SDGs (Rec12 and 15) unfeasible, there might have been a missed opportunity to build on the emerging national demand for decentralization to push the SDGs forward at the sub-national level. The UNSF could have been the lever of such a shift (Rec 14).

#	Recommendation	Y / N	Management Response to MTR	Status To Date
Overall adjustments				
1	Revitalize the LRF and link it with the UNSF, in order to gradually increase the visibility and use of the UNSF as the UN planning framework (in line with the Funding Compact).	Y	This recommendation was accepted for consideration because it needed more thorough work by the UN on assessing all options (including if there is appetite from donors) The recommendation was set to be implemented in current UNSF but also considered relevant for next UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF, or new "UNSF")	No action was taken during the current cycle of the UNSF. Further action was deferred to the new UNSDCF planning cycle. No information regarding the revitalization of the LRF.
2	Task UNSF pillar groups with initiating formulation of SDG relevant integrated policy advice in their areas of focus and explore structural	Y	This recommendation was accepted for consideration along with Recommendation 6, while: ● Stressing the need to refocus the ongoing	There is nor clear evidence suggesting that the policy advice was refocused towards SDGs or the RCO shared learnings from the global efforts to accelerate the

	transformation trends (future of job, new technologies, trade dynamics, etc.) on Lebanon's prospects (in line with the System Wide Strategic Document)		• policy advice towards SDGs • RCO to provide global examples that on UN work accelerating adoption of SDGs could be applied to Lebanon • Policy advice recommended to be re-prioritized based on UNCT retreat • Recommendation to be implemented in current UNSF	adoption / implementation of the SDGs to be applied in Lebanon because of the absence of a national SDGs agenda. It is noted, however, that UNCT retreat re-prioritized the pillars and strategies with solid buy-in from HoAs and PMT. But the UNSF did not develop post 2019. In parallel, the 3RF seems to be policy oriented. (Other platforms were used also to push forward this development agenda)
3	Implement the roll out of UN Info to provide **real time monitoring and reporting of results (outputs delivered), tracked against SDGs,** and based on a functional and widely understood link with Activity Info (note: dedicated M&E expertise may be needed to harmonize the two systems)	Y	This recommendation was accepted for consideration. • Requires coordination with technical colleagues from LCRP on possibilities for linking two systems to avoid double work for UN agencies • Recommend to test with an outcome from Pillar 1/2 to identify and tackle issues • Recommendation to be implemented in current UNSF in phases	This recommendation was accepted for consideration with conditionality that was not picked up. In fact, there is no clear evidence suggesting linking the two reporting mechanisms (LCRP and UNSF). On the contrary, the current evidence confirms that the UNSF M&E framework has not been conducive to report on the outputs and outcomes.
On The Results Framework / M&E				
4	Select in each pillar one or two outputs/themes for which new indicators may be needed and conduct joint evaluations	Y	This recommendation was accepted for consideration, while acknowledging the weak M&E framework of UNSF	**This recommendation was not implemented**. On the contrary, the once established "evaluation sub-group" was dismantled with no clear

	by 2020 on these outputs/themes with the support of the DSWG subgroup on evaluation, to inform programming and further incentivize joint work on evaluation and learning (in line with the Funding Compact)		• Recommendation integrates well with envisioned action plan of Evaluation sub-group • Recommendation to be implemented in current UNSF	rationale, hence risking the possibility to execute joint evaluations. There is no evidence of any joint evaluations being conducted.
5	Place all Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) efforts under pillar two, to avoid the duplication of ensure better coordination among UN entities and with partners;	Y		There is no clear evidence on the position of the RCO and UNCT on this. The latest (2020) reporting matrix does not account for PVE

On Coordination Structures

6	Task pillar groups to focus discussions and priorities on: i. identifying opportunities for joint work ii. initiating the formulation of integrated SDG related policy advice with emphasis on structural transformation and Leave No One Behind, and iii. risk analysis (information sharing, portfolio level risks, SDG policy related risks)	Y	This recommendation was accepted for consideration. • Requires pillar and thematic groups to discuss jointly under the Advisory Group to implement this recommendation rather than bilaterally per pillar • Recommendation to be implemented in current UNSF but also considered relevant for next UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF)	There is evidence that this 1. This was a challenge because there was no funding mechanism to support the joint work opportunities, in addition to the absence of a national SDGs plan. 2. There is no evidence related to the policy advice around the SDGs because of the absence of a national SDGs agenda. 3. Risk analysis was done at the level of the UNCT in October of 21.
7	Rather than (re)instituting a formal PMT structure, use the UNSF Advisory Group on an ad hoc	Y	This recommendation was not accepted. Instead, the UNCT:	The available evidence clearly shows that the Advisory Group has been substituted with a formal PMT (with both a

	basis as the body for consolidating pillar and cross pillar SDG work and formulate recommendations for UNCT consideration		● Formalize the Advisory Group instead of maintaining it ad-hoc would be beneficial if there are clear and agreed upon ToRs/expectations drafted by UNRCO ● Recommendation to be implemented in current UNSF	technical and management function). The PMT, however, was instated early 2021 (late in the process).
8	Increase the vertical accountability between the pillars, the Advisory Group and the UNCT, by regularizing pillar group and thematic group briefings to the UNCT and UNCT guidance to the pillar groups (through the Advisory Group)	Y	This recommendation was accepted for consideration. ● Relevant topics/discussions from Pillars/cross-Pillar should be informing agenda of UNCT meetings, utilizing the Advisory Group as the platform for Pillar co-leads to inform RCO ● UNCT agenda points from pillar groups focusing more on strategic direction than only briefing ● Recommendation to be implemented in current UNSF	The instituted PMT function plays a bridging role between the pillar groups and the UNCT along both the technical and managerial aspects. There has been a shift in focus over the time away from the briefing format.
9	Incorporate the evaluation sub-group into the data and statistics working group (rather than making it a separate group) and include its scope on the agenda of the working group	N	This recommendation was not accepted – acknowledging the different role and mandate. ● Data and M&E experts are usually different focal points ● Both groups have widely different ambitions	Despite rejecting the recommendation, the UNCT abandoned the evaluation sub-group with no clear rationale, risking the chances to design and coordinate joint evaluations (Refer to Rec 4)

On SDG Engagement				
10	Ensure inclusive, system wide, and integrated support to the national SDG process, including from regional entities and Non-Resident Agencies (in line with the Mutual Accountability Framework)	Y	This recommendation was accepted for consideration. ● RCO to ensure continuation of NRAs/regional entities' representation in UNSF coordination structure ● Recommendation to be implemented in current UNSF but also considered relevant for next UNSDCF to ensure support from UN Development Systems	There is not enough evidence on this front with regard to the SDGs process that did not pick up after the 2018 VNR process, given the political paralysis. Another note worth highlighting: The MAF is foundational in reinvigorating the RC system. Provides a clear framework for management and accountability within UNCTs. While the MAF is clear, the content of this framework has yet to fully transpire into changes within existing operational frameworks (i.e. LCRP).
11	Ensure that whole of UN system advice incorporates the **dimensions of structural transformation**, Leave No One Behind, and partnerships (in line with the **System Wide Strategic Document**)		This recommendation was not accepted for it required further clarification from consultants	The recommendation is not clear and there is no evidence on how it was pursued. It should not be accepted in the first place.
12	Clarify and communicate the division of labor between the RCO and UNDP, as well as expected roles and responsibilities of entities and coordination structures (see above on role of pillar groups)	Y	This recommendation was accepted despite the need for further clarification from consultants ● Builds on previous agreement at 2018 UNCT retreat to dissolve SDG Task Force and	The evidence gathered in the Final review confirms clarity on the roles and responsibilities in line with the MAF guidelines. The fact that the UNCT pushed the integration of SDG discussions to the pillar groups level diluted the importance of

			integrate SDG discussions into pillar groups ● Links to Recommendation 10 ● Recommendation to be implemented in current UNSF	the SDGs and minimized visibility for they no longer appear on the UNCT retreats agenda.
13	Increase engagement with donors and civil society on the SDG process to ensure their participation/representation, including through communications (for the public at large)	Y	This recommendation was accepted with no further clarity on how to pursue it.	There is not enough evidence on this front with regard to increasing CSO engagement in the UNSF, which modality and on which scope. Other platforms (such as the 3RF) have been identified as exemplary in institutionalizing civil society engagement. While the 3RF is not a development document, this engagement has buy-in and will most likely continue into the new CF.
14	Include a dimension of SDGs localization in the UN's policy, technical and data support, on municipal capacities for coordinating and monitoring SDG implementation, as well as the coordination role the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM) in the SDG's roll out pla	Y	This recommendation was accepted ● Must also note Deputy Prime Minister's leadership role of SDGs in Lebanon ● Needs further discussion and decision from UNCT/ Advisory Group if to be implemented in current UNSF or more relevant for next UNSDCF, with ongoing efforts re to the local governance plan	The evidence suggests that this recommendation has been deferred to the new cooperation framework (UNSDF), despite the emerging focus on localizing the SDGs at the sub-regional level. In this regard, the UNSF should have been the lever of this shift.
15	In addition to a shift in the focus of the pillar groups meetings, make SDG support a standing item of the UNCT agenda / work plan	N	This recommendation was not accepted. Refocusing Pillar groups' work on SDGs and ensuring relevant topics/discussions from Pillars/cross-Pillar recommendation should be	Despite refusing it, the evidence strongly suggests that the SDGs were not consistently/ systematically present on the UNCT meeting agenda. This should be accounted for in the

			addressed, with a clear decision not to make it a standing item	new cooperation framework (UNSDF) This relates to Recommendation 12.
16	Consider the deployment of a MAPS mission (Mainstreaming, Acceleration Policy Support) which have proven effective not only in providing technical advice to SDG related policy matters but also in serving as a platform for broad-based, inclusive engagement by a range of UN and other actors.	**Y**		There is not enough evidence to confirm whether this has been actioned.

<table>
<tr><td colspan="5" style="background:#F5A623;">On Programming</td></tr>
<tr><td>17</td><td>Increase the use of integrated area-based approaches and when/where relevant through a humanitarian, development, peace nexus lenses, ensure the transition from stabilization to long-term development outcomes</td><td>Y</td><td>This recommendation was accepted, while acknowledging the for

● further discussions with LCRP colleagues who also work on area-based approaches
● Must consider sensitive nature of selection locations for area-based approaches</td><td>The evidence made available does not support a transition/ focus on localized approach except for the environment pillar - under the LCRP (humanitarian) scope, with an acknowledgement of the difficulties and challenges in doing so under the development scope.

Given the unconducive circumstances, this should be accounted for in the new cooperation framework (UNSDF)</td></tr>
<tr><td>18</td><td>Explore opportunities for a scaled up programmatic push on energy, environment and livelihoods, considering the needs, using the LRF (see above), and as a means to relieving pressure on the LCRP</td><td>Y</td><td>This recommendation was accepted, while acknowledging that it is:

● Still unclear why those specific topics were chosen when there are a</td><td>The links with the LCRP were out of scope of the Final review. This should be accounted for in the new cooperation framework (UNSDF)</td></tr>
</table>

			● number of other priority areas ● Need clearer process on how to link long-term development challenges raised at LCRP with UNSF	
19	Consider the deployment of a humanitarian, development, peace nexus expert to inform UNSF related programmatic adjustments and opportunities, increase knowledge and capacities for nexus responses, support government-UN-donor-NGO nexus approaches, and guide the formulation of the CCA from a nexus angle	N	This recommendation was not accepted. ● Humanitarian and development actors on the ground are the best informed to hold these discussions	While not being recognized as a recommendation, the Final Review recommends considering the support of external consultants to facilitate and guide the formulation of the CCA from a nexus angle.
On Ways to Strengthen Government Engagement Between Now and the Next UNSF				
20	The MTR does not recommend that the UN push now for reinstating a steering committee for the UNSF. Instead, the MTR proposes the following more practical, sequenced ways to gradually increase engagement with the government between now and the next UNSF and increase government exposure to, and familiarity with elements of the UNSF (including UN reform): i. Revitalize the LRF, with government as co-chair for strategic decision-making	Y	This recommendation was accepted. ● LRF steering committee already includes GoL Ministers ● GoL can be included in thematic joint evaluations ● To increase ownership and leadership from Government, steering committee for new UNSDCF needs to be established at the beginning of the planning process (developing roadmap, CCA, etc.), which would be in early/mid-2020	The evidence made available clearly shows that: ● the LRF has not been revitalized since this MTR due to emerging contextual challenges and development of 3RF and ERP. ● No joint evaluation was conducted ● Discussions with the current government (PM) started, to engage early in the new UNSDCF process. A steering committee has yet to be established

	ii. Include government in the proposed joint evaluations iii. Establish a steering committee with government in late 2020 / early 2021 for the management of the next UNSF			
In Preparation for the Next UNSF (requires further discussion for the next UNSDCF)				
21	Ensure that all entities are taking the necessary steps to aligning their respective planning cycles (in particular AFPs and their Country Development Programmes) with the next UNSF	**Y**	This recommendation was accepted. ● Special attention should be paid to those AFPs who do not have country programmes to ensure alignment with next UNSDCF ● RCO to make sure to integrate this recommendation in next UNSDCF roadmap	I. The Guidance Document (p. 24) is clear, but the challenges relate to timing and delays in initiating the process. II.
22	Seek DCO support to increase the knowledge among UN staff, Government of Lebanon, donors and other key national and international partners on UN Reform including on the Common Country Analysis and the new Cooperation Framework (note: As the UN in Lebanon start reporting on global UN reform objectives, it will be important, and interesting for the RCO to cost these joint initiatives and see if the UN meets the UN's	**Y**	This recommendation was accepted. ● RCO to make sure to integrate this recommendation in next UNSDCF roadmap	RCO confirmed to account for it in the UNSDCF cycle.

	Funding Compact commitment to allocate at least 15% of resources at the country level to joint initiatives)			
23	Secure a strong partnership with the Government of Lebanon and engage vulnerable groups, donors, CSOs - including through the LCRP inter-sectoral steering committee, academia and private sector in the next CCA process and throughout the planning, implementation and monitoring of the UNSF, including at local level.	Y	• RCO to make sure to integrate this recommendation in next UNSDCF roadmap	RCO confirmed to account for it in the UNSDCF cycle. The Final review stresses on considering institutionalizing a consistent, systematic and inclusive engagement process and platform of those stakeholders– picking up from the learning of the emerging frameworks.
24	Include a conflict sensitive theory of change, based on an integrated local, national and regional analysis in the CCA. The mid-term review team encourages the use of the UNDS Conflict and Development Analysis (CDA) tool as well as innovative ways of analysis such as crowdsourcing and making use of the UN Global Pulse capacities and systems	Y	• RCO to make sure to integrate this recommendation in next UNSDCF roadmap	The Final review stresses on considering a holistic approach starting with a Theory of Change of the development aspired given the circumstances to which all UN agencies, government and stakeholders buy into.
25	Review capacity development approaches and achievements, based on clearer/cleaner definitions, and common approaches to staff salary	Y	• RCO to make sure to integrate this recommendation in next UNSDCF roadmap	The Final review reconfirms it

	support and use of national systems			
26	Ensure that the CCA builds on the SDG Voluntary National Review, recommendations from the human rights mechanisms (including from the Universal Periodic Review), the Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace and Security recommendations, CEDRE, and LCRP related analysis.	**Y**	• RCO to make sure to integrate this recommendation in next UNSDCF roadmap	The Final Review reconfirms, acknowledging the lack of a SDG Voluntary National Review.
27	Building on the strong partnership with the World Bank and the EU/UN/World Bank 2008 Partnership Framework for Crisis and Post-Crisis Situations, consider a partnership with the EU on joint analysis, including through the CCA.	**Y**	• RCO to consider integrating this recommendation in next UNSDCF roadmap • Explore partnerships with other partners apart from WB/EU	The Final Review reconfirms building on the synergies and complementarities
28	Allow for sufficient time, capacity and engagement (including from outside the UN) to ensure quality outputs and validity of indicators through participatory design process and a quality assurance process.	**Y**	• RCO to make sure to integrate this recommendation in next UNSDCF roadmap	The Final Review reconfirms building a more rigorous M&E system to capture the achievements across the board.
29	In line with the new Cooperation Framework, develop a funding strategy to enable donor alignment with UNSF needs	**Y**	• RCO to make sure to integrate this recommendation in next UNSDCF roadmap	The Final Review reconfirms the fundamental need to have a funding scheme attached to the UNSDCF.

30	Include a stronger regional dimension, notably in terms of regional obstacles or enablers to SDG realization in Lebanon	Y	• RCO to make sure to integrate this recommendation in next UNSDCF roadmap	The Final Review reconfirms the fundamental need to shift the focus to localizing the SDGs at the sub-regional level in the UNSDCF.
31	Increase the understanding of risks in a systematic and comprehensive manner to ensure risk informed programming and explore developing a multi-dimensional risk analysis dashboard to track and analyze contextual risks.	Y	• RCO to make sure to integrate this recommendation in next UNSDCF roadmap	The Final Review reconfirms the fundamental need to complement the UNSDCF with a systematic and agile risk management plan.

Table 3: Analyzing the MTR Recommendations: Management Responses and Status To-date

The Final Review reconfirms all the MTR recommendations set to guide the new UNSDCF, namely:

- Consider institutionalizing a consistent, systematic and inclusive engagement process and platform of those stakeholders– picking up from the learning of the emerging frameworks.
- Consider a holistic approach starting with a Theory of Change of the development aspired given the circumstances to which all UN agencies, government and stakeholders buy into.
- Build on the synergies and complementarities with partners and donors
- Build a more rigorous M&E system to capture the achievement across the board.
- Devise a funding scheme attached to the UNSDCF
- Shift the focus to localizing the SDGs at the sub-regional level in the UNSDCF
- Complement the UNSDCF with a systematic and agile risk management plan
- Consider the support of external consultants[37] to facilitate and guide the formulation of the CCA from a nexus angle.

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[37] This recommendation (19) was rejected by UNCT/ RCO with no clear rationale

5.0 Final Review Recommendations

Based on the Final Review findings, the following recommendations were put forward to address the systematic and structural challenges that limited the full implementation of the UNSF, with the aim that once internalized, the chances for a smooth implementation of the new Cooperation Framework are higher - reflecting a coordinated inter-agency approach and serving the people of Lebanon in such harsh circumstances.

General	1. Act upon the MTR recommendations set to guide the preparation for the new cooperation framework (Recommendations 21 onward)
The Whole of Lebanon Approach	2. Promote and implement a "localized" approach to the SDGs at the sub-national level, by implementing the key principles of the SDGs across the UN programmes and finalizing the CCA to identify key challenges toward achieving the SDGs (as per the guidance in the HDP Cooperation Framework Companion piece)
	3. Ensure the new Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) clearly defines, articulates, and communicates how collective UN development efforts are (a) coherent and harmonized across the different frameworks, and (b) complement and mutually reinforce humanitarian support and peacebuilding (in line with UNDS Reform guidelines).

4. Consider a more institutionalized, consistent, systematic and inclusive engagement process and platform for national stakeholder partners, namely the civil society and the private sector, while building on the learning from the emerging 3RF framework and ensuring that no one is left behind (in line with MAF directive, p. 8)

5. Instate a Joint Steering Committee (JSC) to get the GoL back on board to provide high-level oversight, support and ensure ownership and buy-in. In case of continued political paralysis:

5.1 Continue to engage with line-ministries, even bilaterally on agency-ministry basis, while aligning and reporting results with the UNSDCF results framework.

5.2 Foster collaboration with the sub-national structures to deliver on the outcomes of the UNSDCF.

6. Ensure the new Cooperation Framework has a solid funding modality and resource mobilization strategy that reconciles agencies' and RC's efforts to carry out resource mobilization (individually or jointly) and to align donors' commitments with UNSDCF priorities (in line with MAF, 3.5 Funding and Resource Mobilization)

7. Ensure a more balanced budget distribution and soliciting of funds across the different core pillars of the new UNSDCF to reflect the longer-term development component while remaining relevant to the emerging eminent needs.

8. Strengthen partnerships and engagement with partners on longer-term development and policy discussions and explore non-traditional funding and financing sources such as financial institutions, development banks, private sector and enterprises, as well as the Lebanese diaspora.

	9. Reinforce the joint programming approach recently introduced by the UNCT, while ensuring full alignment with the new priorities of the UNSDCF.
	10. Ensure the CCA is developed to provide a comprehensive and integrated situation analysis that captures the causes of the crises, current and emerging risks and vulnerabilities, and expected challenges, at all levels across the humanitarian, development, and peace nexus, while engaging a wide spectrum of stakeholders (in line with the the guidelines of the HDP Cooperation Framework Companion Piece - 2020).
Management and Coordination	11. Balance UNCT members' accountabilities to their respective entities on individual mandates as well as to their RC for their contribution to the agreed results as defined in the UNSDCF in line with the MAF guidance (p.8).
	12. Reflect the agencies' staff's responsibility for active engagement in the UNSDCF processes and related framework implementation in the terms of reference and performance appraisal at all levels with at least one performance management target – in line with the MAF (3.2 Strategic Planning and Programming) and (3.4 Common Services).
	13. Increase the capacity of the RCO to improve coordination, delivery and monitoring and evaluation of the UNSDCF, by recruitment or request of further technical support from individual agencies.
	14. Build on the successful Business Operation Strategy and leverage the opportunities to harmonize operations and processes by aligning terminologies, processes and work modalities across the agencies.
	15. Establish a more robust M&E framework, based on a clear Theory of Change, with a focus on outcome-oriented

Reporting and Monitoring	indicators and real-time reporting to capture the achieved outcomes of UNSF (in line with MAF, 3.2 Strategic Planning and Programming, p 14).
	16. Preserve the institutional memory by establishing a document management system that ensures better documentation of all Working Groups, Pillars, OMT and PMT deliberations (minutes of meetings, discussion notes, workplans, deliverables, reports).
	17. Establish a Monitoring & Evaluation Working Group to strengthen the design, follow up and the monitoring of the new UNSDCF result framework to execute joint evaluations and strengthen the national M&E capacities in the country.
Cross-cutting Issues	18. Promote the use of the age and gender marker across UN agencies' programmes to improve age and gender mainstreaming across the pillars.
	19. Improve reporting modalities to secure evidence on the contribution of the WGs in mainstreaming the cross-cutting themes across the pillars.

Appendix A: List of Documents Consulted

3RF brief update (14-Jul-21)
3RF 'Outcomes'
Aid Tracking Q3 Projects 2021-11-09
Beirut City Profile 2021
Comparison table of priorities vs frameworks
Data and Statistics Working Group TOR 19 April 2017
Diab Government - Ministerial Statement February 2021
Final LCRP Strategic Review 25-August-21
Gender Working Group TOR 19 April 2017 Final
Hariri Government - Ministerial Statement - February 2019
Highlights on the United Nations development system reform
Human Rights Working Group TOR 19 April 2017 FINAL
Humanitarian-Development-Peace Collaboration, May 2020
Implementation plan 2020-2022 AWP
Infographic coordination structure
Integrated Communication Campaign 2017-2020
Joint Communication Strategy for Lebanon FINAL 27-April-17
LCRP Sector outcomes
LCRP Sector outcomes and outputs
Lebanon 3RF Report
Lebanon ERP 2021-2022
Lebanon UNCT UPR submission Annex 2019
Lebanon UNCT UPR submission Annex 2020
Management and Accountability Framework of the UN Development and Resident Coordinator System, 15, September 2021
Membership of Pillar Groups
Mikati Government - Ministerial Statement - November 2021
OMT Common BCP
Pillar Groups Terms of Reference (ToRs) 2021-06-22 (Clean)
Pillar Groups Terms of Reference (ToRs) 2027-04-27
PMT PPT 2-Sep-21

Public Institutions Technical Support_2021 11 09.

Ranking of Overlapping Priorities

Socio-economic brief August 30 - Sept 10 2021

Socio-economic brief September 10 - September 30 2021

Socio-economic Note December 2021

Socio-economic Note October - November 2021

Terms of Reference - Integrated Campaign-V2 comments

Terms of Reference Gender Working Group HDP nexus - ENDORSED by GWG

The Funding Compact Final draft, March 2019

Timeline for JWP 12-Aug-21

Timeline for JWP 15-July-21

Timeline for UNCT Prioritization 25-Feb-21

ToR PMT Lebanon 11-Mar-21

ToR PMT Lebanon 28-Jan-21

UN Development System Reform FAQ

UN Lebanon Annual Report 2017

UN Lebanon Annual Report 2018

UN Lebanon Annual Report 2019

UN Lebanon Annual Report 2020

UN perceptions Survey -Final Report v2 18-Jan-19

UNCT Gender Equality Mapping Design - Adjusted

UNCT Retreat 2021- List of clusters and priorities 11-Mar-21

UNCT Retreat 2021- List of clusters and priorities 25-Feb-21

UNCT Retreat Agenda for the Virtual UNCT retreat 14-15 January 2021

UNCT Retreat Agenda, 3-5 October 2021

UNCT retreat April 21 2021 summary report.

UNCT Retreat Challenges, October 2021

UNCT Retreat Draft Programme, 21-23 April 2021

UNCT Retreat List of Clusters and Priorities 3, Feb 2021

UNCT Retreat Report, 15-16 November 2018

UNCT Retreat Report, 5-6 October 2017

UNCT Retreat Risk Template, October 2021

UNCT Retreat Summary Report, 14-15 January 2021

UNCT Retreat Summary Report, 21-23 April 2021

UNCT Retreat Summary Report, 4-5 October 2021

United Nations Strategic Framework (UNSF) Lebanon 2017-2020

United Nations Strategic Framework for Lebanon (2017 - 2020) Concept Note and Roadmap, February 2016 Update

UNSDCF Internal Guidance, June 2019
UNSF CF&JWP Annex 2018
UNSF CF&JWP Joint Workplan 2018 Final
UNSF CF&JWP Joint Workplan 2019 Final
UNSF CoordStruct Overview Coordination Structure 2021-10-19
UNSF CoordStruct Overview of UNSF Structure 2020-05-21 Final
UNSF Final Review timeline and approval process
UNSF JWP 2019 Outcomes
UNSF Lebanon Joint Work Plan 2017
UNSF M&E 2017 Annex Semiannual Review Activities 2017-08-15
UNSF M&E 2017 Annex Semiannual Review Report 2017-08-15
UNSF M&E 2017-2019 Annex on progress against targets
UNSF M&E 2020 Annex on progress against targets
UNSF M&E MTR Additional Note 2019-09-25 Final
UNSF M&E MTR Common Introduction 2019-09-25 Final
UNSF M&E MTR LCRP report 2019-09-25 Final
UNSF M&E MTR Management Response 2019-08-26 Final
UNSF M&E MTR Strategic Note 2019-09-25 Final
UNSF M&E MTR UNSF report 2019-09-25 Final
UNSF Thematic WG DSWG 2018 Results Report 2019 02 07 Final
UNSF Thematic WG DSWG 2018 Work Plan 2017 12 13 Final
UNSF Thematic WG DSWG 2019 Results Report 2020 01 15 Final
UNSF Thematic WG DSWG 2019 Work Plan 2019 03 15 Final
UNSF Thematic WG DSWG 2020 Work Plan 2020 07 02 Final
UNSF Thematic WG GWG Action Plan 2020
UNSF Thematic Youth WG 2020 Joint Work Plan 2018
UNSF Thematic Youth WG 2020 Joint Work Plan 2019
UNSF Thematic Youth WG 2020 Joint Work Plan 2020 (revised)
UNSF Thematic WG DSWG 2017 Work Plan 2017 08 08
UNSF-operational plans linkages
Update - UN Lebanon Integrated Communication Campaign - Take a Step

Appendix B: List of Meetings

Advisor for National Commission for Lebanese Women (NCLW)
Advisor for Ministry of Energy and Water
Advisor for Ministry of Social Affairs
Association of Lebanese Industrialists
Beirut and Bourj Hammoud Municipality Focal Points
Data and Statistics Working Group
Director General of Civil Status at the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities
Director General of Ministry of Labour
Donor Group
Economic Pillar Leads
Environmental Pillar Leads
Gender Working Group
Head of OCHA
  Head of International Relations of the Ministry of Labor
Human Rights Working Group
IMF
LHDF Steering Committee
LHIF Steering Committee
Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHA)
Ministry of Trade
Ministry of Interior and Municipalities focal point for all UN agencies
OMT
PMT
PPSG Pillar Leads
RC/HC
RCO
Senior Interagency Coordinators
Social Pillar Leads
UNCT
UNIFIL Chief of Civil Affairs
United Nations Communications Group
UNSCOL Chief of Staff
World Bank