

MID TERM REVIEW OF THE LEBANON CRISIS RESPONSE PLAN (2017-2020) AND  
UNITED NATIONS STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK (2017-2020)



**FINAL REPORT - UNITED NATIONS STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK (UNSF)**

*25 September 2019*

*Joint Venture Composed of*



[www.triasconsult.com](http://www.triasconsult.com)

TRIAS Consult Ltd, Unit 23 Canalot Studios, 222 Kensal Road, London W105BN, UK

## Table of Contents

Acronyms.....	3
Introduction.....	5
UNSF MTR Headlines .....	5
1. Purpose and limitations.....	6
1.1. Purpose.....	6
1.2. Limitations.....	6
2. Findings of the Mid-Term Review .....	6
2.1 Strategic Review of Progress .....	6
2.2. Effectiveness of the UNSF Implementation & Coordination.....	13
2.3 Alignment of the UNSF with Core UN Policy and Reform Priorities .....	21
3. Conclusions and Recommendations .....	26
3.1 Conclusions .....	26
3.2 Recommendations .....	27
4. Annexes.....	32
4.1 Joint Programmes Developed under the UNSF .....	32
4.2 Joint Initiatives/ Programmes Under UNSF.....	33
4.3 List of Meetings MTR UNSF LCRP.....	40
4.4 Documents Consulted MTR UNSF LCRP.....	42

## Acronyms

BOS	Business Operations Strategy
CAS	Central Administration of Statistics
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CDA	Conflict and Development Analysis
CEDRE	Conférence Économique pour le Développement, par les Réformes et avec les Entreprises
CIP	Capital Investment Plan
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DSWG	Data and Statistics Working Group
GoL	Government of Lebanon
HDN	Humanitarian-Development Nexus
HRDDP	Human Rights Due Diligence Policy
HRWG	Human Rights Working Group
IASC	Inter-Agency Steering Committee
LCRP	Lebanon Crisis Response Plan
LHF	Lebanon Humanitarian Fund
LHSP	Lebanon Host Community Support Program
LRF	Lebanon Recovery Fund
MAPS	Mainstreaming, Acceleration Policy Support
MSS	Mechanisms of Social Stability Committees
MTR	Mid Term Review
NAP	National Action Plan
NCLW	National Council of Lebanese Women
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NPTP	National Poverty Targeting Program
NWOW	New Way of Working
OCHA	Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMT	Operations Management Team
PDSP	Productive Sector Development Programme
PMT	Programme Management Team
PVE	Prevention of Violent Extremism
RACE	Reach All Children with Education
RCO	Resident Coordinators Office
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks
UNDS	United Nations Development System
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNSCOL	Office of the Special Coordinator for Lebanon
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSF	United Nations Strategic Framework

VNR  
WB

Voluntary National Review  
World Bank

## Introduction

This is the report of the mid-term review of the United Nations Strategic Framework in Lebanon for the period 2017-2021 (UNSF). It complements the accompanying report of the mid-term review of the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), and the inter-linkages between the UNSF and the LCRP. The report is comprised of four parts: context, purpose and methodology, findings, and conclusions and recommendations. The findings, conclusions and recommendations are organized along the lines of the research questions of the terms of reference and the inception report, under three headings: i) strategic review of progress, ii) effectiveness of the UNSF implementation/coordination structure, and iii) alignment to the UN Development System Reform.

### UNSF MTR Headlines

It is important to remember where the UNSF comes from. It was developed in 2016, to ensure a whole of Lebanon UN approach in addition to, and in complementarity with the response to the refugee crisis articulated in the LCRP. It was designed *quickly*, with an urgency to demonstrate the UN's ability to sustain attention and resources on the country's long standing political and socio-economic challenges in parallel with a massive humanitarian-stabilization response, and without central government counterparts able to fully and consistently engage and own the framework.

A number of current gaps and weaknesses stem from this genesis, notably in terms of the UNSF's lack of visibility beyond the UN, its limited value as a priority setting and resource mobilization tool, a weak M&E system, lingering confusion with regards to its links with the LCRP, and higher than needed transaction costs in its coordination mechanisms.

The MTR documents detail these gaps and weaknesses in more detail. However, the value of the UNSF, and its real achievement, resides in what it has started and what it can lead to. It reinvigorated an integrated approach to Lebanon's multi-dimensional challenges, which had been initiated in 2009, but which had lost a bit of momentum in the early years of the Syria crisis.

The MTR offers evidence of the UNSF as incentivizing joint programming, and as fostering a one UN collaborative culture. Considering the complex UN structure in Lebanon, and the country's challenging environment, this momentum is significant, and it has been recognized notably by the regional UNSDG directors' team, which recently awarded the UN Lebanon the rating of "Exceptional Achievements" for the third consecutive year<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> *The UNCT is noted for delivering key result in 2018, including the roll-out of the SDG agenda and the preparation of the Voluntary National Review, establishing new joint programming initiatives in the areas of rule of law and productive sectors development, the development of a UN/World Bank Partnership Compact and the finalization of a Business Operations Strategy. The R-UNSDG notes positive team spirit and strategic vision through the setting of strategic goals and facilitating collective action, utilizing each team members' strengths. The UNCT is encouraged to continue its positive collaboration and to strengthen its focus on delivering tangible results in support of development goals, with a continued focus on advancing support to the 2030 Agenda. (R-UNSDG 2018 Performance Assessment Statement)*

The UN in Lebanon can build on these achievements in preparation for the UNSF's next iteration in 2021. In this regard, the MTR does not recommend a major 'facelift' to the UNSF now. With a new UNSF planning process due to start in (late) 2020, and other imperatives for the UN until then, major changes are not warranted. Instead, the MTR proposes several adjustments to further support this evolution, focused on reducing transaction costs, aligning the UNSF with the national SDG process and incorporating relevant elements of UN reform (e.g. in terms of joint evaluations and a greater use of the Lebanon Recovery Fund - LRF). The next two years represent an opportunity for the UN to gradually turn the UNSF into the central planning instrument to articulate and communicate the UN's vast contribution to Lebanon's priorities.

## 1. Purpose and limitations

### 1.1. Purpose

As stated in the introduction, the purpose of the Mid-Term Review was to take stock, through contextual lenses, of the progress made during the 2017-2019 implementation, and to provide recommendations for the current UNSF, as well as on the way forward (next UNSF). ***The review was designed and undertaken at the strategic level***, by exploring if and how the UNSF had enabled a 'whole of Lebanon / whole of UN response' and strengthened the UN's identity as a development actor in what is a contested and challenging context. ***To that end, it did not evaluate the realization of each outcome, output or activity.***

In exploring these questions, the MTR addressed the issue of alignment with global policy commitments, including the UN Secretary-General's reform agenda, the New Way of Working approach, and the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

### 1.2. Limitations

In addition to the common limitations listed in the introductory report, the review of the UNSF faced a specific limitation: the lack of a robust Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system, led to the lack of comparative quantitative data which limited the analysis of progress made. The UN annual reports reviewed contained mostly narrative information and at activity and process level, rather than focusing on UNSF outcome indicators level.

## 2. Findings of the Mid-Term Review

### 2.1 Strategic Review of Progress

#### *2.1.1 To what extent have planned outputs and outcomes been accomplished?*

A review of UNSF output and outcome level accomplishments is challenging and brings into sharp focus one of the instrument's limitations related to its M&E system and approaches. This is intrinsically linked with the challenge of AFPs not always providing substantial and relevant inputs (within the agreed mechanisms and routines).

UNSF reporting has been inconsistent since 2017, with uneven adherence to timelines and procedures across the UNCT (in 2017, a semi-annual report was developed with a 'on track/off

track' rating, but since then, according several interlocutors, it has not been consistently undertaken due to other priorities).

There have also been no joint reviews or evaluations to date (for example mid-term joint project evaluations) which could have been used in the mid-term review to case-study the impact of the UNSF in a few areas. This gap is exacerbated by difficulties in accessing socio-economic data in Lebanon more broadly, and the absence of SDG targets, which makes assessments of results achieved even more challenging.

Therefore, given the lack of quantitative data, the assessment is mostly qualitative and draws on narrative reporting and triangulation of feedback from various actors concerned.

This section looks at *select notable results pillar by pillar for their demonstration value* (it does not provide an exhaustive account of each result and activity under each pillar). The assessment of the UNSF's stated commitment to increasing joint programming (UNSF page 35) follows.

### **Outcome 1: All people in Lebanon enjoy peace and security**

Notable accomplishments under this outcome include the support provided to the Government of Lebanon and partners in tracking security incidents and analyzing tensions in real time, which contributes to the mitigation of violent conflict in different areas<sup>2</sup>. The **Social Monitoring System**, funded by Australia and the UK, is an impressive joint and innovative initiative that brings together 65 partners, including the Government of Lebanon, the UN and humanitarian, development and peace partners in reporting social tension hot stops across the country.

This system has been used mostly to inform the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan and its objective of addressing conflicts between Lebanese and refugees but its application could be broader. In addition, the UN has supported municipalities in managing conflict through community dialogues, which have proven to be effective in decreasing tension<sup>3</sup>, as well as a vast number of developmental actions to strengthen social cohesion.

The UN has also been coherently working in implementing the recommendations of the 1325 Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) on Women, Peace and Security. The UN supported the National Council of Lebanese Women (NCLW) in developing a National Action Plan (NAP) in November 2018 and a monitoring framework to implement UNSCR 1325. In addition, six UN entities<sup>4</sup> are developing the UN Joint Programme 'Strengthening Stability: Enabling National Leadership in the Implementation of Lebanon's NAP on UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security' (2019-2022)<sup>5</sup> as the UN's contribution to the NAP. Participating AFPs have recognized the RCO efforts in putting agencies together. The NCLW was very positive about the UN's continuous support, stressing the UN's coordinated approach and its instrumental role in resource mobilization.

<sup>2</sup> The information is collected over 90 per cent of municipalities.

<sup>3</sup> UN. *2018 Annual Report*. Beirut: UN.

<sup>4</sup> ESCWA, OHCHR, UNDP, UNFPA, UNIFIL and UN WOMEN, led by UNFPA and UN WOMEN.

<sup>5</sup> Draft under development

## **Outcome 2: Lebanon enjoys domestic stability and practices effective governance**

With an estimated budget of 30 million USD, the Joint UN Initiative to support the rule of law, security and human rights (2018-2020)<sup>6</sup> builds on the outcomes of Brussels II, CEDRE and Rome II conferences and brings together the various competencies and comparative advantages of the UN system, in line with the UN Focal Point Arrangement for police, Justice and Corrections. Although it has been developed through a consultative process among participating agencies, resource mobilization efforts have been conducted collectively, but also bilaterally between distinct UN agencies and donors.

Under the UNSF, the UN has provided substantial support to data & statistics for development, an area of significant importance and need in Lebanon, through the capacity strengthening of the Lebanese Central Administration of Statistics (CAS). The UNSF Data & Statistics working group (DSWG) has played a pivotal role in these efforts, by coordinating a capacity assessment of CAS as the foundation for a joint UN capacity development programme for CAS and the national statistical system, and by coordinating entity led data related initiatives (MPI, MICS, etc.).

UN agencies have also worked closely together to train, bring together and empower thousands of Lebanese and Syrian young people through the employment and peacebuilding – building bridges amongst “youth at risk” in Lebanon programme. The programme is supporting social engagement of Lebanese and Syrian young people through youth groups. 30 joint ventures business plans are benefitting from coaching and seed funding. Lebanese and Syrians “at-risk” youth are benefitting from vocational training and soft skills development programmes as well as paid internships in local small businesses. The three components of the project are intended to lead to more collaboration and peaceful interaction between Syrian and Lebanese youth.

## **Outcome 3: Lebanon reduces poverty and promotes sustainable development while addressing immediate needs in a human rights/gender sensitive manner**

As stressed by its agency leads, the Productive Sector Development Programme (PDSP) is a product of UN collaboration incentivized through the UNSF. With an estimated budget of \$23.6 million, it is a joint initiative of seven AFPs<sup>7</sup>, to support job creation and economic opportunities in the manufacturing (agri-food) and agriculture sectors with special attention to youth employment and women economic empowerment in disadvantaged areas. The government interlocutor stressed the positive relationship with the UN, through UNIDO. An interesting feature of the approach is the decision by the UN agencies to channel funding for the programme through the Lebanon Recovery Fund - LRF as a means to sustain coherence and raise the visibility of the programme. The idea of reinvigorating the LRF in further elevating the value of the UNSF, which is further explored elsewhere this report, stems in part from this initiative.

At the same time, though this joint programme is seen as a ‘One UN’ approach, it will need to address lingering perceptions, shared by government and donors, that the UN works in siloes and often duplicates efforts, including on women economic empowerment related projects.

<sup>6</sup> UNDP, UNODC, OHCHR, UNICEF and UNHCR.

<sup>7</sup> UNIDO, FAO, UNDP, ILO, UN WOMEN, UNICEF, WFP.



At the outcome 3.2 level, most of the planned results mirror those articulated in the LCRP, with additional interventions centering mostly on UNRWA's work. The assessment of results is therefore more suited through the LCRP lens.

Finally, on environmental governance, there is a joint programme in the pipeline (Mainstreaming Environmental Sustainable Development Goals (SDG)s into national and local agendas) awaiting funding. Its future is uncertain but the feedback received points to higher expectations on the part of the UN in this regard, in light of the needs on the ground, the UN's global leadership and normative role, and as a means to alleviating the burden, in this area, on the LCRP.

*2.1.2 To what extent and in what ways has the UNSF and strategic coordination in programming contributed to achieving synergies, and relevant cooperation among UN entities? How much progress against the specific areas for joint alignment identified in the UNSF?*

The UNSF document commits the UN to consider joint work in five initial priority areas:

1. Developing and implementing a UN-wide strategy for efforts to **Prevent Violent Extremism** and supporting the implementation of the SG Plan of Action
2. Collectively supporting the roll-out of the **Sustainable Development Goals** in Lebanon and the forming of a vision for how the 2030 Agenda can help Lebanon's development in the current context.
3. Aligning efforts to support increased protection and societal participation of **youth** and support the development and implementation of an action plan for the National Youth Policy.
4. Joining forces with the wider international community in Lebanon to analyze opportunities for creation of **economic opportunities and jobs** and move towards a common strategy for supporting inclusive long-term growth in the country.
5. Comprehensive support for Lebanese administrative capacity development – particularly with regards to statistical data.

Overall, this commitment is being met, with tangible progress, albeit at different pace, along all five areas. Two joint programmes have been developed, one under 'youth' (employment and peacebuilding – building bridges amongst "youth at risk" in Lebanon) and one under 'economic opportunities and jobs' (PDSP); coordinated support to the Central Administration of Statistics (CAS), following CAS capacity assessment, is currently being planned. The UN has supported the national Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) strategy, for which Ministerial feedback has been positive, with subsequent steps being planned for its operationalization. Finally, the SDGs roll out is underway, with UNDP and the Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO) supporting the Deputy Prime Minister in developing a Vision. As discussed further down, the SDG support needs to be

<sup>8</sup> Based on feedback received from RCO on the MTR report (August 2019)

more inclusive of the efforts undertaken by other UN agencies, and such support must reflect genuine integrated policy offerings, in line with UN reform and Funding Compact commitments.

Beyond these five areas singled out in the UNSF, the UN in Lebanon has increased the number of joint initiatives, 33 having been collected by the MTR, including seven formal joint programmes<sup>9</sup>, and many of them falling under outcome 3.2. which reflects most of the UN contribution to the LCRP. Of particular significance, considering national needs and global normative obligations, several UN entities (UNDP, UNSCOL and UN WOMEN) worked together during the 2018 parliamentary elections in identifying priorities, planning and programming, to ensure women's participation. Other interesting, and highly relevant examples of cross sector, inter agency work include the UN efforts on the association of children with armed violence in Lebanon (addressing UNSF outcomes 1.2; 1.3; 2.1; 2.2 and 3.2) with UNICEF, UNRWA, UNDP, UNODC, ILO, UNSCOL, and the joint UN World Bank strategic framework for anti-corruption (addressing UNSF outcome 2.1 and 2.2) with UNDP, UNODC, UNSCOL, and UNOPS.

As the UN in Lebanon starts reporting on global UN reform objectives, it will be important, and interesting for the RCO to cost these joint initiatives and see if the UN meets the UN's Funding Compact commitment to allocate at least 15% of resources at the country level to joint initiatives.

One particular emphasis of UN(DS) reform, and the commitment to joint activities, relates to joint analysis and focus on common outcomes. In this regard, and according to several interlocutors, the UNSF has been 'where everything seems to fit' with little time to do a thorough common country analysis and develop a theory of change. Joint context/risk analysis seems limited beyond information sharing during pillar groups and beyond formulation of joint programmes.

Here as well, the links between the UNSF and the risk management framework could be strengthened. The sharing of sensitive political information to inform programming is perceived as lacking. While the MTR could not corroborate this perception, this may call for the design of simple but effective information sharing protocol as part of the operationalization of the risk management framework, building on the anti fraud/due diligence mechanism currently being developed by the OMT. In addition to implementing partner related information (used mostly for fiduciary risk management related purposes) this information sharing protocol could cover dissemination and use of political information of relevance for programming and funding decisions.

### *2.1.3 To what extent did the UNSF itself lead to or influence these achievements?*

As with any UN planning framework the realization of many outputs is rather independent of the framework itself, especially when the framework is designed after or based on pre-existing agency plans and mission mandates. This is certainly the case with the UNSF in Lebanon.

Furthermore, several informants attributed progress in joint programming to the commitment of individuals, rather than a UNSF achievement. However, many more spoke to the value of the UNSF (through its design, and through the pillar discussions) in information sharing, joint analysis and joint work more generally, especially when compared to the 'pre-UNSF' days.

<sup>9</sup> See full list in the annex.

However, the MTR team notes that significant efforts undertaken to maximize the impact of the coordination structures on enabling the achievement of results by the UN in Lebanon. These include:

- The revision of coordination structure to enable a more efficient and effective implementation, steering and follow up of the UNSF.
- The alignment of coordination structure ToR to relate more closely to the UNSF (including the UNCT).
- The work of the OMT and the communication group in support the UNSF (BoS and joint UN Communication strategy developed respectively)
- The comprehensive and inclusive gender scorecard review resulting in an action plan, related to the UNSF.

#### *2.1.4 What are the key challenges and gaps in achieving UNSF outcomes and outputs?*

Some of the main challenges in achieving UNSF outcomes and outputs lie beyond the UN's control. A number of expected results across all three pillars depend on external circumstances that the UN can only seek to influence and shape rather than control. These relate to the national and regional political situation, the inconsistent engagement with and from the government beyond bilateral agency-ministry relationships and the challenges associated with mobilizing development resources in a high middle-income country.

Furthermore, results associated with UNIFIL and UNSCOL are particularly and by nature highly complex and dependent on other actors' actions, but it is also important to note the severe budgetary constraints facing both missions and their direct impact on their ability to successfully carry out mandated tasks.

These external constraints notwithstanding, the UNSF also faces internal challenges and gaps that affect the UN's ability to fully achieve planned outputs and contribute to outcomes:

- The under-utilization of the LRF as a sizeable common funding mechanism to incentivize and support common programming, and drive coherence;
- The lack of a joint governance structure with government to prioritize UN efforts, present and discuss UNSF / system wide integrated policy advice and agree on requirement government actions to contribute to UNSF outcomes;
- An inconsistent and under-capacitated M&E approach that has weakened mutual accountability, joint reflection on progress made and collective adjustments;
- Unclear purposes of pillar work groups and thematic groups, leading to perceptions of redundancies with the LCRP structures and/or higher than needed transaction costs;
- Insufficient socialization of the UNSF with external partners, including government, donors, NGOS and academia, in terms of how they can engage (in the analysis, programming, reporting).

As mentioned previously, many of these gaps reflect the instrument's genesis, which arose more as a 'collation' of UN entity mandates and existing programs rather than as the starting point for setting a 'One UN' strategy, based on a theory of change contributing to collective outcomes.

These gaps also have self-reinforcing qualities:

- Without a robust, central funding mechanism, the UNSF's value as a resource mobilization asset remains low. This in turn impacts UN engagement in the UNSF itself, as well as the instrument's communications value, which is also undermined by the incomplete M&E.
- The absence of consistent and centralized government engagement has also fueled fragmentation, leading agencies to approach line ministries bilaterally, resulting either in duplication of efforts and/or request of funding to donors for the same projects. In this regard, UN interlocutors recognized the UNSF document as a first step towards aligning the work of the UN, and while '*it might take time to fully get there*'<sup>10</sup>, but "*it was a big step forward on the 'what', and the way forward needs to be focusing on the 'how'*".
- Limited visibility and identity of the UNSF at the central/Beirut level also makes it hard to envisage its "localization" with the MoI and the municipalities.
- Furthermore, as mentioned by several interlocutors, capturing progress in a document like the UNSF will always be challenging as there is sensitive work 'behind the scenes' that will not be reported, especially at political and security level. The changing political landscape requires adaptability (as some ministries have been removed or changed since the new government was formed), but there is an inherent rigidity to programming that militates against reliance on the UNSF as a day to day guide.

*2.1.5 To what extent is the UNSF relevant and appropriate in addressing the Lebanon's needs and priorities? What are the main gaps? What has been the impact of changes in the political, operational and regional environment? How should this be taken forward to ensure the UNSF stay relevant?*

Unlike the previous UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAF), the UNSF was developed as a UN system-wide, integrated cooperation framework, including the development, humanitarian, peace, human rights, security and political pillars. The UNSF reflects combined efforts and mandates of the UN presence in Lebanon, i.e. UN Country Team (UNCT), the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL), and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). As such, its *content* remains relevant in addressing Lebanon's needs and priorities, and there is little that the UN does that is not captured in the UNSF.

UN entities, the government and many donors indicated that programming presented in the UNSF has been relevant to address people's needs in Lebanon, despite changes in the political operational and regional environment and the lack of a national development plan and approved national budget. Its relevance is a function of, inter alia, the UN's long-standing presence and understanding

<sup>10</sup> Discussion in pillar 3 meeting.

of the country's challenges (including through UNIFIL and UNSCOL), the alignment of several agency country programs to ministerial/sector strategies as well as its vast scope and formulation.

Its relevance moving forward may be tested however. In particular, as the government develops an SDG plan and with the expected implementation of the CEDRE/CIP program, the UN will need to demonstrate increased responsiveness. This does not require a major change in the current UNSF document (and results framework) per se at this point, beyond marginal adjustments to specific targets as demanded by the context. Major changes should wait the development of the national SDG plan. Rather such adaptation must take place through the work of the UNSF pillars (see below).

### *2.1.6 What risks, if any, to the UN has the UNSF generated?*

The UNSF itself has generated few risks to the UN. This is partially a result of the UNSF's low visibility and its limited use in supporting major policy and programming choices or in informing funding decisions.

But this limited visibility is a double-edged sword. Having failed through the UNSF to strengthen the UN's development identity, the perception has continued that the UN is not doing enough beyond addressing the needs of Syrian refugees. The lack of robust, consistent monitoring of results has further stilted efforts to communicate the UN's comparative advantages and achievements beyond LCRP related results.

The current narrative does not reflect reality; for decades, the UN has provided substantial development value (to say nothing of the UN's peacekeeping and political role), including through very targeted technical support. While such support can certainly be scaled up (notably in energy, environment and livelihoods<sup>11</sup>) and improved (notably through integrated policy advice that speaks to structural transformation needs and long term global trends), the UNSF has not served the UN well in telling this side of the story. In this regard, the UNSF contributes to the reputational exposure of the UN.

## **2.2. Effectiveness of the UNSF Implementation & Coordination**

*2.2.1 To what extent is the UNSF coordination structure (including UNSF pillar groups, working groups, etc.) effective and relevant? Which measures can be taken to increase added value, complementarities and accountability, and promote partnership and coordination with key partners, including government, civil society and partners?*

The UN has set up a coordination mechanism that reflects partially what was suggested in the UNSF document. Below is the current UN coordination structure, including the links to the LCRP:

<sup>11</sup> See Strategic Note recommendations

## United Nations Coordination Structure in Lebanon




Fig 1.1

Many interlocutors spoke to the overall structure’s ineffectiveness and high transaction costs.

However, as a starting point, it is therefore important to note that the coordination structure of the UN in Lebanon is similar and comparable to other UN coordination complex settings. Few, if any of the groups in place would not be found elsewhere.

Furthermore, issues of capacity and transaction costs related to coordination, which exist in Lebanon, exist almost everywhere else, including in places that do not at the same time face a major humanitarian crisis.

It is also important to stress that many interlocutors indicated overall satisfaction with the pillar groups, emphasizing (notably under pillar 1 and 2) their value in sharing information and exploring opportunities for joint work. More could be gained from these structures, but these two attributes should not be derided, especially in Lebanon, where the UN has a complex structure, where the history of collaboration is weak, and where many incentives (different mandates, different funding structures, etc.) act as centrifugal forces. Complaints about coordination structures are common across all UN configurations. Yet without them, they would need to be invented.

The challenges, and the frustration lie mostly in the overlap with the LCRP structures, in the functional relationship between the thematic groups and the pillar groups, and in the missing link between the pillars and the UNCT.

### Overlap

The overlap between the UNSF and the LCRP resides in particular with outcome 3.2. There are two distinct problems: one relates to duplication of reporting and the other one to duplication of discussions. The MTR team believes the first one to be less of problematic than originally understood, and the second one to be relatively easy to fix.

On reporting, there is little variance between the UNSF indicators and those used under the LCRP for the same results (save for slight difference in expected targets under education and health). Hence, as a few agencies indicated, the UNSF's requirement (coordinated by the RCO) to just copy and paste the same reporting information seems to be a small price to pay for having consistency between the two instruments that can 'speak to one another'.

The frustration with having to duplicate discussions held in LCRP meetings with UNSF pillar meetings is more understandable. Here, rather than proposing the abolishment of certain UNSF structures, including the outcome 3.2 group which would have undermined the integrity of the UNSF, the MTR team proposes to shift the nature of the discussions held in the pillar groups.

Where there is overlap, operational coordination matters should be left to the LCRP structures. Under the UNSF, the discussion should focus on the country's long-term prospects and goals (including the SDGs) and on developing common, integrated UN policy offers on major national challenges towards the 2030 Agenda. This shift would align UN operations with UN(DS) reform and the commitment, expressed in the UN System Wide Strategic Document, to provide whole of UN expertise on structural transformations informed by global trends (e.g. future of jobs, technology, financial flow patterns, trade dynamics, etc.). This shift would raise the stakes, and hence the active participation in the pillar groups.

It would also respond to consistent feedback received from pillar members. While most understand the advantage of the current structure, many expressed the need to go beyond information-sharing to focus on policy coherence, joint work and resource mobilization. The 2030 Agenda and UN reform provide an opportunity for that.

To this end, each UNCT member should review its membership in the groups to ensure adequate capacity for analysis and policy/option advice on structural transformation needs.<sup>12</sup>

### **The Link with the UNCT**

This shift (in focus and purpose towards policy support for SDG design and implementation) also requires increased UNCT engagement on SDG related matters and an active programme management team (PMT) or PMT like structure.

The original configuration included a PMT, which would have served as the interface between the UNCT and the pillar groups. It was abolished to make way for a lighter structure. As a result, pillars and the UNCT seem to be operating independently and in isolation of each other and opportunities for cross pillar collaboration may go missing. As expressed by several pillar group members and revealed by the UNCT agendas<sup>13</sup>, and despite the presence of UNCT members in the pillar groups, the lack of UNCT "attention" to the pillars further discourages participation (in the pillar groups).

<sup>12</sup> The MTR team refers the UN to the System Wide Strategic Document and the Cooperation Framework guidance for more details on structural transformation as a key UN lens

<sup>13</sup> While UNCT retreats have included the SDG as a theme, it has not been a regular feature of normal UNCT meetings; nor have Pillar or thematic group briefings been featured regularly in the UNCT meetings.

The RCO is currently drafting ToRs for an ‘UNSF Advisory Group’ which could act as an interface between the UNCT and the pillar groups, as well to ensure cross-linkages among them and policy coherence<sup>14</sup>. An additional structure may indeed be taxing on UN personnel, notably the country and mission directors who are asked to chair the groups, attend the UNCT, and who supposedly would also be asked to participate in this Advisory Group. Yet, the need for integrated/coordinated UN support to the SDG planning process (and notably the need for coherent, collective policy offers in line with UN(DS) reform commitments) is real. The MTR team would therefore propose that in addition to a shift in the focus of the pillar groups meetings, the UNCT make SDG support a standing item of its work plan, supported by a reinvigorated RCO effort, equipped with a policy advisor (as part of core RCO functions as envisaged by the UNDS reform), and jointly with UNDP, to consolidate pillar based and cross pillar SDG work for UNCT consideration. Ad hoc meetings across pillars following the purpose of the proposed UNSF Advisory group would certainly be needed to make recommendations for UNCT decision, but a formal, regular PMT like structure does not seem warranted.

### **The Role of Thematic Groups**

The link between the pillars and the task force and thematic groups is not consistent. At the same time, these task forces and thematic groups have undertaken important work that could be better known, and used by the entire UN system, as the following select examples demonstrate.

The Gender working group<sup>15</sup> has been supporting the implementation of the security council resolution 1325 in Lebanon, in partnership with the National Commission of Lebanese Women, and has been pivotal in coordinating and developing the joint programme for the Development and Operationalization of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. It has contributed to Joint UN advocacy and communication campaigns (2017 and 2018)<sup>16</sup> to which AFPs committed resources, both financially and technically. Looking forward, the group sees itself playing a key role in the next CCA (it did not participate during the 2016 CCA) to ensure gender is well mainstreamed. As mentioned in the Gender scorecard: *it substantively contributed to the 2017-2020 UNSF in terms of strategic prioritization (i.e. formulating outputs, development of interventions, agreeing on joint interventions, etc.), M&E framework (i.e. indicators with baseline and targets) and indication of financial resources*<sup>17</sup>.

The group also supported the implementation of a dedicated UNSF outcome<sup>18</sup> and gender equality mainstreaming across pillars (which caused some confusion among UN entities), and many UN

<sup>14</sup> On the absence of a Programme Management Team (PMT), and to strengthen coordination and policy coherence among the pillars and working groups, and informal group has been formed, led by the RCO, pillar and thematic working group co-leads. The RCO is currently drafting ToRs for the UNSF Advisory Group. It will be chaired by the head of RCO and includes pillar co-leads and thematic group co-chairs, to meet on a monthly basis. The draft ToRs state the group should provide advisory support to the UNCT on inter-agency programmatic and coordination issues, especially on cross-cutting and joint programmes. This group is also accountable for quality assurance of key UNSF products (including workplans, reports and proposals developed within the pillars and thematic working groups), as well as for the deliverables agreed at the UNCT level. Finally, the group is expected to provide advice on potential areas of collaboration among the pillars and working groups to avoid a siloed approach. The ToRs were discussed within the RCO, and at the moment of the field mission, they were not yet finalised and agreed.

<sup>15</sup> The group includes 19 UN entities (AFPs, UNSCOL, UNIFIL, RCO, World Bank).

<sup>16</sup> ‘16 Days of Activism against Gender-based Violence (GBV)’.

<sup>17</sup> UN Lebanon, Gender scorecard, May 2019, p.30.

<sup>18</sup> Outcome 2.3. Institutional mechanisms and policies strengthened for improving the legal status of women and girls, eliminating gender based violence and promoting gender equality.



entities mentioned that this constitutes an area for improvement. There is a disconnect between the pillar and gender workplans, which new leadership in UN Women is now addressing by streamlining the priorities of the working group.

The Human Rights working group (HRWG) has been providing technical support to the national Universal Periodic Review report. The working group also coordinates the development and implementation of the HRDDP (Human Rights Due Diligence Policy), provides training in human rights-based approach to UN entities, and contributes to joint messages on human rights. The group is conscious of the need to scale up the work, but it recognizes capacity limitations. Engagement with pillars has been inconsistent. Several pillar group members indicated human rights mainstreaming as a key gap in their current work.

The Youth working group was re-established by the UNCT in July 2018, and after discussions with partners and UNCT. Its priorities for 2019 are: Evidence Generation and Knowledge Sharing, joint Messaging and Advocacy, youth engagement and Strategic Alignment, Partnership and Resource Mobilization. The youth working group includes most of the UN entities, and has developed a UNSF strategic note on coordination on youth engagement to ensure a coordinate approach among UN entities and has contributed to UN joint messages on youth. The work on youth has been mostly done through outcome 3.2. The youth working group is currently working on a joint programme by the end of 2019.

The Data & Statistics working group (DSWG) was established in February 2017 and is considered by UN entities and GoL counterparts as a very effective group. However, at the moment, the DSWG feels that connections between the pillar groups and the DSWG could be enhanced. To this end, the recently established sub-group on evaluation, will provide reinforced support to the UNSF M&E and joint evaluations is a positive evolution. This group has conducted an internal capacity assessment survey to identify existing capacities to work on a set of initial activities. However, rather than a sub group, the MTR team suggests that M&E feature as a standing item of the regular DSWG agenda, to reduce transaction costs, to further support data driven M&E practices, and to help prioritize data related initiatives according to programmatic and evaluative needs.

### *2.2.2 To what extent have the UNSF and the pillar structure succeeded in mobilizing wider investment / engagement with partners?*

The UNSF itself has had limited impact in mobilizing additional partnerships. The fact is that very few partners beyond the UN know about the UNSF, so it is difficult to link any new partnerships directly to the instrument. However, the programs reflected in the UNSF have themselves naturally generated new partnerships, which the MTR did not prioritize in its assessment. However, the UN annual reports do not represent the full spectrum of ongoing partnerships that could be better reflected to build a stronger narrative of the comparative advantage of the UN as a convener.

One standout development resides in the collaboration with the World Bank, which was formalized through the Strategic Partnership Compact for Lebanon 2018-2020. The Compact overall goal is to jointly respond to the humanitarian crisis and reduce vulnerabilities while fostering economic growth and sustainable development, towards the SDGs. The Partnership, which has recently undergone a review, captures both existing collaboration between the two institutions, such as, inter alia, anti-corruption, gender equality, education, and new areas of strategic joint work (e.g. harmonization in data collection, environmental health, agriculture etc.). Building on the

Compact's commitment to strengthening data collection and evidence base in Lebanon, the UN and the World Bank have committed to a joint country assessment next year, moving towards the alignment of the respective programmatic frameworks for the upcoming cycle. Moreover, the alignment of the respective trust funds (LRF and the LSCTF) should potentially open new funding opportunities, jointly leveraging on donors' support. <sup>19</sup> This local version of the Compact builds on the global framework.

However, the Compact should be seen for what it is, a starting point. Follow up and monitoring of the Compact has increased transaction costs for those involved. Taking stock of progresses made, challenges encountered and recent changes in the national political context, the Compact is being reshaped with various changes<sup>20</sup> concerning the implementation and reporting mechanisms,. In this process and for future reference, the MTR advises against attempts to force and over-engineer collaboration

Beyond the World Bank, civil society engagement with the UN has mostly been done through outcome 3.2, i.e. the work the UN is doing under the LCRP CSOs are largely unaware of the UN development, peace and security work under the UNSF. Several NGO interlocutors indicated that they feel they are not yet seen as equals by the UN, but as implementers.

**Likewise, the UNSF has not been instrumental in leveraging new investments.** At approximately \$80 million, the UNSF's financial footprint (excluding the LCRP elements) is not inconsequential. However, there is little evidence of agencies referring to the UNSF in their respective resource mobilization efforts, beyond a few isolated cases (see joint programme on productive capacities). This is partly a function of having such a large UNSF portfolio actually captured under the LCRP (outcome 3.2), which has much greater value as a fund-raising tool. It is also a consequence of not having government engaged to advocate to donors for the UNSF to be their reference in their funding decisions. And it is also the result of not equipping the UNSF with a central funding vehicle. There is sufficient experience and evidence from other countries to demonstrate that UN planning frameworks gain in relevance and value when supported by a pooled fund that can drive coherence and galvanize joint work. The LRF in Lebanon has not fulfilled that function.

**Moving forward, and with new joint programmes coming on line, the UN has an opportunity to revitalize the LRF** with a more robust programmatic pipeline and position it as a key element of UN reform in action to support the country's development efforts ('development' writ large, encompassing peacebuilding and stabilization efforts). This effort will require convergence between the plan (UNSF), the funding vehicle (the LRF) and the risk management framework as a feature now increasingly standard (and expected) at country level in the following two ways:

<sup>19</sup> This compact builds on the UN-WB Partnership Framework for Crisis and Post-Crisis Situations and recalls the Commitment to Action signed at 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. The original Compact included the following areas for collaboration: data/evidence and alignment of financial instruments; joint programming engagement (water, health, education, economic opportunities/job creation, social safety net, environmental impact of the Syria crisis, and e-governance / anti-corruption.

<sup>20</sup> Major changes include: a) extension of the partnership to 2021; b)" agriculture" added as new area of joint programmatic engagement; c) "environmental impact of the Syria Crisis" was re-scoped and will focus on "environment and climate change", d) reporting on annual basis on both Compact's high level KPIs and specific KPIs per each priority area; e) flexible and dynamic approach in the implementation of Action Plan

- The UNSF results framework constitutes the investment strategy of the LRF (which will follow SDG priorities when the national SDG plan is developed)
- The risk management framework includes risks related to the LRF, both at the portfolio level and for each programme (since risks materializing in any programme funded by the LRF will generate risks to the LRF overall)

It will also require donors to shift some of their funding away from bilateral earmarked support which many seem to prefer. Thus, they will meet their commitment under the Funding Compact, which asks donors to increase their contributions to pooled funds.

### *2.2.3 To what extent is the current UNSF designed as a results-oriented, coherent and focused framework with indicators that are Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic and Time-bound or Trackable (SMART)?*

The UNSF results framework presents the entirety of the UN’s support to Lebanon’s multi-faceted challenges. It has a clear structure flowing from outcomes to outputs. Given the scale of all the programmes and the disparate nature of the UN entities operating in Lebanon, this alone is an important achievement.

However, from a technical perspective, there are elements that could be improved. The formulation of some outputs is insufficiently clear and is not consistent with standard OECD definitions<sup>21</sup> (for example output 2.1.1 “good offices and advocacy efforts deployed toward political progress and evidence-based dialogue facilitated on key issues”). Furthermore, some of the output indicators are too low level. They merely reflect activities, rather than measure progress on the achievement of a result (for example output 1.3.1 indicators no.2 “# of initiatives at community level promoting social stability, including women/youth led initiatives for peace and security”). Where indicators refer to benefits to people, there is no consistent disaggregation of targets by age or sex.

Meta data on indicator numerators and denominators was not provided to the mid-term review team, so a full assessment cannot be made of the robustness of the indicators, but, at face value, many would appear to be challenging to measure consistently and reliably over time and by different UN entities.

Finally, the results framework does not reflect a theory of change, which could have helped articulate the specificity of the UN’s contribution of the UN to outcomes (its unique offer), and clarify the assumptions as to how change takes place. Both are important elements for resource mobilization and for ensuring that accountabilities for results (within the UN, between the UN and other partners) are adequately set.

It is of note that some of these lacunae in the design of the results framework were identified by an external review in 2017. Whilst some indicators have subsequently been removed and others amended, they have failed to address these deeper weaknesses.

<sup>21</sup> <https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7311>

**As a result, consolidated monitoring and evaluation of the UNSF remains limited, and of limited value, including for telling a robust story on the UN's whole of Lebanon approach.** It seems that entities report on what they choose to report on, or what they can report on. For example, the UN annual reports do not represent the full spectrum of ongoing partnerships; those could be better reflected to build a stronger narrative of the comparative advantage of the UN as a convener.<sup>22</sup>

Several additional weaknesses or concerns were recorded:

- Prevention Violent Extremism (PVE) is reflected under both pillar 1 and pillar 2, causing confusion and lack of coordinated response. For the MTR team, PVE seems to fit better under outcome 2, especially if the UN is to uphold distinction between PVE work and Counter Terrorism work.
- Pillar 3 members highlighted the challenges around data especially for SDGs monitoring at outcome level, to capture development gains above and beyond the humanitarian nature of most of the outputs under outcome 3.2. (i.e. 'number of shelters provided' vis a vis 'x number of schools built', or '# of community policing pilot municipalities and related management system set up').
- Pillar 3 members also raised concerns over the links between 'Activity Info' and the upcoming roll out of 'UN Info' (a requirement under the Funding Compact), considering that Activity Info has proven to be a reliable monitoring system which has been developed based on needs throughout the years. The RCO and the LCRP team will need to ensure that this does not further exacerbate the issue of duplication on reporting to both LCRP and UNSF under Outcome 3 when this aspect of UNDS reform is put in place. The RCO is coordinating with the information management team of the LCRP and UN info technical team at HQ to ensure that technical linkages between the two platforms are established and that the advantages of each system are capitalized on. Considerable M&E work will nonetheless need to take place before the UN info roll out to ensure maximum consistency between indicators.

Moving forward, the MTR team is of the view that major changes to the results framework are not worth the effort for now. The next UNSF will provide the opportunity to design a more robust results framework and M&E approach, incorporating UN Info, and based on a solid CCA. Rather,

<sup>22</sup> Despite the wide number of partnerships the UN has enabled, the 2017 Annual report only refers to the following partnerships: CSOs on improving legislation in human rights; one CSO on capacity development to the ISF and the General Security Office (GSO) staff on human trafficking; several line ministries ; and Beirut Bar Association on law enforcement; and makes reference to 'a joint national/UN steering committee (...) to facilitate reviews and guide the strategic direction of the UNSF' but it was not implemented. In the 2018 Annual report the references to partnerships include: local organizations in implementing eleven community stabilization initiatives; Lebanese Government in Improving job skills and employability and Strengthening access to water and sanitation; Ministry of Women's Affairs, in developing the strategy to prevent/respond to violence against women; and Ministry of Public Health and national institutions in Enhancing the quality of the health-care system. In addition, it refers to the UN-WB Partnership compact that has been established.

for now, it recommends minor tweaks (e.g. PVE) and suggests that each pillar choose one particular theme where outcomes/outputs and indications can be adjusted and subjected to a joint evaluation in 2020. Such joint evaluations would i. inform planning and programming for the next UNSF, ii. further incentivize the habits of joint work, iii. enhance the UN in Lebanon's contribution to global commitments on joint evaluations, and iv. Provide a platform for national capacity building and government engagement in the UNSF as a foundation for the next iteration.

### **2.3 Alignment of the UNSF with Core UN Policy and Reform Priorities**

*2.3.1 To what extent does the UNSF enable the provision of integrated policy support to Lebanon, and serve as a true partnership vehicle (including for financing)? To what extent does the UNSF govern all programming efforts of the UN Country Team, including individual country plans and programmes?*

It is difficult to argue that the UNSF governs all programming efforts of the UNCT. A significant part of the UN portfolio derives from the LCRP, which is then reflected in the UNSF.

Furthermore, CPDs are aligned in the sense that most of what is in the CPDs is in the UNSF, and therefore the UNSF offers a comprehensive overview of UN support, but this is the result of retrofitting due to the timing of the original UNSF.

However, there is little to be done for now, and this should not prevent efforts to use the UNSF structures to adapt programming as need be and continue to identify opportunities for joint work.

The decision to extend the UNSF by one year, and the entry into force of UN(DS) reform will provide the opportunity to achieve greater substantive alignment, where the duration and the content of the collective planning framework (the UNSF in the case of the UN Lebanon) informs the duration and content of individual agency plans.

*2.3.2 To which extent is the UNSF based on a unified vision for achieving the 2030 Agenda and how can alignment to the SDG be strengthened?*

While the UNSF includes linkages with the global SDGs at outcome level, the absence of a national and government led SDG vision and plan, with localized SDG indicators prevents further SDG alignment.

However, AFPs have been advising their line ministries bilaterally on how to mainstream the SDGs in their respective sectors, with already a few sector strategies incorporating SDG targets.

At the same time, the UN (through the RCO and UNDP) has played a key role in supporting the Government of Lebanon, through the Prime Minister's and Deputy Prime Minister's Offices, in implementing the 2030 Agenda. It followed the assistance provided for the 2018 Voluntary National Review) with increased support for the preparation of an SDG vision and a mid-term action plan. The Prime Minister's Office spoke highly of the UN's support and recognized the great efforts in providing technical support, since the VNR until now. However, the PMO's interviewee noted the need for an integrated support to avoid fragmentation, to avoid 'agencies knocking at Line Ministries doors and offering parallel advice'.

This last comment speaks to how the UNSF structures can be used to avoid the risk of fragmentation on the SDG process. Overall, the SDG process has not yet been internalized within

the UNSF pillar group. As stated earlier under the coordination section, each pillar group should increase its attention (and the content of its meetings) on initiating the formulation of integrated, SDG focused policy options in its areas of coverage. This is a key requirement of UN reform, and an expectation from Member States.

The foundational work undertaken by RCO and UNDP (which includes supporting government with an SDG work plan and the SDG indicator matrix) is critical and should move forward following four imperatives:

1. One, **the division of roles and responsibilities between the RCO and UNDP on the overall support to the SDG process needs further clarification.** UNDP has the mandate of being the SDG integrator, at the same time the RCO has a key convener role amongst the Government of Lebanon, UN, donors, CSOs, private sector, among others.
2. Two, **the support needs to be inclusive of the entire UN system,** including at regional level. Bilateral advice from agencies to their respective ministerial counterparts must form a coherent SDG policy offer.
3. Three, as the process moves forward, it will be important for the UN to support **discussions on the SDGs localization** and the strengthening the municipalities' capacities for coordinating and monitoring the SDGs implementation, as well as the coordination role of the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities in the SDGs roll out.
4. Finally, there is a sentiment that **donors are insufficiently engaged in collective policy discussions and financing strategies around Agenda 2030.** Several donors see the SDG process as an 'excellent tool to move us forward', and an opportunity to improve coordination at development, humanitarian level under the DPMO (instead of line ministries). The responsibility for increased engagement and policy coherence lies with the donors themselves, but there is a clear role for the RC/RCO in mobilizing a wider coalition around the SDG.

As part of this coalition building effort, the UN will also need to increase the space for civil society organizations (CSOs), including humanitarian and peace actors to enhance their own awareness of the SDGs<sup>23</sup> and meaningfully contribute to policy development around the SDGs. While two NGOs are included in the SDG national committee established last year, the engagement of the wider CSO community has been limited. Right now, Agenda 2030 does not seem to feature high on their agenda; they know little about it and they have been preoccupied mostly with the refugee crisis response.

To this end, the UNCT may consider the deployment of a MAPS<sup>24</sup> mission (Mainstreaming, Acceleration Policy Support) which have proven effective not only in providing technical advice to SDG related policy matters but also in serving as a platform for broad-based, inclusive engagement by a range of UN and non UN actors.

Finally, as the UNCT increases its engagement on the SDG process and prepares, notably through the CCA, for its next UNSF, communication on the SDGs will be critical. According to several interlocutors, while aid actors may be insufficiently aware of the SDG (or unable for now to pay attention), other segments of Lebanese society have shown both an understanding and a desire to

<sup>23</sup> [UN Global Compact in Lebanon](#) have stated some degree of collaboration with the RCO.

<sup>24</sup> <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/files/en/qcpr/doco-summary-brief-on-maps-march2016.pdf>

engage. An SDG communication effort that emphasizes the SDGs as an opportunity, with concrete evidence of direct benefits to people, will prove beneficial at many levels, not least when it comes to countering perceptions that the UN's support for long term development needs in Lebanon is inadequate.

### *2.3.3 Which elements of UNDS reform could be reflected in a revised UNSF? How could it be or should it be adjusted to incorporate relevant elements of UNDS reform to increase its impact?*

At the country level, the main features of UNDS reform were only finalized this year, so it is unrealistic to expect the current UNSF to fully reflect them. However, when exploring how the UNSF could be adjusted to incorporate relevant elements of UNDS reform, three points need to be mentioned.

One, in its nature and in its intent, if not fully in its implementation, the current UNSF already embodies a number of key tenets of UN reform writ large, notably, the focus on prevention (which is also included in the LCRP), the integrated structure of the UNSF and its coordination structures, the UN-WB compact, the Business Operations Strategy (BOS), the annual reporting to government on UNSF results (despite its weaknesses), and the drive towards more joint activities and joint programming.

Moving forward, and within the current lifespan of the UNSF, additional elements of UN reform can be further incorporated, as mentioned previously:

- A reinvigorated LRF, with increased government participation and donor support, equipped with a robust pipeline of joint programmes, and linked to a comprehensive risk management framework;
- The formulation of integrated policy advice, against SDGs and across all SDGs; this entails joint analysis / evidence gathering, joint technical advice on policy options (including financing options) for reaching SDG targets and joint advocacy on ensuring that SDG priorities, targets and programmes reflect key national and international obligations (more details on 'how to' is being developed by DCO for UN use in country<sup>25</sup>
- The roll out of UN Info to improve results tracking and reporting (against SDGs), and;
- Select **joint mid-term, final/impact programmatic or thematic evaluations**, to provide lessons learned and further promote joint work and increase the collective knowledge of the UN in Lebanon to inform the content of the next UNSF

All four elements feature prominently as country level commitments by the UN to the Member States in the Funding Compact approved in July 2019 by the ECOSOC.

Finally, the MTR team recommends that other key elements of UN reform be incorporated in the next UNSF, notably the design of a funding framework that provides greater clarity to government

<sup>25</sup> See upcoming guidance from DCO

and donors alike on the right funding mix required to finance the UNSF. Such a funding framework requires an updated results framework, and thorough analysis (supported by DCO) on which UN interventions are best suited for which types of funding instruments (core, pooled, tightly earmarked, etc.).

The next UNSF should also explore how to incorporate regional SDG dimensions, including regional barriers and enablers to SDG achievement in Lebanon, notably through i. Analysis of regional trends and their impact on Lebanon's SDG trajectory, and ii. Regional responses, in collaboration with UN presences in other countries, to manage regional risks and/or seize opportunities for Lebanon at the regional level (e.g. trade, financing, tourism).

This differentiated approach to UNDS reform implementation enables the UN Lebanon to manage the burden on capacities, especially under the new RCO configuration provided for by UNDS reform. In terms of extra capacity for the system, the MTR team only recommends the on-boarding of a Nexus advisor (see 2.3.5 and recommendation section).

#### *2.3.4 To what extent is the UNSF risk informed to ensure that any threats to the SDGs and vulnerable populations are well anticipated and prevented?*

In the absence of a national SDG plan, threats to SDGs in Lebanon are difficult to assess. The paucity of data on Lebanese populations has exacerbated the challenge. However, significant risk related information is being generated through the LCRP response, which can find its way into UNSF related programming and discussions. The UN has also undertaken significant work for HRDDP implementation (with SOPs developed and endorsed)

Yet, the UN does not seem to consistently invest in ongoing contextual multi-dimensional analysis that can support the UNSF implementation (identifying the risks to the outcomes/outputs) or in programme-related risk analysis in a collective manner beyond that done in the context of joint programmes.

The next CCA process is an opportunity to strengthen the risk based analytical approaches. With UNDS reform, and the focus on prevention, the CCA will now need to be used as a live instrument, based on a real time ongoing multi-dimensional analysis. This is particularly relevant given the wide spectrum of the SDGs. It should build upon existing initiatives to support these efforts, for example the UNDP integrated risk analysis dashboard, UN Global Pulse and seek innovative partnerships in big data and research with universities and think tanks in Lebanon.

At the same time, a UNSF risk framework, which was coordinated by the RCO with working groups and WB/IMF representatives, and endorsed by the UNCT in November 2018 looks primarily at risks *to* the UN. Its comprehensive and integrated articulation of risks, risk treatment measures and the division of labour and partnerships for joint risk management is welcome and still rare amongst UN presences in complex environment. A risk guidance has also been developed for the UNSF pillar groups.

The challenge moving forward is to ensure that the framework is used and embedded in collective decisions under the UNCT. Right now, risks are identified and mitigated at project or programme level, but risk related discussions at a collective level (for example, in making complex programming choices that impact the entire UN presence) could benefit from a more structured analytical process, coordinated by the RCO, OCHA and UNSCOL, based on the framework.



Rather than solicit inputs for regular rounds of updates to the framework, the key operational measure here will be to ensure regular updating of the risk register (already underway), monitor the range of risks identified and only select those for which recent contextual developments leading to a change in the risk level for the entire UN system (e.g. increasing the vulnerability of all entities) warrant UNCT consideration.

Risk related discussions can also feature more prominently in the pillar group discussion, in three ways: basic operational risk sharing information (e.g. related to a partner), portfolio level risk analysis (e.g. what risks to the entire UN, across pillars, are associated with the UN's PVE approach), and SDG related risks (e.g. what risk associated with a particular UN SDG policy position?).

### *2.3.5 Does the UNSF sufficiently integrate collective outcomes spanning the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, and if not how can this be addressed?*

Overall, the UN in Lebanon has made substantial progress on implementing the humanitarian, development and peace nexus, through the design of an integrated UNSF as well as through the support provided through the LCRP, to both vulnerable Lebanese and refugee populations, across the three UNSF outcomes<sup>26</sup>. As recent studies have shown, Lebanon is presented as an international good practice in implementing strategies and programmes that address the humanitarian, development and peace nexus.

As this report and the LCRP report show, there are tangible achievements across all three dimensions of the nexus: reinforce rather than replace national capacities; plan jointly and on multi-year basis across all three dimensions; and plan pro-actively (contingency planning).

With regards to the UNSF, the Syrian crisis and the influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon shaped to some extent the timing and the scope of the UNSF and provided further impetus on joint work, under active leadership of the RC/HC/DSC<sup>27</sup>.

The UNSF's structure reflects the nexus's second imperative, by combining elements of development, emergency, prevention and stability responses. Outcome 2 is a particularly solid example of a robust integrated response to addressing risks and vulnerabilities, linking immediate and long-term needs and working towards collective outcomes. For example, the output on youth that seeks to strengthen youth groups' capacity to engage as active citizens decision making processes has a long-term development dimension awhile addressing the more immediate, LCRP focused need to support social stability (LCRP outcome 2, output 2.2).

Other notable examples of 'nexus approaches in action' include the support to public services through the refugee crisis (\$224 million through national institutions in 2018, a 29 per cent increase from 2017), the Lebanon Reach All Children with Education (RACE), Plan; the Lebanon National Poverty Targeting Program (NPTP); the Lebanon Host Community Support Program (LHSP); and

<sup>26</sup> For example, in outcome indicator 1.2; 2.1; 2.2; 3.1 and 3.2.

<sup>27</sup> ODI. 2017. *The Capacities of Agencies, Funds and Programmes to Sustain Peace, An Independent Review*. London: ODI.

the joint programme on Supporting implementation of UNRWA's School Health Strategy joint programme (UNDP and UNRWA).

The UNSF has also contributed to easing tensions between host communities and refugees, through peacebuilding actions, for example through the joint programme on youth at risk. The programme has created Mechanisms of Social Stability committees (MSS) at village level, as an infrastructure for peace, and has identified opportunities for Syrian and Lebanese youth to work together. The social monitoring system mentioned earlier has served an innovative tool to support the peace dimension of the nexus.

Despite these achievements, several interlocutors indicated they are not yet fully conversant with the new way of working (i.e. humanitarian, development, peace nexus) what it means at implementation level, and that little guidance on how to implement the nexus is available. To this end, the MTR reviewed global and UNHQ guidance, which remains very limited, and at times, behind the practice in Lebanon and other contexts. The reality also is that centralized policy guidance on the nexus may be of limited use: its implementation varies substantially from context to context and needs a tailored made approach<sup>28</sup>.

While the UNCT/HCT could benefit, through the RCO and OCHA from engaging with the IASC task force on strengthening the humanitarian and development nexus as it serves as an exchange platform on good practices and light guidance on how to implement the nexus, the MTR would recommend a different option: Rather than relying exclusively on externally manufactured guidance, the UNCT may explore onboarding a Nexus advisor on a temporary basis (through UNDP and DCO), to support both the LCRP and the next iteration of the UNSF, especially at a time when an SDG plan may be developed and implemented.

### **3. Conclusions and Recommendations**

#### **3.1 Conclusions**

As presented throughout the review, the 2017-2021 UNSF should be seen as a starting point from which to sustain efforts, seizing opportunities in the coming two years in the lead up to the next UNSF.

As currently constituted and used, it has not contributed to a strong narrative on the UN work and added value in Lebanon. The absence of central government counterparts in setting and reviewing the UNSF's strategic direction, several M&E weaknesses, the LCRP imperative, and the lack of a strong funding vehicle are four of the main factors that have undermined the UNSF's identity. Yet, it has enabled in shift in mindsets and practices, with the UN being more joined up and more collaborative across a number of very relevant national priorities.

<sup>28</sup> Lebanon could consider deploying an expert through the UNDG roster of humanitarian, development, peace nexus to provide advice to the UNCT on better adjust the implementation of the NWOW in Lebanon, within the UN and also with the GoL and key national and internal partners. This is particularly relevant now as the SDGs Vision for Lebanon is being developed. The UNCT/HCT could benefit from strengthening the link with the IASC task force on strengthening the humanitarian and development nexus<sup>[3]</sup> as it serves as an exchange platform on good practices and [light guidance](#) on how to implement the nexus, recognising that each context needs a tailored approach.

Moving forward, the UN can capitalize on this shift, which mirrors the direction of travel set by UN reform. The MTR proposes a number of internal adjustments that the UN itself can take: measures that are useful in and of themselves (notably to reduce overlap, and transaction costs) and that set up the UN for success with the next UNSF. **The objective is to gradually set up the UNSF as the central framework for UN joint planning, programming and funding.**

Other actors have a role to play. As described in the Funding Compact, in Lebanon as in everywhere else, behaviors and choices by government and donors in particular shape the UN's ability to achieve results. For government, the development of a credible, inclusive SDG plan represents a key opportunity to drive unity of effort on the part of the UN and to lever additional development resources. For donors, expectations for more sustained coordination by the UN on the SDG process, and for more joint work, are both legitimate and aligned with global commitments. At the same time, donors can incentivize such a shift by living up to their own commitments to promote pooled funding (through the LRF) and collective resource mobilization, and to align their funding to entities with the UN's common framework, engaging with the RC in doing so.

### **3.2 Recommendations**

The UNSF should not go through major facelifts during the remaining period, given the ongoing SDG planning process. Instead, the mid-term review team suggests the following overall adjustments for the remaining period of the UNSF:

- i. Revitalize the LRF and link it with the UNSF, in order to gradually increase the visibility and use of the UNSF as the central planning framework (*in line with the Funding Compact*), along the following lines:

**LRF Revitalization – Key Elements:**

- Develop a pipeline of programs, in collaboration with government, aligned with UNSF results
- Embed the LRF into a comprehensive UN funding framework linked to UNSF results (in preparation for the next UNSF, as mandated in the new Cooperation Framework guidance), that positions it as one of the key funding sources for the UNSF.
- Equip the LRF with a risk management strategy, building and drawing on risks identified in the UN risk management framework and the anti-fraud mechanism being developed, and ensuring that risks related to the governance of the LRF (e.g. government paralysis), the portfolio and individual programs are included
- Explore a ‘national window’ in the LRF, through which funds go directly to public institutions, for targeted/niche support that complements similar national funding mechanisms in place in Lebanon (this would further strengthen the engagement of government with the LRF and the UNSF)
- Ensure and accelerate coordination of LRF portfolio with other funding instruments within the UN (e.g. PBF, LHF) and beyond (e.g. WB fund)
- Consider increased synergies between the LRF and the LHF (with LHF as a specific window) to maximize support for the development-humanitarian-peace nexus, based on three options:
  1. Merger of the LRF and LHF into one fund
  2. Position the LHF as one window of the LRF, allowing for specific earmarks and differentiated governance for project allocation, but under the LRF strategic direction
  3. Keep the LHF separate but increase coordination of portfolio development and implementation (between the two secretariats)

- Task UNSF pillar groups with initiating formulation of SDG relevant integrated policy advice in their areas of focus and explore structural transformation trends (future of job, new technologies, trade dynamics, etc.) on Lebanon’s prospects (*in line with the System Wide Strategic Document*)
- Implement the roll out of UN Info to provide real time monitoring and reporting of results (outputs delivered), tracked against SDGs, and based on a functional and widely understood link with Activity Info (note: *dedicated M&E expertise may be needed to harmonize the two systems*)

*3.2.1 On The Results Framework / M&E*

- Select in each pillar one or two outputs/themes for which new indicators may be needed and conduct joint evaluations by 2020 on these outputs/themes with the support of the DSWG sub-group on evaluation, to inform programming and further incentivize joint work on evaluation and learning (*in line with the Funding Compact*)
- Place all PVE efforts under pillar two, to avoid the duplication of ensure better coordination among UN entities and with partners;

### 3.2.2 On Coordination Structures

- Task pillar groups to focus discussions and priorities on i. identifying opportunities for joint work; ii. initiating the formulation of integrated SDG related policy advice with emphasis on structural transformation and Leave No One Behind, and iii. risk analysis (information sharing, portfolio level risks, SDG policy related risks)
- Rather than (re)instituting a formal PMT structure, use the UNSF Advisory Group on an ad hoc basis as the body for consolidating pillar and cross pillar SDG work and formulate recommendations for UNCT consideration
- Increase the vertical accountability between the pillars, the Advisory Group and the UNCT, by regularizing pillar group and thematic group briefings to the UNCT and UNCT guidance to the pillar groups (through the Advisory Group)
- Incorporate the evaluation sub group into the data and statistics working group (rather than making it a separate group) and include its scope on the agenda of the working group

### 3.2.3 On SDG Engagement

- Ensure inclusive, system wide, and integrated support to the national SDG process, including from regional entities and Non-Resident Agencies (*in line with the Mutual Accountability Framework*)
- Ensure that whole of UN system advice incorporated the dimensions of structural transformation, Leave No One Behind, and partnerships (*in line with the System Wide Strategic Document*)
- Clarify and communicate the division of labor between the RCO and UNDP, as well as expected roles and responsibilities of entities and coordination structures (see above on role of pillar groups)
- Increase engagement with donors and civil society on the SDG process to ensure their participation/representation, including through communications (for the public at large)
- Include a dimension of SDGs localization in the UN's policy, technical and data support, on municipal capacities for coordinating and monitoring SDG implementation, as well as the coordination role the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM) in the SDG's roll out plan
- In addition to a shift in the focus of the pillar groups meetings, make SDG support a standing item of the UNCT agenda / work plan

- vii. Consider the deployment of a MAPS<sup>29</sup> mission (Mainstreaming, Acceleration Policy Support) which have proven effective not only in providing technical advice to SDG related policy matters but also in serving as a platform for broad-based, inclusive engagement by a range of UN and other actors.

#### *3.2.4 On Programming*

- i. Increase the use of integrated area-based approaches and when/where relevant through a humanitarian, development, peace nexus lenses, ensure the transition from stabilization to long-term development outcomes
- ii. Explore opportunities for a scaled up programmatic push on energy, environment and livelihoods, considering the needs, using the LRF (see above), and as a means to relieving pressure on the LCRP
- iii. Consider the deployment of a humanitarian, development, peace nexus expert to inform UNSF related programmatic adjustments and opportunities, increase knowledge and capacities for nexus responses, support government-UN-donor-NGO nexus approaches, and guide the formulation of the CCA from a nexus angle

#### *3.2.5 On Ways to Strengthen Government Engagement Between Now and the Next UNSF*

The MTR does not recommend that the UN push now for reinstating a steering committee for the UNSF. Instead, the MTR proposes the following more practical, sequenced ways to gradually increase engagement with the government between now and the next UNSF and increase government exposure to, and familiarity with elements of the UNSF (including UN reform):

- i. Revitalize the LRF, with government as co-chair for strategic decision-making
- ii. Include government in the proposed joint evaluations
- iii. Establish a steering committee with government in late 2020 / early 2021 for the management of the next UNSF

#### *3.2.6 In Preparation for the Next UNSF*

- i. Ensure that all entities are taking the necessary steps to aligning their respective planning cycles (in particular AFPs and their Country Development Programmes) with the next UNSF
- ii. Seek DCO support to increase the knowledge among UN staff, Government of Lebanon, donors and other key national and international partners on UN Reform including on the Common Country Analysis and the new Cooperation Framework (note: As the UN in Lebanon starts reporting on global UN reform objectives, it will be important, and interesting for the RCO to cost these joint initiatives and see if the UN meets the UN's

<sup>29</sup> <https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/files/en/qcpr/doco-summary-brief-on-maps-march2016.pdf>

- Funding Compact commitment to allocate at least 15% of resources at the country level to joint initiatives)
- iii. Secure a strong partnership with the Government of Lebanon and engage vulnerable groups, donors, CSOs - including through the LCRP inter-sectoral steering committee, academia and private sector in the next CCA process and throughout the planning, implementation and monitoring of the UNSF, including at local level.
  - iv. Include a conflict sensitive theory of change, based on an integrated local, national and regional analysis in the CCA. The mid-term review team encourages the use of the UNDS Conflict and Development Analysis (CDA) tool as well as innovative ways of analysis such as crowdsourcing and making use of the UN Global Pulse capacities and systems
  - v. Review capacity development approaches and achievements, based on clearer/cleaner definitions, and common approaches to staff salary support and use of national systems<sup>30</sup>
  - vi. Ensure that the CCA builds on the SDG Voluntary National Review, recommendations from the human rights mechanisms (including from the Universal Periodic Review), the Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace and Security recommendations, CEDRE, and LCRP related analysis.
  - vii. Building on the strong partnership with the World Bank and the EU/UN/World Bank 2008 Partnership Framework for Crisis and Post-Crisis Situations, consider a partnership with the EU on joint analysis, including through the CCA.
  - viii. Allow for sufficient time, capacity and engagement (including from outside the UN) to ensure quality outputs and validity of indicators through participatory design process and a quality assurance process.
  - ix. In line with the new Cooperation Framework, develop a funding strategy to enable donor alignment with UNSF needs
  - x. Include a stronger regional dimension, notably in terms of regional obstacles or enablers to SDG realization in Lebanon
  - xi. Increase the understanding of risks in a systematic and comprehensive manner to ensure risk informed programming and explore developing a multi-dimensional risk analysis dashboard to track and analyze contextual risks<sup>31</sup>.

<sup>30</sup> See details of the operational recommendation in the MTR Strategic Note

<sup>31</sup> UNDP offers support to UNCTs on early warning and corporate preparedness, and in setting up a country crisis risk dashboard (CRD), a tool which aggregates multi-dimensional data for ongoing tracking and analysis of contextual risks. The dashboard can contribute to adapt programming based on contextual changes, and support UNCT positioning and joint analysis. The estimated timeline to establish such a dashboard varies but 22-28 weeks. This dashboard could be particularly relevant for monitoring the risks to the SDGs through the tracking and analysing risks associated to each of the UNSF outcome and outputs. The DSWG has developed a mapping of all the data produced by the UN entities that can feed into the dashboard.

## 4. Annexes

### 4.1 Joint Programmes Developed under the UNSF

Joint Programme on Youth at Risk, funded by Peace Building Fund in UN Secretariat	1.3	i) Recommendations from research commissioned by the United Nations and the World Bank are implemented and measures are contributing to the evidence on the peacebuilding impact of employment programmes. ii) Inclusive community mechanisms are used to defuse social tensions by providing a mechanism for linking youth-at-risk with skills-building, employability and entrepreneurship support and sensitizing older generations.	UNDP, ILO, UNICEF	MoSA, MoIM, MoYS, municipalities	January 2018-June 2019
Productive Sectors Development Programme	3.1	Job creation and economic opportunities in the manufacturing (agro-food) and agriculture sectors with special attention to youth	FAO, UNIDO, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, ILO, UNWOMEN	Mol, MoA, MoET, MoSA, MoL	2019 (upon arrival of funding) - 2022
Mainstreaming environmental Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) into national and local agendas	3.3	Government has mainstreamed environmental Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) into national and	UNDP, FAO, UN ENVIRONMENT, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNOPS	MoA, MoE, MoEW, MoIM, Mol, MoET, OPCM, Parliament, UNION of Municipalities and	2019-2021
Respond to the sudden and urgent multi-dimensional humanitarian crisis in Tripoli through the human security approach	3.2, 1.3	Human Security improved through neighborhood upgrading and economic empowerment of vulnerable refugees and host committees.	UN Women, UN-Habitat, UNICEF	MoSA, Municipality of Tripoli	April 2019 - March 2020
Joint Initiative for the Development and Operationalization of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda	1.2; 1.3; and 2.2	Government of Lebanon has finalised and rolled out implementation of the country's first National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325. The partnership focuses on joint activities and campaigns to support the development and	UN Women, UNDP, UNFPA, OHCHR, UNIFIL (with ESCWA)	NCLW, OMSWA	2017-2020
Supporting implementation of UNRWA School Health Strategy	3.2	WASH programme has improved school physical environment, solid waste, and hygiene through ANERA.	UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA	MoE	2017/2018
Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme	3.1	i) Assets are developed; ii) Temporary job opportunities are created.	ILO & UNDP	MoSA & MoL	2nd Phase Jan 2019 - may 2020



## 4.2 Joint Initiatives/ Programmes Under UNSF

<b>Title of Joint UN Programming Initiative</b>	<b>UNSF Outcome(s)</b>	<b>Key Objective(s)</b>	<b>Involved UN Entities</b>	<b>Government Counterparts</b>	<b>Time-frame</b>	<b>Joint Programme (Y/N)</b>
<b>Joint UN strategic framework for rule of law in Lebanon (security, justice, and human rights)</b>	1.2; 1.3; 2:1; and 2:2	The most vulnerable have increased access to justice and security, and their rights are being promoted and protected by the state.	UNDP, UNODC, OHCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF	MoJ, MoIM, ISF, GS, LAF and prison authorities	2017-2020	N
<b>Joint UN Approach to address the association of children with armed violence in Lebanon</b>	1.2; 1.3; 2.1; 2.2 and 3.2	Communities and leaders in Lebanon reject the use of or support to armed violence by under 18; children associated with armed groups are protected, rehabilitated and reintegrated in their communities. Government of Lebanon prevents or addresses the involvement of children in armed violence through laws, policies and programmes.	UNICEF, UNRWA, UNDP, UNODC, ILO, UNSCOL	MoSA, MoJ, MoIM, MoD	2019 onwards (6-monthly extensions/reviews)	N
<b>Joint UN World Bank strategic framework for anti-corruption</b>	2:1 and 2:2	Lebanon is enabled to prevent and combat corruption in the public sector and its interface with businesses and citizens.	UNDP, World Bank, UNODC, UNSCOL, UNOPS	OPCM, OMSAR, MoJ,	2019-2030	N
<b>Joint Programme on Youth at Risk, funded by Peace Building Fund in UN Secretariat</b>	1.3	i) Recommendations from research commissioned by the United Nations and the World Bank are implemented and measures are contributing to the evidence on the peacebuilding impact of employment programmes. ii) Inclusive community mechanisms are used to	UNDP, ILO, UNICEF	MoSA, MoIM, MoYS, municipalities	January 2018-June 2019	Y

		defuse social tensions by providing a mechanism for linking youth-at-risk with skills-building, employability and entrepreneurship support and sensitizing older generations.				
<b>Productive Sectors Development Programme</b>	3.1	Job creation and economic opportunities in the manufacturing (agro-food) and agriculture sectors with special attention to youth employment & women economic empowerment in disadvantaged areas.	FAO, UNIDO, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, ILO, UNWOMEN	MoI, MoA, MoET, MoSA, MoL	2019 (upon arrival of funding) - 2022	Y
<b>Mainstreaming environmental Sustainable Development Goals (SDG)s into national and local agendas</b>	3.3	Government has mainstreamed environmental Sustainable Development Goals (SDG)s into national and local agendas, including policy support, monitoring and capacity building.	UNDP, FAO, UN ENVIRONMENT, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNOPS	MoA, MoE, MoEW, MoIM, MoI, MoET, OPCM, Parliament, UNION of Municipalities and Municipalities	2019-2021	Y
<b>Respond to the sudden and urgent multi-dimensional humanitarian crisis in Tripoli through the human security approach</b>	3.2, 1.3	Human Security improved through neighborhood upgrading and economic empowerment of vulnerable refugees and host communities. The project is Phase II of the UNHSTF project initiated in 2016.	UN Women, UN-Habitat, UNICEF	MoSA, Municipality of Tripoli	April 2019 - March 2020	Y
<b>LOUISE (Lebanon One Unified Inter-organisational System for e-cards)</b>	3.2	The LOUISE partnership has improved complementarities between the agencies' mutual efforts in the delivery of cash based assistance, created synergies and ensured that affected populations receive the best assistance possible in a cost effective manner while avoiding parallel systems or duplication.	UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF	MoSA		N

<p><b>Provide technical support to government institutions and civil society organizations to ensure better inter-ministerial/ CSO coordination while dealing with victims of trafficking, including development of national standard operating procedures</b></p>	<p>1.1; 2.1; and 2.2.</p>	<p>Lebanese capacity to support victims of trafficking strengthened and national standard operating procedures developed.</p>	<p>IOM (lead), OHCHR, UNICEF + Partners</p>	<p>OPCM, MoSA, NCLW, MoPH, MoI, MoJ, OMSWA, Parliament</p>		<p>N</p>
<p><b>Expanded program of Immunization</b></p>	<p>3.2</p>	<p>Children are protected against vaccine preventable diseases. The partnership focuses on reinforcing routine vaccination, ensuring availability of vaccines and quality management of vaccines, and organizing national vaccination campaigns. In addition, it provides technical support for monitoring vaccine coverage.</p>	<p>WHO, UNICEF</p>	<p>MoPH, MoSA</p>	<p>2019-2023</p>	<p>N</p>
<p><b>Primary health care reinforcement</b></p>	<p>3.2</p>	<p>Continuum of care ensured for beneficiaries between PHC, secondary and tertiary care. This includes designing the model, costing the packages of services, and training HRH. The initiative is piloting models of service delivery and payment mechanisms, with focus on people centered primary care.</p>	<p>WHO, World Bank (with EU)</p>	<p>MoPH, MoSA</p>	<p>2019-2021</p>	<p>N</p>

<b>National school health program</b>	3.2	School health programmes are reinforced in its three components: physical medical screening, health promotion and awareness, and healthy school environment.	WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNDP	MoPH, MEHE	2007-ongoing	N
<b>Upgrading the technical agriculture education system in Lebanon</b>	3.1	Seven agricultural technical schools are managed in a sustainable manner providing adequate high quality agricultural technical training for young Lebanese and Syrians to respond to the labour market demand.	FAO, ILO, UNICEF	MoA	2016-2019	N
<b>Solid Waste management</b>	3.3	Improved solid waste management (programming initiated).	UNHCR & UNDP	MoEnv.	2019	N
<b>Building the capacity of the water establishments (WE) on water safety planning.</b>	3.2	Improved capacity of the water establishments to supply safe water to both Lebanese and refugees. It includes capacity building of the water establishments to develop and implement water safety plans.	UNHCR, UNICEF (with IHE)	MoEW/WE	2019-2020	N
<b>Joint Initiative for the Development and Operationalisation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda</b>	1.2; 1.3; and 2.2	Government of Lebanon has finalised and rolled out implementation of the country's first National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325. The partnership focuses on joint activities and campaigns to support the development and endorsement process. Upon endorsement, UN agencies will further support the Government with implementation of WPS through a UN joint programme	UN Women, UNDP, UNFPA, OHCHR, UNIFIL (with ESCWA)	NCLW, OMSWA	2017-2020	Y
<b>Learning Support programme at</b>	3.2	Improved learning of Palestine refugee children at lower grades focusing on the learning and well being of	UNICEF, UNRWA	MoE	2017/2018	N

<b>UNRWA schools</b>		children with disabilities and learning difficulties.				
<b>Supporting implementation of UNRWA School Health Strategy</b>	3.2	WASH programme has improved school physical environment, solid waste, and hygiene through ANERA.	UNDP, UNICEF, UNRWA	MoE	2017/2018	Y (UNDP, UNICEF, ANERA)
<b>Direct assistance including: multi-purpose cash assistance, targeted seasonal support and food assistance are provided to most vulnerable persons of concern.</b>	3.2.10	Vulnerable persons in Lebanon meet their needs in dignity, are protected and can become more resilient.	UNRWA, WFP	MoSA	2018/2019	N
<b>Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programme</b>	3.1	i) Assets are developed; ii) Temporary job opportunities are created.	ILO & UNDP	MoSA & MoL	2nd Phase Jan 2019 - may 2020	Y
<b>Community Security</b>	1.2	1. Host communities and Syrian refugees have access to basic security services; 2 MoIM Governate/District authorities and ISF provide support to municipalities to respond to basic security needs; 3. Vulnerable groups including women have access to basic justice services; 4. Basic needs of prison population at risk are addressed.	UNDP & UNHCR	MoIM	2017 - 2021	N
<b>Strengthen the Long Term Resilience of Sub National Authorities</b>	3.1	i). Subnational authorities have enhanced capacity; ii) Service delivery is increasingly responsive and generates greater social stability outcomes based on the needs of the	UNDP and UN Habitat	MoIM	2019 - 2021	

		host and refugee populations; iii). Subnational authorities are empowered to facilitate local economic development.				
<b>Joint assessment of the situation of the refugees (VASYR)</b>	3.2	Conduct household-level visits to assess the socio-economic vulnerability of Syrian refugees.	UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP	MOSA	2019	N
<b>Call Center</b>	3.2	A joint UNHCR and WFP call centre for winter cash & food assistance provides two way communication between refugees & agencies, incl. monitoring and reporting red cards & protection relation issues.	UNHCR and WFP		2019	N
<b>Support the development of policies/strategies/action plans to prevent and respond to gender based violence</b>	2.3 & 3.2	i) Support provided to GBVIMS Coordinator Position; ii) SGBV Task Force ensures quantitative profiling, collection of data on SGBV incidents and proper analysis in place for better coordinated response.	UNHCR, UNICEF, UNFPA	MoSA	2019	N
<b>Strengthening social protection in Lebanon through supporting SDCs</b>	3.2	Social service cards programme, Social protection working group, SDCs assessment are coordinated, efficient and effective.	UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP	MoSA	2019	N
<b>Support to the Roll-Out of Child Protection Information Management System-CPIMS</b>	3.2	Information management system in place for efficient child protection cases.	UNHCR, UNICEF	MoSA	2019	N

<b>System strengthening and institutional support to MEHE</b>	3.2	i) Technical staff deployed or seconded to MEHE and its institutions (PMU, DG) ii) Harmonizing staffing support to MEHE to avoid duplication and ensure that support provided to the ministry contribute to the overall plan.	UNHCR, UNICEF	MEHE	2019	N
<b>Joint advocacy with donors to ensure an education national data system in place</b>	3.2	MEHE has developed/shared a 3-4 years road map on the 'School Information Management System-SIMS' and ensured one consolidated national education system.	UNHCR, UNICEF	MEHE	2019	N
<b>Support to profiling, referring out of school children and back to School</b>	3.2	i) Drop outs are brought back to school; ii) Data is collected on children out of schools and efforts are strengthened to refer children to schools.	UNHCR, UNICEF	MEHE	2019	N
<b>Support to Secondary education</b>	3.2	Increased access to secondary education. Joint programming initiative and emerging, where UNHCR will aim at complementing UNESCO efforts to support tuition fees for Syrians under secondary education.		MEHE	2019	N
<b>Support Vulnerable Lebanese and Non-Lebanese (girls and boys) to access to primary education</b>	3.2	Vulnerable Lebanese and Non-Lebanese (girls and boys) are provided with adequate support to enrol primary education. UNHCR contribution is limited to retention of children in primary education.	UNHCR, UNICEF	MEHE	2019	N

Table prepared by the RCO, 20 June 2019.

### 4.3 List of Meetings MTR UNSF LCRP

- 1- 3RP Secretariat (Yvonne Helle)
- 2- Al Majmoua (Alia Farhat)
- 3- Ambassador of Norway HE (Ms Lene Lind)
- 4- Basic Assistance Sector Coordinator (Khalil Dagher)
- 5- Byblos Bank Chief Economist (Nassib Ghobril)
- 6- Caritas (Ms. Rita Rhayem)
- 7- CAS (Lara Bader)
- 8- Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture of Beirut: (Rabih Sabra, Director General of the Chamber and Hana Nehme Haidar, Director of Human Resources)
- 9- Concern (Catherine Whybrow)
- 10- Data and Statistics working group
- 11- Donor group meeting
- 12- Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany (Raymond Taraby and Stefanie Scharf, Head of Cooperation)
- 13- EU-EEAS (Rein Nieland, Jose Vinuesa, Head of Political section, programme Managers)
- 14- FAO Country Representative (Maurice Saade)
- 15- Field visit with UNDP and UNHCR to north Lebanon
- 16- Field visit with UNHCR and UNDP to the southern district of Beirut
- 17- Focus group discussion with NGOs and INGOs
- 18- Gender working group
- 19- HCT
- 20- Health Sector Coordinator (Stephanie Laba)
- 21- IMP (Najla Nakhle)
- 22- Joint task force of the LCRP
- 23- LCRP inter-sector meeting
- 24- LCRP interagency team
- 25- Lebanese Red Cross (Jad Achkar, Elie Tekle)
- 26- Lebanon Center for policy studies
- 27- Livelihoods Sector Coordinator (Hiba Douaihi)
- 28- Mercy corps (Georges Antoun)
- 29- Ministry of Education and Higher Education (Iman)
- 30- Ministry of Energy and LCRP Environment task force (Lamia Mansour)
- 31- Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (Randa Hobeich)
- 32- Ministry of Industry (Ms. Feryal Moghrady)
- 33- Ministry of Justice (Hon. Mr Ayman Ahmad, Hon. Ms Angela Dagher, Hon. Ms Razane Hajj Chehade, and Hon. Ms Raja AbiNader)
- 34- MoSA (Robin Saghbini, special advisor to the minister of social affairs)
- 35- MTR management team (Anne France White (OCHA), Jean-Charles Rouge (Inter-agency), Jon Hedenstrom (UNRCO), Kristine Najjar (UNRCO) Carol Sparks and Lauren Panetta (UNHCR))
- 36- National Commission for Lebanese Women (Ms. Haeyk Massaad)



- 37- OHCHR (Ulrik Hallsteen, Lyn Eid, and Ansam Al-Abayechi)
- 38- Operations management team
- 39- Outcome 3:1 coordinators (Etienne Careme and Nada Nohra (FAO and UNIDO) and Cristiano Pasini, (UNIDO Representative))
- 40- Prime Minister's office (Ms. Hazar Caracalla)
- 41- RCO (Jon Hedenstrom, Kristine Najjar, Rony Gedeon, Roberta Maio, Christian De Clercq Hanna Schmitt and Michael Schaadt)
- 42- Shelter Sector Coordinator (Abed Abdelghani)
- 43- Social Stability Sector Coordinator (Tom Lambert)
- 44- UN Global Compact (Ms. Dina Harake)
- 45- UN Habitat Country Representative (Tarek Osseiran)
- 46- UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (Philippe Lazzarini)
- 47- UN Risk Management (Anne-France White, Alexander Binns (OCHA) Jon Hedenstrom, Michael Schaadt (RCO) and Sabir Mughal (DSS))
- 48- UN Women Country Representative (Rachel Dore Weeks)
- 49- UNCT
- 50- UNDP (Diana Menhem)
- 51- UNDP CPD evaluators (Ms. Vijayalakshmi Vadivelu)
- 52- UNDP Representative (Celine Moyroud)
- 53- UNFPA (Asma Kordahi)
- 54- UNHCR (Lauren Panetta, Carol Sparks, Layal Abou Darwich)
- 55- UNHCR Country Representative (Mireille Girard)
- 56- UNHCR Deputy Representative – Protection (Karolina Lindholm Billing)
- 57- UNIC Director (Marguerite el Helou)
- 58- UNICEF (Sarah Hague)
- 59- UNICEF Country Representative (Tanya Chapuisat)
- 60- UNICEF Deputy Representative (Violet Speek-Warnery)
- 61- UNICEF (Alex Schein)
- 62- UNRWA affaires OiC (Daniela Leinen)
- 63- UNSCOL and UNIFIL (Office of Chief of Staff and Political Affairs unit (UNSCOL))
- 64- UNSF pillar 1
- 65- UNSF pillar 2
- 66- UNSF pillar 3
- 67- US Embassy (Stephen Estes, Youssef Boutros)
- 68- WFP (Kaori Ura)
- 69- WFP (Paul Skoczylas, Simon Renk, Yasmine Kara, Kaori Ura)
- 70- WFP Country Representative (Abdallah Alwardart)
- 71- WHO Country Representative (Iman Shankiti)
- 72- Women Peace and Security Joint Programme meeting
- 73- World Bank (Haneen Sayed, Mouna Couzi, Mouna Ziade, Paul Welton, Pierre Joseph Kamano and Wissam Harake)

#### 4.4 Documents Consulted MTR UNSF LCRP

##### LCRP:

- 1- Brussels monitoring framework draft
- 2- End of year financial tracking (Jan-Dec) 2017
- 3- End of year financial update 2017
- 4- End of year financial update 2018
- 5- End of year sector dashboard basic assistance 2017
- 6- End of year sector dashboard basic assistance 2018
- 7- End of year sector dashboard education 2017
- 8- End of year sector dashboard education 2018
- 9- End of year sector dashboard energy 2017
- 10- End of year sector dashboard energy 2018
- 11- End of year sector dashboard food security 2017
- 12- End of year sector dashboard food security 2018
- 13- End of year sector dashboard health 2017
- 14- End of year sector dashboard health 2018
- 15- End of year sector dashboard livelihoods 2017
- 16- End of year sector dashboard livelihoods 2018
- 17- End of year sector dashboard multisector 2017
- 18- End of year sector dashboard multisector 2018
- 19- End of year sector dashboard protection 2017
- 20- End of year sector dashboard protection 2018
- 21- End of year sector dashboard shelter 2017
- 22- End of year sector dashboard shelter 2018
- 23- End of year sector dashboard social stability 2017
- 24- End of year sector dashboard social stability 2018
- 25- End of year sector dashboard water 2017
- 26- End of year sector dashboard water 2018
- 27- External review of coordination in Lebanon (LCRP 2015-2016), Paul Bonard, Lewis Sida and Inger-Johanne Tjoflaat
- 28- Financial trends 2015-2018 v2
- 29- Findings from participatory assessments with working children, child spouses, female-headed households, women alone, detained persons, minorities and stateless persons in Lebanon, UNHCR
- 30- HCT minutes of meeting (ad hoc – draft) 190517
- 31- HCT minutes of meeting 011218
- 32- HCT minutes of meeting 061218
- 33- HCT minutes of meeting 080617
- 34- HCT minutes of meeting 080818
- 35- HCT minutes of meeting 090518
- 36- HCT minutes of meeting 090618

- 37- HCT minutes of meeting 091018
- 38- HCT minutes of meeting 110517
- 39- HCT minutes of meeting 130618
- 40- HCT minutes of meeting 150318
- 41- HCT minutes of meeting 170117
- 42- HCT minutes of meeting 170119
- 43- HCT minutes of meeting 170302
- 44- HCT minutes of meeting 170406
- 45- HCT minutes of meeting 170706
- 46- HCT minutes of meeting 170914
- 47- HCT minutes of meeting 171012
- 48- HCT minutes of meeting 171109
- 49- HCT minutes of meeting 180418
- 50- HCT minutes of meeting 180419
- 51- HCT minutes of meeting 180718
- 52- HCT minutes of meeting 210218
- 53- HCT minutes of meeting 210219
- 54- HCT minutes of meeting 210319
- 55- In Focus: Evictions of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 23 May 2017
- 56- In Focus: Secondary and Tertiary Health Referrals June 2017
- 57- In Focus: Informal Settlements June 2017
- 58- In Focus: Cash-Based Assistance under the LCRP May 2018
- 59- In Focus: Child Labour in Lebanon November 2018
- 60- In Focus: Evictions of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon in 2018 February 2019
- 61- Independent monitoring report for the Brussels framework (data) 7 March 2019
- 62- Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon Survey 2018 Field National
- 63- Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon Survey 2018 Field Office Beirut & Mount Lebanon
- 64- Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon Survey 2018 Field Office Bekaa and Baalback  
Hermel
- 65- Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon Survey 2018 Field Office North and Akkar
- 66- Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon Survey 2018 Field Office South and Nabatieh
- 67- Inter-sector MandE framework December 2018
- 68- Inter-sector priorities compiled v6
- 69- Inter-sector vulnerabilities discussion with comments
- 70- LCRP 2017
- 71- LCRP 2018
- 72- LCRP 2019
- 73- LCRP annual report 2017
- 74- LCRP basic assistance 2017-2020 logframe
- 75- LCRP basic assistance 2018 logframe
- 76- LCRP basic assistance 2019 logframe
- 77- LCRP basic assistance 2019 logframe Q1
- 78- LCRP education 2017-2020 logframe
- 79- LCRP education 2018 logframe
- 80- LCRP education 2019 logframe
- 81- LCRP education 2019 logframe Q1

- 82- LCRP energy 2017-2020 logframe
- 83- LCRP energy 2018 logframe
- 84- LCRP energy 2019 logframe
- 85- LCRP energy 2019 logframe Q1
- 86- LCRP food security 2017-2020 logframe
- 87- LCRP food security 2018 logframe
- 88- LCRP food security 2019 logframe
- 89- LCRP food security 2019 logframe Q1
- 90- LCRP health 2017-2020 logframe
- 91- LCRP health 2018 logframe
- 92- LCRP health 2019 logframe
- 93- LCRP health 2019 logframe Q1
- 94- LCRP key facts and figures 2018
- 95- LCRP key facts and figures 2019
- 96- LCRP livelihoods 2017-2020 logframe
- 97- LCRP livelihoods 2018 logframe
- 98- LCRP livelihoods 2019 logframe
- 99- LCRP livelihoods 2019 logframe Q1
- 100- LCRP MandE system final
- 101- LCRP overview 2019
- 102- LCRP population figures 261018
- 103- LCRP progress report 2018 draft
- 104- LCRP protection 2017-2020 logframe
- 105- LCRP protection 2018 logframe
- 106- LCRP protection 2019 logframe
- 107- LCRP protection 2019 logframe Q1
- 108- LCRP reporting calendar 2019
- 109- LCRP research question matrix 2019
- 110- LCRP sector coordinators and field focal points 2019
- 111- LCRP shelter 2017-2020 logframe
- 112- LCRP shelter 2018 logframe
- 113- LCRP shelter 2019 logframe
- 114- LCRP shelter 2019 logframe Q1
- 115- LCRP social stability 2017-2020 logframe
- 116- LCRP social stability 2018 logframe
- 117- LCRP social stability 2019 logframe
- 118- LCRP social stability 2019 logframe Q1
- 119- LCRP steering committee meeting report 24 November 2017
- 120- LCRP water 2018 logframe
- 121- LCRP water 2018 logframe
- 122- LCRP water 2018 logframe
- 123- LCRP water 2019 logframe
- 124- LCRP water 2019 logframe Q1
- 125- Lebanon coordination review, presentation by the interagency team to the HCT 18 September 2017
- 126- Lebanon partnership paper April 2018

- 127- Lebanon Q4 funding update v3
- 128- Mainstreaming Environmental Issues in the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan and the Transition to Sustainable Development in Lebanon, Reflections and Opportunities for consideration by the LCRP/UNSF Mid-term Evaluation Team by the environment task force 2019
- 129- Making aid to Jordan and Lebanon work: aid effectiveness in middle income countries affected by mass displacement, Oxfam LCPS and Phenix
- 130- Outcomes of LCRP steering committee July 2018
- 131- Participatory assessment main findings 2017-2018
- 132- Presentation on coordination survey results by the Interagency coordination team 2 March 2018
- 133- Public institutions support report 2015
- 134- Public institutions support report 2016
- 135- Public institutions support report 2017
- 136- Public institutions support report 2018
- 137- Quarterly sector dashboards basic assistance Jan-Apr 2017
- 138- Quarterly sector dashboards basic assistance Jan-Jul 2017
- 139- Quarterly sector dashboards basic assistance Jan-Apr 2018
- 140- Quarterly sector dashboards basic assistance Jan-Aug 2018
- 141- Quarterly sector dashboards education Jan-Apr 2017
- 142- Quarterly sector dashboards education Jan-Jul 2017
- 143- Quarterly sector dashboards education Jan-Apr 2018
- 144- Quarterly sector dashboards education Jan-Aug 2018
- 145- Quarterly sector dashboards energy Jan-Apr 2017
- 146- Quarterly sector dashboards energy Jan-Jul 2017
- 147- Quarterly sector dashboards energy Jan-Apr 2018
- 148- Quarterly sector dashboards energy Jan-Aug 2018
- 149- Quarterly sector dashboards health Jan-Apr 2017
- 150- Quarterly sector dashboards health Jan-Jul 2017
- 151- Quarterly sector dashboards health Jan-Apr 2018
- 152- Quarterly sector dashboards health Jan-Aug 2018
- 153- Quarterly sector dashboards livelihoods Jan-Apr 2017
- 154- Quarterly sector dashboards livelihoods Jan-Jul 2017
- 155- Quarterly sector dashboards livelihoods Jan-Apr 2018
- 156- Quarterly sector dashboards livelihoods Jan-Aug 2018
- 157- Quarterly sector dashboards protection Jan-Apr 2017
- 158- Quarterly sector dashboards protection Jan-Jul 2017
- 159- Quarterly sector dashboards protection Jan-Apr 2018
- 160- Quarterly sector dashboards protection Jan-Aug 2018
- 161- Quarterly sector dashboards shelter Jan-Apr 2017
- 162- Quarterly sector dashboards shelter Jan-Jul 2017
- 163- Quarterly sector dashboards shelter Jan-Apr 2018
- 164- Quarterly sector dashboards shelter Jan-Aug 2018
- 165- Quarterly sector dashboards social stability Jan-Apr 2017
- 166- Quarterly sector dashboards social stability Jan-Jul 2017
- 167- Quarterly sector dashboards social stability Jan-Apr 2018

- 168- Quarterly sector dashboards social stability Jan-Aug 2018
- 169- Snapshot of IM tools
- 170- Survey of refugees and field staff in Lebanon, World Humanitarian summit, OECD
- 171- Taking stock of recent reports/ assessments regarding the UN's humanitarian response and "sustaining peace", Summary of Reports and Findings
- 172- Trend Analysis of Participatory Assessment (PA) Reports: A timeline of key events reported by persons of concern from 2012 to 2017
- 173- UN Humanitarian Coordination in Lebanon the Consequences of Excluding Syrian Actors, Kholoud Mansour
- 174- Understanding vulnerabilities IFG 22 May 2019
- 175- VASyR 2017 key findings
- 176- VASyR 2018 key findings
- 177- Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon VASyR 2017
- 178- Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon VASyR 2018
- 179- Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon VASyR 2019

**UNSF:**

- 1- Activities UNSF finalization 24 March 2016
- 2- Agenda Pillar Group Meeting 1
- 3- Agreed final changes in Pillar 2 of the joint UN workplan 2019
- 4- Annex Advocacy messages
- 5- Annex Advocacy messages
- 6- Annex UNSF Annual Review Dashboard 2017
- 7- Annex UNSF JWP activities and resources 2018
- 8- Annex UNSF JWP activities and resources final 13 February 2018
- 9- Annotated agenda for the Pillar Groups Meeting 1
- 10- Annual UN Lebanon report 2018 Arabic
- 11- Annual UN Lebanon report 2018 English
- 12- Anticorruption meeting Agenda 11 February 2019
- 13- Anticorruption workshop minutes 13 November
- 14- Areas for coordination or joint programming from JWP exercise 27 October 2016
- 15- Attendee list Pillar 2 meeting March 2017
- 16- Attendees Pillar 1 and 2 11 May 2017
- 17- BOS Lebanon final
- 18- CCA Lebanon internal final May 2016
- 19- Concept agenda for UNCT Lebanon workshop on anticorruption 7 September
- 20- Concept notes PSDP
- 21- Contribution to UNSF Joint workplan final review 20 December 2018
- 22- Copy of GWG workplan October 2017
- 23- Copy of JWP 2018 w replaced indicators
- 24- Copy of Mapping of Data Stats initiatives
- 25- Data and Statistics Working Group terms of reference final 27 April 2017
- 26- Division of Labour SWAP Gender Scorecard IAT 10 February
- 27- Draft UNCT retreat report and action points 2018
- 28- Draft anticorruption meeting plan 29 March
- 29- Draft Gender score card report May 2019

- 30- Draft Lebanon UNCT HRDDP SOP May 2018
- 31- Draft list of strategic anticorruption activities 2019
- 32- Draft minutes of UNCT 22 February
- 33- Draft minutes of UNCT meeting 19 December 2017
- 34- Draft minutes Pillar 1 meeting 29 May
- 35- Draft minutes UNCT 17 May 2018
- 36- Draft Work Plan HRWG 2018
- 37- DSWG and gaps analysis
- 38- DSWG JWP draft input 2017
- 39- DSWG JWP 2018
- 40- DSWG 2019 Joint Work Plan
- 41- Extension of UNSF period to 2021 – for virtual no objection approval 9 May
- 42- Final Draft Monitoring Plan with comments 2
- 43- Finalizing Pillar 1 SDGs alignment Your inputs requested
- 44- Finalizing Pillar 2 SDGs alignment Your inputs requested
- 45- Finalizing Pillar 3 SDGs alignment draft for your review
- 46- Gender Scorecard IAT Lebanon
- 47- Gender Working Group TOR Final 27 April 2017
- 48- GWG JWP final draft 2018
- 49- Human Rights Working Group Annual Work Plan 2017
- 50- Human Rights Working Group TOR Final 27 April 2017
- 51- Humanitarian contingency plan 2017-2018 final 6 September
- 52- Integrated communication campaign 2017-2020
- 53- Invitation to UNSF Pillar 1 Workshop for planning reporting 5 December
- 54- Invitation to UNSF Pillar 2 Workshop for planning reporting 8 December
- 55- Joint annual UNSF workplan 2019 endorsed by UNCT
- 56- Joint communication strategy for Lebanon final 27 April 2017
- 57- Joint UNSF risk management framework
- 58- JWP Final 14 March 2017
- 59- Key anticorruption messages 25 April 2019
- 60- Lebanon economic vision, McKinsey
- 61- Lebanon needs a budget for its people not its ruling class, Jad Chaaban
- 62- Lebanon SDGs VNR 2018
- 63- List of recommendations to UNCT
- 64- List of recommendations to UNCT updated 2
- 65- M&E UNSF resources 2018
- 66- Mapping of data and statistics initiatives update
- 67- Mapping UN activities to National Strategy September 2017 v4
- 68- Matrix of UN border activities
- 69- ME plan 2018-2019 3 October
- 70- Message to Pillar 1 to finalize UNSF-SDGs linkages initiative
- 71- Message to Pillar 2 to finalize UNSF-SDGs linkages initiative
- 72- Message to Pillar 3 to finalize UNSF-SDGs linkages initiative
- 73- Minutes from Meeting on Collaboration on Security Sector Support 9 March 2017
- 74- Minutes from Meeting on Programming for Rule of Law 28 March 2017
- 75- Minutes Pillar 1 29 May 2018

- 76- Minutes Pillar 1 meeting September 2018
- 77- Minutes Pillar 2 meeting 6 June 2018
- 78- Minutes Pillar 2 revised 23 November 2016
- 79- Minutes Pillar 2 meeting 10 April 2017
- 80- Minutes Pillar 2 4 April 2019
- 81- Minutes Pillar 3 meeting 050417
- 82- Minutes Pillar 3 meeting 050618
- 83- Minutes Pillar 3 meeting 050618
- 84- Minutes Pillar 3 meeting 050618
- 85- Minutes Pillar 3 meeting 180517
- 86- Minutes Pillar 3 meeting 180517
- 87- Minutes Pillar 3 meeting UNSF 5 June 2018
- 88- Minutes Pillar meeting UNRCO 20 March 2019
- 89- Minutes on Input to Pillar 3
- 90- Minutes Outcome 3.1 meeting 250417
- 91- New Youth working group Terms of Reference draft 22 May 2018
- 92- OMT annual report 2017 draft 060218
- 93- Overview of UN coordination groups 26 April 2019
- 94- Pillar 1 meeting attendee list November 2016
- 95- Pillar 1 meeting 10 January 2018
- 96- Pillar 2 attendee list November 2016
- 97- Pillar 2 meeting 10 January
- 98- Pillar 2 meeting 15 January 2018
- 99- Pillar 2 meeting 18 January
- 100- Pillar 2 Rule of Law Meeting 28 March
- 101- Pillar 2 meeting 6 June 2018
- 102- Pillar 2 Meeting Minutes Agreed Action Points
- 103- Pillar 2 meeting November 2016
- 104- Pillar 3 draft minutes and presentations
- 105- Pillar 3 meeting - save the date
- 106- Pillar 3 meeting attendees November 2016
- 107- Pillar Group 1 meeting 1 Draft Presentation 17 November 2016
- 108- Pillar Group 1 summary of meeting 23 November 2016
- 109- Pillar Group 2 meeting 1Draft Presentation 17 November 2016
- 110- Pillar Group 2 summary of meeting 23 November 2016
- 111- Pillar Group 3 meeting 1 Draft Presentation 17 November 2016
- 112- Pillar Group 3 summary of meeting 25 November 2016
- 113- Pillar Group 3 meeting 20 March
- 114- Pillar Group 2 meeting Rule of Law Programming 10 April
- 115- PPT UN Taskforce 12 July 2018
- 116- Prep. UNSF Outcome 3.2 (social services) meeting
- 117- Proposal for EU meeting with the UN Pillar 1 Group on peace and security
- 118- PSDP cover letters
- 119- Q1 UNSF resources 2019
- 120- RBM workshop October 2017



- 121- (Re)establishment of the Youth Working Group under the UNSF coordination structure  
ToRs for review by 6 June
- 122- RE Outcome 3.1 Meeting - Friday 12 April
- 123- RE UNCG annual workplan and report
- 124- RE UNSF Reporting Planning Pillar 2 - final inputs by Wednesday 20 December
- 125- RE UNSF Reporting Planning Pillar 2 - update and next steps
- 126- Review of Implementation of the HRDDP Lebanon input cleared 04 June 2018
- 127- Risk register
- 128- SDG fund proposal submitted
- 129- Semiannual UNSF progress review report Aug 2017
- 130- Tackling Lebanon's financial problems? You might be looking the wrong way, Jad Chaaban
- 131- Tentative timeline anticorruption initiatives
- 132- Terms of Reference for gender scorecard October 9
- 133- Terms of Reference for Pillar groups final 27 April 2017
- 134- Terms of Reference Gaps Analysis
- 135- The CEDRE Reform Program Needs a Credible Action Plan Sami Atallah, Georgia Dagher, and Mounir Mahmalat, LCPS
- 136- TOR for PSEA network - Final Draft
- 137- UN Country Team Terms of reference
- 138- UN engagement and support to PVE in Lebanon positions 06 January 2017
- 139- UN engagement and support to PVE in Lebanon positions 1 June 2017
- 140- UN joint initiatives for rule of law 2018 to 2020 revised copy 7 January
- 141- UN Programme for Rule of Law 2017 to 2020
- 142- UN PSDP programme document 181203
- 143- UN report final year 2017
- 144- UN-WB compact Lebanon 23 March 2018
- 145- UNCT Lebanon working group for fraud prevention
- 146- UNCT meeting draft readout 25 October
- 147- UNCT readout 22 March 2018
- 148- UNCT minutes 28 June 2018
- 149- UNCT minutes draft 26 July 2018
- 150- UNCT Final Minutes 23 August 2018
- 151- UNCT retreat report and action points draft for review
- 152- UNCT retreat final summary report and action points 2016
- 153- UNCTOMT meeting draft readout 17 September 2018
- 154- UNFPA Enhancing National Women Machinery Capacities for Advancing Gender Equality
- 155- UNHCR Ad hoc UNCT meeting
- 156- UNSF final 25 Nov 2016
- 157- UNSF LCRP alignments by UNSF outcome November 2017 v2
- 158- UNSF joint workplan 2018 final
- 159- UNSF joint workplan 2018 final endorsed
- 160- UNSF joint workplan 2019 final version to UNCT
- 161- UNSF joint programming initiatives 5 March 2019
- 162- UNSF Pillar 2 meeting Fri 12 January UNDP

- 163- UNSF Pillar 2 Meeting Minutes Proposed Action Points
- 164- UNSF Pillar 3 Outcome 3.1 subgroup 25 April
- 165- UNSF Reporting and Planning Co-Leads communication with Pillar 1
- 166- UNSF Reporting and Planning Co-Leads communication with Pillar 2
- 167- UNSF Reporting Planning Guidance Timeline Responsibilities for Pillar 2
- 168- UNSF Reporting Planning Guidance Timeline Responsibilities for Pillar 3
- 169- UNSF Reporting Planning Next steps for Pillar 2
- 170- UNSF Strategic Note on education 120118
- 171- UNSF Strategic Note on environment 310517
- 172- UNSF Strategic Note on social protection 120118
- 173- UNSF Strategic Note on water and health 060218
- 174- UNSF Strategic Note on youth 120118
- 175- UNSF Youth WG - Work Plan 2019
- 176- UNSF-SDG Linkages Final
- 177- UNWB strategic framework on AC in Lebanon 23 January
- 178- Update on the SDG Task Force
- 179- Work Plan 2019 HRWG
- 180- Youth Working Group Terms of Reference 23 July 2018